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PREFACE
There is no such thing as presuppoeitionlees thinking. I cannot, 
therefor«1 pretend that in this thesis on the Christian interpretation of 
history, I am to be, in such a sense, objective. I write as a professing 
Christian, and further, as one who stands generally on the biblical- 
dialectical rather than the aristotelien-thomist side of the great theolo- 
gical debate.
There are of course kinds and degrees of objectivity and detachment. 
In the natural sciences, the self with its proximate interests and ultimate 
concern is only indirectly involved* This is by no means to say that one 
can work in this area without presuppositions and commitments - presupposi- 
tions and commitments which are themselves incapable of absolute theoretical 
justification. The natural scientist must, for instance, believe in truth 
in somefeense and be persuaded that it can be achieved by scientific method. 
The real problem is not, however, that the self should be involved, but 
rather that it tends to insinuate its interests and conclusions in a way 
that corrupts. This is true even in the natural sciences, though in a 
minimal way. It is even more true of other inquiry, particularly true 
perhaps of the interpretation of history, where the question of meaning as 
such is directly confronted. It is therefore necessary here to be especial- 
ly vigilant against wishful or dogmatic thinking that tries to make reality 
conform to predilection. Yet, it is as right as it is inevitable that the 
self should be concerned, for to understand means to stand under. The 
scientist cannot work by standing outside the spirit and method of science, 
and the philosppher cannot really philosophize non-existentially. It is
not only trite, it is true to say that we are not spectators of life but 
participants in it. Any "objectivity" that rests upon obscuring th*s basic 
fact of the human situation is a dishonest pretension. And it can lead 
only to bad philosophy.
Now the question might be asked; "What, in this existential view, can 
 bad* philosophy mean except that one rejects it! Are not the terms 'good' 
and 'bad 1 relative!" Yes and No. Yes, in the sense that any human judg- 
ment of value it made from a limited perspective and not from the absolute 
perspective of God; truth, beauty and good are always, for me, my truth, 
my beauty, my good* No, in the sense that my judgments about these things 
may, nay must in some way, lay hold on truth, beauty, and the good - on 
God Himself.
My view is, then, in other words, that the historical always contains 
but never exhausts, always expresses but also always contradicts, the divine. 
This conviction is the basic presupposition with which I come to the writing 
of the thesis.
INTRODUCTORY 
Background of the Thesie Subject.
The interpretation of history might be described as a Syriac phenomenon
1 
which attained its highest expression in Christianity. There have, to be
sure, been reflections on life in every civilization, and in so far as the 
meaning of history participates in the meaning of life these reflections 
have concerned history at least implicitly. But for the sense of history 
as such - the notion of a movement of man and society through time, possess- 
ing positive, cumulative, and permanent significance - it is necessary, I 
think, to go to the Syrian-Christian tradition. 
A. Alternatives to the Christian interpretation of history.
Before entering upon the exposition of the Christian interpretation, 
I propose to say a few words by way of characterisation of two alternative 
points of view, one being exemplified in the dominant thought of thejbriental 
and hellenic worlds, the other in liberalism and marxism. I do this because 
the distinctiveness of the Christian perspective will be more apparent 
against such a background.
i* Simple negation of history; oriental _and_ .he_l_lenic_.
2 3
A distinguishing feature of the oriental and the hellenic tradi- 
tion and a common element between them is the depreciation of history. 
Whether we consult the Buddha and his Wheel of Existence and the ascetic 
discipline by which escape is made into the oblivion of Nirvana, or remember 
Plato's cycles, or Horace's verse "Damnosa quid ndn ixnjinuit dies" - Time
1 See John MacMurray's The Glue to Histor.^.
2 i.e., Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism.
3 i.e., Parraenides, Plato, Neo~Platonism and to a lesser degree Aristotle-
1
depreciates the value of the world" -, we find essentially the same spirit. 
This spirit is one of contempt for particularity as against undifferentiated 
being, of change as against permanencej a losing of the finite in the 
infinite, a negation of history.
2. Simple affirmationoof history; liberal and marxian.
In the most complete contrast is the unqualified affirmation of 
history found in liberalism and marxism. These two differ from one another 
in important respects; but they are one in believing that there are not two 
cities but one, and that the city of this world is its own redeemer.
Liberalism believee that history is gradually fulfilling the mean- 
ing of life. The particular form of this confidence has varied. For 
Smith and Bentham it was rooted in a pre-established harmony. For August
Comte it was belief in the possibility of extending the natural goodness of
&
parental affection through rational discipline. For Herbert Spencer
change itself was progress. For Hegel, history was the self-realization
of absolute spirit, "the development of Spirit in Time, as Nature is the
2<
development of the Idea inppace". But whatever the specific form, the con 
viction of a gradual development is the mark of liberalism.
Marxism shares this optimistic mood, but substitutes a revolution- 
ary for a gradualist method. It too believes in enhistorioal fulfilment, 
not however at the end of a gradual process but on the other side of prole- 
tarian revolution. The occasion for revolution is given in the presence of 
evil in history that cannot be extirpated bj^nere persuasion or tinkering. 
The evil is the division of labour with resulting private property and
1 Quoted by J.B. Bury - The Idea _o£JPro^re_B_s_. p. 11-12.
2 See for instance A General Vie'w of Positivism, p. 102. 4,.r»»
3 The Philosophy J>JJgi3torv r '
cleavage of classes. The work of the revolution is to destroy this evil
and to build a new classless society. If one asks why, since Hthe history
1
of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles", the 
coming conflict between the proletariat and the owning class should be the 
final conflict, or why the historical dialectic should stop in a socialist 
organization of society, the answer is no more clear than the answer to the 
question as to why the hegelian dialectic should stop in the Germanic world. 
But be that as it may, the central conviction of marxism is that, on the 
other side of proletarian revolution, there will be perfect justice and peace
In both marxism and liberalism, then, there is a losing of the 
infinite in the finite, an unqualified affirmation of history. 
B. 1. The distinctive Christian perspective.
Christianity both differs from and agrees with these other views. 
It stands between but beyond anjotherworldliness which finds no significance 
in history, and a utopianism which expects the fulfilment of life in history. 
For it holds that history, though a realm of meaning, is not the realm of 
completed meaning, which is only at the end of history in the Kingdom of Sod. 
2« Differin£ vereione within the church.
This notion of history is the distinctive one that is common to 
all Christians- It is when more specific content is introduced that 
differences arise. Here we may distinguish and briefly characterize five 
points of view.
There is the fundamentalist position. It is marked by a literal- 
istio view of biblical revelation, which tends to become an interpretation
1 From the opening of The Communist Manifesto.
4
of past and present and a prophecy of the future (including often the 
imminent end of the world; on the basis of arbitrary manipulation of 
selected passages of scripture. He note it here, not for its theological 
excellence, but because of its acceptance by a considerable portion of the 
untutored mass of the Church.
The liberal point of view stems in part fromjthe pelagian-socinian- 
sanctifieatioaist side of Christian tradition and in part from the mood of 
 orjgress so characteristic of the modern period. It sees man working, 
gradually, through rational freedom by God's grace, to solve his problems, 
and, though it looks beyond history for life's final fulfilment, inclines 
to over-estimate historical possibilities.
Barthianism, on the other hand, under-estimates the possibilities
of history. In reaction against the excessive optimism of liberal
to>
Christianity and its compromises, Earth.thundered that every moment of
existence is a crisis of sinful man before holy 3od, a moment in which 
judgment and mercy, Yes and No, are pronounced. Here Barth is dialectical.
But he is not dialectical when, to the whole natural activity of man and to
1 
the point of contact for God's revelation in Christ, he says simply "Wein!"
Thus Barth, and others in so far ae they agree with him, describe the rela- 
tion of Christianity to culture as one of discontinuity, and think of life's 
fulfilment almost wholly in terras of the Kingdom of Sod beyond history.
Thomism is the synthesis of aristotelianiam and. augustinianism 
wrought by St. Thomas Aquinas. Neo-thoraism is the twentieth century move- 
ment which derives its inspiration and determinative principles from this
1 See Barth*s essay jn Natural Theology.
1
system and seeks to relate it to the contemporary situation. It is 
characterized by its emphasis upon the continuity between the historical and 
the eternal, particularly within the Church, Maritain and Gilson are 
perhaps to-day its chief spokesmen.
Finally there is the dialectical position. A few words concerning 
this term "dialectical" are necessary. In the moat general sense, dialec-
^
tic refers to "pro" and "con" discussion. Hegel (somewhat anticipated by 
Heraclitus) gave it his own meaning. He meant by it a logic of thesis- 
antithesis-synthesis which grasps truth. Kierkegaard regarded this as a
rationalistic pretension, denied the possibility of synthesis, and maintained
is 
that the best man can do/to set up a thesis and an antithesis which do not
contain truth but only point to truth that cannot be contained. This is to 
speak in epistemological terms. Its theological equivalent is a God who is 
both continuous and discontinuous with man. On this view there is a reli- 
gious basis for culture, yet also a point of transcendence from which to 
criticize and set a limit to all claims on behalf of historical achievement 
and cultural forme* It is a Kierkegaardian dialectic, more particularly 
as understood by Reinhold Niebuhr, that I shall have in mind in this thesis 
when the term "dialectic" is used. 
C. Choice of the latter two for treatment.
I have not chosen to expound the fundamentalist position because of 
it» crudity of form. Nor has the liberal interpretation as such interested 
me, primarily because some of its characteristic notes make so little sense
1 We shall henceforth use only the term "thomiem", as Maritain often 
expresses his preference for it.
either in terms of my personal experience of evil or the public manifes- 
tation of it in our time. Yet Barth, who realise* so profoundly the depth 
and final recalcitrance of historical evil, is not compelling to me because 
he denies what seems the obvious creativity of natural man and the signi- 
ficant possibilities of history. Thomism is like liberalism in affirming 
these possibilities and in assuming the historical task,but it has more 
adequate philosophical and theological foundations. Regarding it as the 
most significant alternative to the dialectical position, I have choeen to 
expound it, (in the person of Jacques Maritein). And I treat the dialecti- 
cal view itself (as found in Reinhold Niebuhr) because, as I have already 
suggested, I think it the most valid, the most true to biblical Christianity, 
and the most adequate to the need of our age, which desperately requires 
both a challenging of idolatry and a religious foundation for culture. 
D. The Organization of the Thesis.
I should perhaps conclude these brief introductory words by a statement 
about the organization of "this thesis. Chapters I and II will expound 
the basic principles of Maritain and of Niebuhr, respectively, without 
critical comment. Chapter III will join the debate between them, at the 
same time further elaborating the two views of man and historical movement 
in terms of the problem of the truth, the problem of the good, and the 





1. The "philosophy of History" and the "wisdom of history".
To say, as to. Maritain does, that "it ie properly a prophetic
1 
work to deliver to men the philosophy of their history" , ie to define by
implication at once the character of history and the peculiar nature of the
problem involved in interpreting it. For history, having its source,
> 
meaning, and destiny beyond itself, requires illumination that comes in
some sense from beyond itself, if it is to be understood.
Admitting the necessity of revelation and of the wisdom springing 
from it in the task of historical interpretation is not, however, to deny
therein the role of reason. Indeed, since for Maritain and thomism
2 
"being as such is intelligible 11 (though not wholly so to us and to our
intellect) human reason is able to know proximate causes in the created 
world, where history occurs, and through these proximate causes to mount 
to the First Cause itself. Thus reason is able to lay certain metaphysi- 
cal foundations for historical interpretation.
Thomism is a philosophy of being, and not a philosophy of either 
pure becoming or of pure being. As such it established the very possibi- 
lity of history. Its character as a philospphy of being depends upon 
Aristotle*s solution of the argument between two great thinkers of the 
ancient world. Heraclitus had held that reality is becoming, that change 
alone is real, while Parmenides had taught that only being, - the one,
1 Three Reformers, p. 93
2 Introduction to Philosophy, p. 140.
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eternal and unchangeable, - is real. Aristotle sought to show that both 
are real and to refute the element of error in each of these other views 
by reference to the principle of identity or non-contradiction. Against 
Heraclitus, he maintained that change itself presupposes something which 
changes, that movement presupposes a mover and thus the reality of being. 
Against Parmenddes, he argued that to deny the fact of change is to deny 
the dependability of our senses and intellect which testify to it. In 
thus discerning the reality of both being and change, Aristotle established 
the fundamental ontological presupposition of history. Heraclitian change 
on the other hand precludes it (history), since pure change would lack any 
orientation or principle of unity, while parmenidian being has the same 
consequence, since pure being, lacking nothing, could have no movement.
It is instructive to reflect that while Aristotle did establish
the basic metaphysical foundation of history, he did not develop the notion
1 
or even possess the sense of history itself. This is a striking symbol
of both the possibilities and the limits of reason. It shows what reason 
is capable of; but it also indicates what is beyond its scope and what 
therefore depends upon revelation. Hence not Aristotle, but "St.Augustine 
(basing himself on the Bible) created the philosophy of history, or let us 
say more exactly, (for the illuminations of faith are here necessary) the
1 Did he not think of history as moving cyclicly, and did he not say: 
"What is best for all men and women is not to be born, and after that, 
the chief of other possible goods, but the second of goods, is, having 
been born, to die as soon as may be.,?! Fragment of Eudemian 
Dialogue in Plutarch; Consolatio ad Apollonian. Quoted by NAtifaao in 
Three Reformers, p. 117.
Ill 
1
wisdom of history". And thus, though reason has its part to play, Hit 
is properly a prophetic work to deliver to men the philosophy of their 
history".
First of all, it is necessary to speak further of those metaphy- 
sical principles and presuppositions of history which reason can supply, 
and which we shall be using directly or indirectly throughout the discussion 
of Maritain. We shall now elaborate the thomist idea of being from the 
three standpoints of intelligibility, of existence, and of action.
2. The ontological presuppositions of history; intelligibility.
In considering being from the standpoint of intelligibility, 
Maritain makes a distinction between "ideas (as) the internal likenesses 
of things by which the latter are presented in such a way that we can 
reason about them (and thus acquire knowledge)" and "images" (as) "the
internal likenesses of things by which the latter are presented to us as
2 
our sensations have first made them known to us". And he shows that,
whereas an image of a man is of a particular man, an idea leaves out of 
account the individual characteristics and concerns only man as such - 
non-individual, abstract and universal. Thus we come directly to the 
vital issue of the universal and the particular.
To designate what a thing is primarily as intelligible, Maritain 
uses the term essence (essentia). For, since being as such is intelligible 
and the intellect is modelled on being, it follows that what a thing is 
primarily for the intellect is what is most important about it. Now it
1 The Degrees of Knowledge, p
2 An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 117.
is the essence (of corporeal things, not immaterial things or pure spirits 
which we know by analogy and not in their essence), that the mind
extracts or abstracts from tniggs. This essence is interpreted as univer-
2 
sal in the mind, as individualized in reality. For instance, there is
such a thing as human nature; it exists as a universal in the mind 
abstracted from individual men but is present outside the mind, in reality, 
only in this or that particular man. Such an interpretation of the 
particular and the universal Maritain puts forward as alone able to 
account for our knowledge, given the fact that on the one hand real facts 
are singular and on the other that our ideas can directly present only 
the universal. Nominalism, which affirms that uiiiversals have no exist- 
ence outside the mind, denies the possibility of intellectual knowledge; 
while absolute realism (or idealism), which asserts that the reality of 
things is thought-univereals, denies sensory knowledge and particularity*
In saying that essence exists as a universal only in the 
intellect which extracts or abstracts it from things in which it exists 
individualized (essence as such being neither universal nor individual), 
it is implied of course that there is more in a thing than the intellect 
extracts as a universal* "More" in what sense? Certainly not in the 
sense of more to be known, for being in thomist thought is co-extensive 
with intelligibility. Rather, "more" in the sense of the principles of 
its individuality, which do not enter into the essence. How is this?
Though there are universale which constitute the essence of and
1 Ibid, p* 151%
2 Ibid, p. 120.
the sameness in a multitude of individuals, there are also individuals 
which differ from one another. Thus, for instance, both John and James 
are men, but they differ in various ways. These differences cannot be 
derived from the essence, which, by definition, is the same in each. 
Yet the differences are unalterable and necessary to both. Thus there
are principles of individuality; and according to thomism, they have
/ 
their ground in what Aristotle called first matter, somethingjof itself
wholly indeterminate, but subject to determination by force, a species
of non-being, "something which can enter into the constitution of a being
1 
but is not itself a being".
Now the intellect does not grasp things in their material 
individuality. But it is not by that fact frustrated, for it does 
obtain its formal object, namely, being in its intelligibility, or as 
essence. This means that our knowledge, though imperfect, is still 
trustworthy and useful.
It must be emphasised that the thomist view of the universal 
and the particular includes both in the real. "The truth of the matter 
is..... that there exists in everything an intelligible and immaterial 
element, which Aristotle calls form, in virtue of which it possesses a 
specific nature or essence. But this principle is not separate from 
things; it inheres in them as one of the factors which constitute their
substance. Thus individual objects, though mutable and mortal, are no
2 
longer deceptive shadows; they are reality". When Maritain says this,
1 Ibid, pp.119-121,
2 Ibid, p. 63.
VI
he establishes the basis for the affirmation of the significance of 
history.
3. The ontplogical presuppositions of history; existence.
We move on to a consideration of being in reference to existence.
1 
Maritain defines existence as "act of being". It transcends pure essence,
for it embraces essence as actualised under the conditions of materiality. 
What the intellect apprehends, then, from the standpoint of existence, is 
the indiYidual thing. And the nature or essence of an individual thing, 
considered as the subject of action, is that in virtue of which the thing
has existence. Thus substance is defined as "a thing or nature whose
2
property is to exist by itself and not in another thing". Since sub- 
stance is the principle of a thing*& actuality, it follows that so long as 
a thing exists its substance is immutable.
There are, however, aspects of individual things which change 
and which therefore are not of the substance. Such are called "contin- 
gent accidents". There are other aspects of things which do not change, 
and without which a subject of action cannot exist, - additional beings 
which complete the substance (such as the understanding and the will) - 
but which cannot themselves be substance, as we possess andistinct notion 
of them wholly extrinsic to that of substance (and this would be imposs- 
ible if they were not in fact distinct). These are called "necessary
3 
accidents".
An individual thus possesses what are called substance and
1 Ibid, p. 165.
2 Ibid, p. 16^.
3 See An Introduction to Philosophy, pp.172-173.
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accident. Our intellect is aware that an individual thing exists by 
means of sensations and images. What that is in virtue of which it has 
existence, that is, what is the substance of its individuality, can be 
known directly only by an abstraction from the accidents in a universal 
idea. This is the thomist view. The substantialists on the other hand 
deny the existence of real accidents really distinct from substance, while 
the phenomenalists say there is no substance. But these simply repeat 
in another mode the respective errors, already noted, of Paraenides and 
Heraclitue with regard to being and change, and by the absolute realists 
and nominalists on the problem of universal^. They fail to give an 
adequate answer to the question of how a variable and contingent object 
can give rise to a stable knowledge. Thomism, however, in distinguishing 
between the thing (accidents) with which knowledge is occupied and the 
object (substance) on which it is based is able to answer the question. 
It is so, because contingence depends on the singular and the materially 
individuated, while knowledge is based on universal natures in the 
singular and the contingent.
To recognise that essence is not existence is to grasp the very 
possibility of history: "The world of existence in act and of concrete 
reality is not the world of pure intelligible necessities... Every 
existing thing has its nature or essence, but the existential position 
of things is not implied by their nature... Existent reality is thus
composed of nature and the adventitious: that is why there is a meaning
1 
in time and its duration constitutes (irreversible) history..." Thus
1 The Degrees of Knowledge, pp.33-34.
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the possibility of freedom is implicit in the distinction between essence 
and existence. To say there is natural determinism is only to say, 
therefore, that every cause, taken abstractly in its universal nature, is 
determined to an effect (which can in fact be lacking if the cause is not 
posited or other causes intervene) and not that there is a universal 
determinism of nature. Thus Maritain declares that "the aristotelian- 
thomist conception... by showing how in the course of singular events 
contingence is reconciled with the necessity of scientific laws, enables us 
to see how it is possible to integrate into nature the liberty which is 
proper to spirits, which as such do not make part of the sensible and
corporeal world, but which nevertheless have in that world their field of
1 
action".
4. The ontological presuppositions of history; action.
We shall, finally, consider being under a third aspect, that of 
action.
The first datum of experience about the behaviour of things is that
they change. And since there can be no change without a subject of change,
«
being is prior to change. The basic question is, as Maritain formulates
it, as to how the starting-point of change can become its goal. Bearing 
in mind the principle of identity or non-contradiction, it is evident that 
this question can neither be answered by "being", which is already every- 
thing that it is, nor by "not-being", which is nothing. The answer lies 
rather in the eui generis concept of power of being or potentiality; for,
1 Ibid, p. 38.
 3 Soo noto in An Introduction to Philosophy! pi IQfr
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though the starting-point of change is everything which it is, it is not
yet all it can be. Change therefore is transition from potentiality
1 
to act.
There are two kinds of being: determinate being which is called 
act, and indeterminate being which is called potentiality. God alone is 
the fulness of being or pure act. All else is a compound of act and 
potentiality. The substance of corporeal things is a union of a purely 
potential principle or first matter, and an actual principle or form. 
This union is the subject of substantial changes. Between God or pure
act which is unchanging and the world which is changing, there is an
2 
absolute and infinite difference.
The distinctiveness of the thomist conception of being as act and 
potentiality may once again be suggested by setting it against its alter- 
natives. Exaggerated intellectualism and anti-intellectualism (to use 
Maritain's terms) alike end in confusing God and the world, - the former 
by denying potentiality, the latter by denying act. It is only on the 
basis of the distinction within being between act and potentiality that 
either the majesty of the Creator God, or the derived and developing 
character of the world, man and history, can be understood and defended. 
5. The wisdom of history, and personality.
We have now recorded and elaborated in terms of being considered 
from the three standpoints of intelligibility, existence and action, the 
thomist conviction that the so-called natural reason can discover by an
1 ifcid.See Note in An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 189.
2 For foregoing, see Introduction to Philosophy, pp.131-190.
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analysis of being the possibility and ground of history. When, however,
 <.- >-'(v-
we turn to the question of historical meaning itself, we are told that 
revelation and the wisdom of faith based upon it are indispensable. Why 
is this?
The answer in a word is that "the three divine persons are the
1 
supreme object of man's fruition", and that, as this is a question of
entering into the depths pf God, it is not possible by reason which can 
merely observe the behaviour of Grod as cause of the world, but only by 
His disclosing Himself to us as He is in Himself and in His purpose for 
us, and by raising us to connaturality with Himself, - by sanctifying 
grace and charity here below, by the beatific vision above.
The theoretical principle, which declares that while reason 
can lay the foundation for historical interpretation the structure cannot 
be completed without revelation and faith, seems to Atari tain validated by 
experience as well as logically cogent. For, as we remarked at the 
beginning, it was not in fact Aristotle or any human wisdom but men of 
faith within the biblical tradition who grasped history as such. It was 
they who attained to the full notion of both divine personality and human 
personality. And "history" as Maritain says "is an unimaginable drama 
of the confrontation of free personalities, of the eternal and divine
personality and our own personality... dialogue... always a question of
2
'Thou* and r I' H . While the wisdom of the philosophers raises a moun- 
tain of pride and tends at once to divinize and to degrade the creature,
1 Science and Wisdom, p. 18.
2 Ibid,
forgetting God, the wisdom of faith understands that "our personality 
exists only in humiluty, and is only saved by the divine personality.
For the one is a personality that gives and the other a personality that
1 
is given".
In his view of the Christian interpretation of history, then, 
MariLain has recourse to both the insights of reason and the illumination
of faith, the latter being understood as completing and not contradicting
2 
the former. To the exposition of Maritain's view of history we now
proceed directly.
2 See, for instance, Science and Wisdom, p. 18: "The wisdom of this world 
is overcome, and subordinate to it (the wisdom of grace). And it is a 
conquest without loss or harm, neither for the conqueror nor for the 
conquered, because in ridding itself from the mixtures of syncretism 
and pride, the wisdom of the philosophers recovers its true nature 
and its own truth".
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B. The Doctrine of Man.
If, as Maritain holds, the interaction of the divine and human 
personality is the distinctive reality of history, it must be the princi- 
pal category of historical interpretation. Further, if God, lacking 
nothing in Himself, is not subject to change and development, whereas man 
is, it follows that it is man (man under God) who must be the direct 
object of analysis.
1. Man as a unique Qorporeal substance.
Man, like thv; world he lives in, has his origin in the creative 
fiat of God. His position in creation may be described as midway between 
pure spirits and inanimate bodies and as the highest of corporeal sub- 
stances. All corporeal substances, even inanimate bodies, possess two 
principles,-first matter and form The substantial form of all corporeal 
beings except utan differs from that of pure spirits in that it cannot 
exist epart from matter. Man ie unique in that he is a composite unity 
whose soul can exist apart from matter.
It is due to the presence in human beings of these two aspects - 
body and soul - that the study of men, anthropology, can be neither part 
of the philosophy of sensible nature, nor of metaphysics,, which de&ls 
only with the immaterial. It is a dietinct science, with its own cate- 
gories, which we shell henceforth be using.
2. The individual and the person. We must consider in greater 
detail what has already been suggested regarding man as a unique corpor- 
eal substance, in terms now of the individual and the person.
The term individual is not of itself an anthropological category
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(for thomiem), but is so only in relation to person. As such it points 
to that in man which ie not unique but common to the whole of physical 
creation. Individuality ie based on the necessity of a physical thing's 
having quantity and a position in space distinct froojb.ll other things. 
It has its ontological root in first matter (pure potentiality or an 
avidity for being). Insofar a& man is material individuality he is 
subject to the deterainationof the physical world and like all matter 
tends towards decomposition. Dualistic anthropologies have always 
regarded this as evil, thus tending to negate history. And since 
Maritain himself speaks at times of material individuality as "the
narrowness in being, and the grasping for oneself, which in a body anima-
t 
ted by a spirit, derives from matter", one might imagine he regarded
particularity itself as evil or the source of evil. But he denies this, 
explicitly declaring: "Let us note... that material individuality is not 
something bad in itself. No, it is something good, since it is the very 
con ition of our existence. But it is precisely in relation to person- 




What should predominate is the distinctive aspect of man, personality.
Thie is what we have heretofore called form - that "imprint of metaphysi- 
cal energy which constitutes with matter a substantial unity, and which
3 
determines the latter to be that which it is H . It is that about man
t Scholasticism and Politics, p. 49
J. Ibid, p. 52.
3 Ibid, p. 48.
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which is unique, that by which he subsists and by himself exercieee exist- 
ence. "Man ie an individual who holds himself inland by hie intelligence
and will", a total being which can choose ends and means, and "introduce
2 
a new series of events into the universe by liberty", a being who can give
himself and receive other selves, even God Himself,and, "as His image..*
3 
be elevated by grace to participate in the very life of God". Such is man
in the total reaches of his personal being. 
3. Intelligence, will and freedom.
If, as has been suggested, intelligence and will are the means 
by which man "holds himself in hand" as personality, they obviously 
require special attention*
Both the intellect and the will regard being andkood immaterially, 
but they do so under different aspects. The intellect has for its object
"the simple essence of the good in its intelligible constitution and in
4 
truth". The object of the will, on the other hand, is "the desirable
5 
good itself, taken in its concrete existence". Regarded in themselves
and from the standpoint of pure metaphysical hierarchies, the intellect, 
says Maritain, has primacy over the will, for it is more abstract and 
spiritual. This primacy is also shown by the fact that willing and 
doing proceed from the understanding; and by our relationship with God 
at the last, where we shall see Him in the beatific vision. Thus it is 
that contemplation is metaphysically superior to action. But, regarded
1 The Rights of Man, p. 6.
2 Three Reformers, p.20.
3 Scholasticism and Politics, p. 52
4 Three Reformers,p. 38.
5 Ibid, p. 39.
XV
from the standpoint not of theme elves but in relation to the things which 
they may reach, the will is higher than the intellect. For the will seeks 
its object in its own mode of being and carries us thither, whereas the 
intelligence regards being as it is in the mind, drawing it into iteelf   
Thus it is said to be better to know that which is below man, but to love 
Him who is above. And for this reason there it, a wisdom of the Holy 
Spirit proceeding from the connaturality of charity higher than the dis- 
tinct ideas of philosophic knowledge.
The interrelatedness of the intellect and the will is expressed
1 
in the thomist definition of the will as "intellective appetite".
appetite is rooted in awareness. Sensitive appetite - desire and emotion - 
has its basis in the awareness of the senses, spiritual appetite in the 
intellect. Indeed, spiritual appetite, will, even free will, is declared 
to be a necessity of every intelligent nature vr How is this!
The intellect is ordered on being, and since being and the good 
are co-extensive, the intellect has the notion of what is good as such -
the metaphysically good, that is, that which would, fulfil all the essential
2 
possibilities of our bieng. ... Man, therefore, desires not merely this or
that good known through the senses, but the good as such, even before know- 
ing what it is, where to find it, or whether in fact it can be found (all 
this being disclosed only by revelation). Now that in man which necessari- 
ly desires and affirms the good as such is called the will. Since it 
necessarily desires beatitude, or is determined by absolute good, it follows
1 Scholasticism and Poiitice. p. 96
2
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that toward everything which is not this absalute good, the will is
undetermined and free, - that is, toward everything nsie on earth, even
1 
the divine good. Thus freedom is deduced from necessity.
It thus appears paradoxically enough, that, though man necessarily 
desires the absolute good and loves God even more than himself, in spite of 
himself, he does so by a free option (here below) which he can decline. 
For, so long as man is on earth he does not behold God as the beatitude 
which beatifiesthim, but can only know He is the beatitude which will 
beatify him; hence until man does so behold Him, he is not determined by 
Him as such and can refuse Him. Thus, on earth man freely seeks happiness 
or beatitude. In Heaven he will necessarily possess it, for he will 
behold God face to face. The freedom man has with respect to all things 
which are not beatitude, grasped as actually beatifying and fulfilling 
all desire, Maritain calls freedom of choice. The freedom man will have 
perfectly in Heaven, but toward which he tends even on earth so far as he 
lives under grace, is not freedom of choice, but what Maritain calls 
freedom of spontaneity. By this he means a dependence on the divine 
causality alone whereby through love man rises to the fullness of his 
possibilities as a person. Thus freedom of choice is understood to be not
an end in itself but ordained to a higher freedom. "...One chooses
2 
finally not to have to choose".
While we have thus far noted that man has freedom of choice, we 
have not yet specified in what it actually consists. For Maritain,
1
2 Ibid, p. 112.
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freedom of choice consists "in the mastery by the will of the practical
1 
judgment which determines it". The intellect, which has no direct
object but the universal, is unable in itself to judge of what ought to 
be done in the singular and the contingent (except as it rightly orders 
the inclination of the will). It is the will which determines the 
intellect to past from a speculative to a practical judgment and to act 
specifically and efficaciously. It does this by an act rising from the 
depth of the personality in which the will, so to speak, transfers to the 
particular good the power deriving from its determination to the infinite
good. Maritain points to this act of will and capacity for decision as
2 
bearing "the greatest possible resemblance to the creative fiat" and as
manifesting supremely the divine image in man.
The will} then, freely choosing, determines the intellect in the 
order of efficient causality; but there is a co-determination, for the 
intellect, in supplying the notion of good as such, determines the will 
in the order of formal causality.
We may observe finally here that, whereas the truths of the 
speculative intellect consist in knowing or conforming to the thing, the
truths of the practical intellect consist in guiding or conforming to
3 
the right appetite of the subject. This means that the practical
judgment canonly be valid if the appetite is right; and this depends 
not on knowledge as such but on the rectitude of the moral virtues;
1 Ibid, p. IfiO.
2 Ibid, p. 101.
3 See Three Reformers, p. 41.
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this in turn, however, presupposes knowledge of 
the basic metaphysical and religious truths. Thus the relation between 
the intellect and the will is characterized by distinctness, and yet oy 
interdependence 
4. Good and evil; original, fallen, and redeemed nature.
Are then the intelligence and the will the source of our good 
acts! Yes. We have full initiative and free choice and actually work 
our own good acts. But our role is a secondary one, not the primary one.
That belongs to God alone. "Our good acts are thus wholly from God as
1 
primary cause, and wholly our own as due to a secondary free cause."
This is not qualified by a certain distinction between "operating" and 
"co-operating" grace. In the latter, the soul is moved while at the 
same time moving itself; while in operating grace the soul is moved 
without moving itself, as in the interior act of the will, that is to say, 
the first act to which the soul cannot move itself in virtue of a previous 
act, - for instance when the will begins to will the good, having pre- 
viously willed evil. Yet even here, the soul, in being passive under
2 
the action of God, receives Him in a vital, fr«e and meritorious way.
Thus, both divine creativity and human fr§«dom may be affirmed as fully 
compatible one with the other, mutually producing good acts. 
But what of evil and the source of evilT
According to thomism, "evil is mere privation of being without
3 
positive existence". It is the absence of good: And "we are the
1 Scholasticism and Politics, p. 103.
2 See Prayer an<LIntelli/tence, pp. 53-54, De gre e s o f Knowledge , p. 325.
3 An Introduction_tpPhilosophy, p.20.
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(deficient) prime source"; "he (man) alone is responsible for the evil
2 
that he does". How is it, then, that man, the image of &od and the
secondary source of his good acta, is also the sole cource of evil?
It is by failure of the will. God created man in His own 
image, endowed him with freedom of choice. Freedom of choice in the 
creature presupposes the possibility of wrong choice. And this possi- 
bility became an actuality when Adam chose to eat of the tree. Through 
this original sin man turned from God his final end, deprived himself and
the whole race of those supernatural graces and gratuitous privileges
3 
(innocence, integrity, inerrancy, happiness, corporeal immortality etc. )
which had been given at his creation; and he initiated all that has 
followed by way of disruption and tragedy in the natural order and common
life. By himself henceforth helwas lost and could do nothing to save
4 
himself.
But for all this man's essential nature was not destroyed, or 
even in itself, corrupted. As we have seen, his essential nature con- 
sists in substance (or that in virtue of which he has existence),and in 
accidents distinct from the substance and yet indispensable to his exist- 
ence, principally the intelligence and the will. Since, therefore, his 
e&bential nature is that by which he is what he is, it follows that his 
essential nature is indestructible so long as he exists. However sinful 
and wounded he may be, then, man never ceases to be man. As such he
1 The Degrees of Knowledge, p.373.
2 True Humanism^ p. 4.
3 See The Degree so f Knqwle^d^e, p. 374.
4 See True Humanism, p. 4.
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retains intelligence and free will and the possibility of "natural" 
virtue. That is to say, he is still able to attain some measure of truth; 
to apprehend and create beauty; to develop the virtues of prudence, 
justice, fortitude and temperance, and to organize the community on the 
basis of natural law and civic friendship. For he still acts by divine
grace, - not indeed by that "special presence which is peculiar to a
1 
soul in the state of grace", - that grace of charity by which fallen
nature is raised above itself to connaturality with Sod - but by that
general grace and infinite effect by which "at each instant He endows us
2 
with our action and our being".
Inasmuch, however, as we bear the burden of original sin and 
are dispossessed of the supernatural gifts, salvation is possible only if 
God acts in some further way. This He does, or will do, with the full 
power of primary initiative, but not by violating the free choice of man. 
By baptism and sanctifying grace, Grod, if man answer to His call, washes
away original sin and restores the supernatural graces. Mortal sin,
3 
"the ultimate constituting form of sin" through which man turns from God
the final end and loses sanctifying grace, is overcome by infused charity,
4 
"the ultimate constituting form of justification" which enables man
efficaciously to choose Grod as his final end once more. For Maritain, 
it is wrong to say that salvation is attained by faith alone and by an 
external imputation which does not justify from within. Faith is vital
1 The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 317.
2 Ibid.ja.3if.
3 Three Reformers, p. 203.
4 Ibid, 9.
XXI
to salvation, and is the root and foundation of charity itself; but it
must be completed by charity. For, Hit is the sanctifying grace of
1 
infused charity which makes man just in the eyes of God w . Thus, while
faith is the presupposition of saving grace, good works follow as its 
product and manifestation.
It is important to note carefully what baptidm and sanctifying 
grace do and do not do, according to Maritain. They wash away original 
sin and restore man to connaturality with God. They depot efface concu- 
piscence or preclude venial sin. Concupiscence, which means theologically
Ma general propensity to an uncontrolled love of oneself or perishable
2 
things", is the seat of sin and it is in us even after baptism as the
material element and permanent wound of original sin. Venial sins are 
weaknesses and impurities which do not cause man to lose grace. Thus, 
for thomism and Catholic theology, sin in the justified man "can be dead
as to its ultimate formality (intrinsic) while continuing alive as to all
3 
the material of itejdispositions and its tendencies". For Luther, on
the other hand, who did not distinguish between mortal and venial sin, 
the justified man (allegedly) is formally at once just and sinful.
Maritain calls this "a fantasy of incurably nominalist theology which
4
places opposites side by side". "If% he says, "the fire of concupi- 
scence is still there, necessitating constant vigilance, yet is man no
5 
longer rent. He is surrendered to the spirit of God".
1 Ibid, p. 201.
2 Ibid, p. 172.
3 Ibid, p. 203.
4 Ibid, o. 177.
5 Ibid,
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The keystone, then, of the thomiet view of nature and grace,
as indeed of the whole structure of thought, is "continuity"  Not only
1
does "nature only act from the beginning as grace has raised it up"* 
But fallen nature itself is continuous with redeeming grace: "The order
of charity does not destroy, it confirms it; but it perfects it
2 
eupernaturally".
5. Man in society, in the temporal and spiritual orders.
What has hitherto been implicit throughout the exposition of 
Mar i tain 1 s doctrine of man concerning his social nature must now be made 
explicit.
It will be recalled that a distinction is made, within the 
unity which is man, between the individual and the person, - the individual 
having its ontological root in first matter, the person in form or spirit- 
ual soul.
Now it is by virtue of the individuality of man that he is re- 
lated to society as a part to a whole and that his individual good is 
subordinate to the social good. The classic text of this thomist prin-
ciple is this: "Every individual person bears the same relationship to
3 
the whole community as the part bears to the whole".
Yet, by virtue of his personality man transcends society, being 
so orientated to the absolute and eternal that society must minister to 
his end. Thus St. Thomas^says: "Man is not ordered to political society
1 The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 317.
2 Three Reformers, p
3 Sumrna Theologica, 11 - 11, 64, 8.
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by reason of himself as a whole and by reason of all that is in him".
Man requires and tends towards social life both by his needs, - 
material and epiritual - and by his openness to the communications of 
intelligence and love. He is by nature, as Aristotle puts it, a politi- 
cal animal and ordained to society.
What, then, is the right relation between man and society? 
It consists in a good at once personal and common. Such a good is not a 
mere aggregation of individual goods, for this would dissolve society. 
But neither is it a good proper to a whole which sacrifices the parts to 
itself, for this would vitiate the dignity of the person. "The common 
good is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons;
it is communion in the good life; it is therefore common to the whole
2 
and to the parts... 1* It is the task of society to work for this
common good.
There is a certain inevitable tension of conflict between man 
and society, since the^mutually surpass each other. It is true that 
man partly realises his possibilities by subordinating himself to the 
group. But it is also true that the group tends to diminish the person 
so far as it considers him merely a part. Now this tension cannot be 
suppressed, and it can only be surmounted by heroic efforts. These 
efforts require action on both the temporal and the spiritual plane.
The distinction between the temporal and the spiritual is a 
Christian one, or at least it is a distinction which reaches its ultimate 
form in the gospel word: "Render unto Caesar the things that are
1 Ibid, 1 - 11, 21, 4-3.
2 Scholasticism and Politics, pp.55-56.
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Gasear*e, and unto God the things that are God's". This distinction is 
not a separation in which there aretwo absolute and final ends unrelated
to one another, thereby permitting man, "by a sagacious division of labour
1 
unforeseen by the gospel, to serve both God and Mammon". Nor does it
imply that the temporal has a value merely instrumental to the spiritual. 
Rather, the temporal has its own value; thus the state is supreme in its 
ownjorder. At the same time, the temporal is subordinate to the spiritual 
and elevated by the grace of the church. The temporal good is conceived 
as the fullest possible realization of common human possibilities, under
the conditions of earth, (related analogically to given epochs and histori-
2 
cal configurations). It implies a struggle for conditions of freedom:
freedom from natural, material miseries and historical servitude® freedom 
for a fully human life on earth, open to eternal ends. The spiritual 
good, on the other hand, concerns the order of faith, the gifts of grace,
and eternal life,which is participation in the life of God - begun on
3 
earth and consummated in Heaven. While this order can only be known
through revelation and experienced by grace, the good of the temporal order 
can be known by reason and sought for by all who accept the natural law -
Hthe ensemble of things to do and not to do which follow... in a necessary
4 
fashion from the simple fact that man is man".
Thus, man lives in both the temporal order and the spiritual 
order (whether or not given individuals recognize the spiritual order as
1 Maritainjused the phrase in a lecture at Columbia.
2 See True Humanism, p. 103, or p. 132.
3 See, for instance, Scholasticism and Politics, p. 179} True Humanism 
p. 90.
4 The Rights of Man, p. 36.
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such, inasmuch as they are persons who surpass society in the fullest 
reaches of the spirit). The tension between these two orders is at once 
a "necessary condition of the growth of history, the essential condition
whereby the history of time enigmatically prepares its final consummation
1 
in the Kingdom of God", and a problem in the life of man in society to be
surmounted by heroic efforts in both orders.
We may conclude this discussion of man and society in the 
temporal and the spiritual orders (as well as the exposition of Maritain's 
doctrine of man) by quoting the succinct summary of the point which 
Maritain himself gives:
"Thus the person craves society, and tends always to surpass 
"it, until man enters at last into the society of God. From the 
"family group (more basic because it has to do with the perpetuation 
"of the species) the person moves on to civil or political society 
"(more exalted because it has to do with rational life itself), and 
"in the midst of civil society it feels the need for more limited 
"groups or fellowships which will contribute to its intellectual and 
"moral life. These the person enters of its own free choice, and 
"they assist in its efforts to ascend to a higher level, yet they 
"will end by cramping it, and it will feel obliged to pass beyond 
"them. Above the plane of civil society the person crosses the 
"threshold of a kingdom which is not of this world and enters a 
"supra-national, supra-racial, supra-temporal society which is called 
"the church, and which has to do with the things which are not 
"Caesar's".
1 True Humanism, p. 103.
2 The Rights of Man, p. 14.
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C. The Movement of History*
Thus far, in expounding Maritain, we have set down the metaphysical 
presuppositions of history and the doctrine of man. We have yet to 
consider the movement of history. The question, put in secular terms, 
is as to whether there is such a thing as progress, and, if so, in what 
it consists; stated religiously, the question is as to what part is 
played in the realization of the Kingdom of God by the temporal and the 
spiritual orders of earth.
1. Historical movement, according to Maritain, is precipitated 
by man and society in their nutually surpassing character* There is 
thus provoked a double motion - horizontal and vertical. The vertical 
motion arises from man's free transcendence of all social process and his 
tengent to eternity. On earth it is expressed ultimately in the life of 
the communion of saints, thoughkt also indirectly affects the life of 
civilization* The horizontal movement arises both from man's transcen- 
dence of society and his ordination to it. It represents a triumph 
over the inertia of nature by the exertions of mind and spirit directed 
to the task of the earthly good of man. It is the horizontal movement 
of history with which the idea of progress is concerned.
Maritain himself uses the term "progress". But, just as he 
sharply distinguishes his view from that of those in the church (as he 
thinks, contrary to Christianity) and those outside it, who deny progress, 
so also he means by progress something very different from the automatic 
progress and simple triumph o£ good over evil formulated, for instance,
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by Condorcet. Although he asserts a metaphysical difference between 
man and the rest of nature, Maritain nevertheless believes that the life 
of human societies must be understood as a continuation of natural 
evolutionary process. He speaks of humanity from this point of view as
being still very young, and declares that to take the longer perspective
1 
is "to recover faith in the forward march of our species". The forward
aiarch of our species consists, more specifically, in "the ascent of
2 
conscience... where (this) is linked to a superior level of organization",
both moral and technical: technical in a self-explanatory sense, moral
in the sense both of greater unity and of a tendency toward "the law of
3 
personality to prevail over the law of individuality". But^whereas
the natural evolutionary process was automatic up to the appearance of 
free spirit in man, it is no longer so in the life ot human society. 
The liberty of man sets him apart from all other creatures, and makes 
him responsible for his own progress. Thus does "evolution, by means
of the very mechanism of its synthesis, take unto itself ever-increasing
4 
liberty".
The fundamental question for man is, therefore, how to use his 
liberty to secure greater unity of society and higher quality in its 
structure. There are two mtthodb. The "coercive" method is inferior 
and canjonly achieve superficial results, though it mu&t be acknowledged 
that a certain measure of coercion will always be necessary in society.
1 The RightsL._qf_Man, p. 20.
2 Ibid.fc.20-
3 Scholasticism and Politics, p. 59.
4 Quoted from Reflections sur le Progress, by Pierre T. de Ghardin, 
in The Rights of Man, p. 20.
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The "biological" or "internal" method alone ia able to attain a real 
unification of society on higher levels. And this is finally possible
only as a result of a "common attraction exerted by a transcendent center
1 
which is Spirit and Person". Thus, the horizontal movement of history
and the idea of progress itself cannot be discussed adequately without 
reference to the vertical movement and Him toward whom it tends. It is 
for this reason that Maritain speaks for the most part in his treatment 
in explicitly religious terms.
2. There are three such basic terms in Maritain 1 s view of history: 
the world, the church, and the Kingdom of God. In order to understand 
him, then, we must see what each of these means and what its relation is 
to the other.
a. The world. The world signifies the temporal order, the earthly 
enterprise of man withlits own proper and infravalent end. Its life is 
rooted in nature, but it is as such a. work of reason and virtue - particu- 
larly the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and 
temperance. Its law is the natural law and its scope is the natural 
catholicity implicit in reason. Yet nature and reason are not self- 
sufficient or rightly self-enclosed, but open to the special dispensations 
of grace and subordinate to the spiritual order and eternal destiny of man. 
This is the essential nature of the world.
But its essential nature is gravely wounded by sin. It is thus 
not merely the perishable character of all those deeds that pertain to time 
which is the problem of life here below. "The world belongs to the devil
1 The Rights .of._Man, p. 21.
XXIX
1
by right of conquest 1*. History as the temporal order ie not the Kingdom 
of God, and it is not the field for the realization of the Kingdom of God.
It is rather that realm where man, or at least the Christian, is obliged
2 
to seek "the refraction... of the exigencies of the Gospel" in the
contingencies of given epochs. Such refraction will, by definition, 
always be partial and fragmentary, limited by finiteness and by various 
impurities. Thus the movement in the world is a double one; it is at 
once toward the Kingdom of God... and the Kingdom of reprobation, to be
overcome at the last by a "substantial mutation described as the conflag-
3 
ration or bruning up of the world". There is therefore "progress" in
the temporal order in the sense of the development of both the wheat and 
the tares until the last day.
k- The church. The church is at once the spiritual order of
4 
earth and "the chrysalis of the Kingdom". Though it ie in the world it
is not of it or of the order of time. Its end is not an earthly good as 
such, but eternal life, and its scope is the supernatural catholicity of 
grace. The devil and the prince of this world has no part in the church. 
At the same time, there are limiting human elements connected with her 
historical life, and it is therefore necessary to discriminate. "The 
order of sacred activities will also, in the degree to which it is a 
collective human form, be deficient here on earth. It is insofar as it 
is specially assisted by the spirit of God, and in the degree to which it
1 True Humanism, p.101.
2 Ibid, p. loi.
3 Ibid, p. 95.
4 Ibid.
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is governed by itt> invisible Head (and by its visible head when he acts
1 
by right of his universal authority), that the church is indefectible".
This distinction between the church as such and the church in 
its dimension as an historical collective form may be stated also in terms 
of church and Kingdom of God. If the Kingdom is a city in the new world 
of the resurrection of the dead where God is King, then it is distinguished 
from the church in time and in history. But if this distinction be pressed 
too far, says Maritain, it conflicts with the direct establishment of the 
church by Jesus. Thus, although in the sense stated, there is a distinc- 
tion, the church is also already the Kingdom. It is the crucified and
wandering Kingdom, existent and living, but veiled, not yet in full
2 
realization.
The movement within the spiritual order then, though tending 
toward that which is more than it, that is, the eschatological kingdom, 
does not tend toward that which is essentially different from it. While 
the temporal order or civilization leads toward two opposing final ends, 
the spiritual order of the church moves toward no other than the final 
realization of the Kingdom of God.
c. The kingdom. Having spoken of the world and the church and their 
relation to one another and to the Kingdom, it is necessary, finally, to 
speak more explicitly of the Kingdom itself, and of the whole matter of the 
consummation of history and of the fulfilment of life.
"The Kingdom of God constitutes the ultimate end prepared for by
1 Ibid, p. 118.
2 See True Humanism. p . 94.
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1
the movement of all history and in which it concludes".
It may be helpful, in clarifying Maritain's conception of the 
positive preparation of the Kingdom in history, to set his views against 
the major alternatives (as he sees them).
There is first of all a view of pure discontinuity, wherein 
history is sealed off, so to speak, and left to its own sinful self- 
destruction. The world is here conceived in a "satanocratic w way. This 
Maritain holds to be the Reformation and Barthian position.
There is, second, a perfectionist interpretation which in its 
two different ways, - theophanic and mystical, theocratic and political, - 
regards the world as a place to realise the Kingdom too simply. In its 
theophanic form, expressed principally in the Eastern Church, the world is 
delivered individually in a my§tical way which lifts the faithful beyond 
natural conditions, while the collective forms of life are ignored. In 
its theocratic form, men hope too much in the world and in what they can do 
with it. Secular history in itself is considered holy, the church and the 
world occupying ana disputing the same ground. Such a view was the tempta- 
tion, if not the actual sin, of medieval Christendom in its feeling about 
the sacrum imperium; and it has since had/steady extension and seculariza- 
tion in the West, culminating in the hegelian notion of the nation of race
and the marxist idea of class. It is as Utopian in/principle as theY e
Reformation is defeatist.
The third is similar to the second, but a still further develop-
1 True Humanism, p. 94.
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ment of the theocratic principle to the point of complete secularization. 
History, for Augusts Gomte, is already the Kingdom - the Kingdom of pure 
humanity. Thus no preparation is necessary or possible.
For Maritain, the positive preparation for the Kingdom of God 
includes a temporal and a spiritual aspect. Society has possibilities 
of justice, of a realization of the Gospel under earthly conditions, 
Insofar as these are realised there is a movement toward the Kingdom of 
God. Insofar as they are not realised, there is a mvement toward the 
kingdom of perdition, and the necessity} as we have seen, of a substantial 
mutation in the passage from history to the Kingdom of God. Thus Maritain
speaks of "that essential discontinuity which is marked by the final
1 
mutation".
The possibilities of spiritual life are higher than those of 
temporal life. For individuals may be elevated by grace in the fthurch. 
beyond mere natural virtue, the highest term of the temporal order, even 
becoming one spirit with God. This consummation of history is reached in
mystical experience of oneness with God (meaning not entitative but
2 
intentional oneness). It is the work of grace through charity.
H ... It is understood that so long as love has not achieved the trans- 
formation of the soul, the latter lives within its own life, without doubt 
progressively made divine, but nevertheless always enclosed in its created 
limits, always finite ... but when the transformation of Idve is accom-
1 Ibid, p. 104.
2 See The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 453.
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plished.., the uncreated Love has become, as the immaterial being of
1 
love, the principle and agent of all that the soul does..." Thus, if
the final fulfilment of life (in the beatific vision) is only possible 
in the Kingdom beyond history, yet the essential fulfilment of life is
possible here below, within the souls of the faithful; and such discon-
a& there i&, therefore,
tinuity/is merely quantitative and not qualitative*
3. Conclusion.
This question of continuity - discontinuity between man and 
God, between history and the Kingdom of God, is obviously decisive for 
any interpretation of history. And we shall be returning to it later on. 
Meanwhile, we must proceed to the general exposition of what we consider 
to be the second of the great alternative interpretations of history 
within Christendom, namely the dialectical position - as it is contained 
in the thought of Reiuhold Niebuhr.





When D.R. Davits remarks, in his little book, Reinhold Niebuhr,
1 
Prophet from America, that Henry Ford was one of the greatest influences
in forming Niebuhr*s thought, he is being more than merely facetious. 
Indeed, he is pointing to that which is most characteristic in Niebuhr, 
namely, the fact that he is not primarily a thinker speculating about 
history, but a man living and acting inkt who must think to find hie way. 
No doubt all thinkers are, so to speak, organic to time and place, and 
much more conditioned by historical circumstance than most would care to 
admit or perhaps even realize. Niebuhr is not only aware of the import- 
ance of particularity in thought, but is actually unusually sensitive to 
it* Thus it is that, whereas, in treating Maritain, we set out from an 
exposition of thomist ontological principles as presuppositions of 
history, we must with Niebuhr begin with a few biographical notes.
1. It will no doubt be impossible to give an adequate^account of 
those external influences and internal dispositions which have been 
decisive for Niebuhr's thought. Yet enough can be gleaned from his 
writings, supplemented by knowledge gained through personal contact, to 
lay hold on much that is illuminating and indispensable to an understand- 
ing of him.
a. Home
The first book which Niebuhr published, Does Civilization need
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Religion?, is dedicated to hie parents. In it he speaks of hie lather, 
an immigrant German Evangelical pastor in the American mid-west, as teach- 
ing him that "the critical faculty can be united with a reverent spirit". 
Here is contained that affirmation end yet challenge, that Yes and No., 
which has been the distinguishing feature of Niebuhr'e attitude from the 
beginning, though to be sure the "dialectic" hat. been sharpened with the 
years. This critical but reverend spirit instilled b.y a paetor-father, 
we note as the first point of departure for Reinholc Niebuhr. 
b. Training.
The second is hie "liberal" theological training. Taking a 
degree at Yale in 1915, he completed hit formal education at the time of 
the flood-tide of theological liberalism (neither the first world war nor 
Karl Berth having yet undermined it). What might be described as both its 
virtues and ite vices made important impressions on Niebuhr't mind. On 
the one hand, there were the open-minded spirit of inquiry and the sense 
of human creativity and historical dynamism. These depdsits of the 
Renaissance spirit, re-inforced by the activism of American life, left a 
permanent mark on him more crucial than even he perhaps has usually 
suggested - describing his experience and expounding his thought in the 
context of an American church which he felt was submerged in the errors 
of liberalism - but nevertheless true, as realized well, for instance, by 
continental theologians of "neo-orthodox" persuasion. On the other hand, 
that the influence of liberalism constrained him to re-fashion or even
1 Dedication of Does Civilization Need Religion:
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forsake in some sense certain aspects of the Christian faith is suggested 
by his description of his attitude, at the time of his ordination, toward,
for instance, the statement in the Apostles' Greed.-- "I believe in the
1 2
resurrection of the body", or toward the sacraments. And if this part
of the liberal influence has not been permanent in positive terms, it was 
yet most assuredly present in his early theological years, and it remains 
to this day as something to be continually refuted. 
c. Intellectual jpil^r image .
Finally here, we may note a gradual emergence in Niebuhr of the 
sense that the facts of life, as he was experiencing and observing them in 
personal, industrial, and international terms, did not fit the optimistic 
view of man and history which liberalism held, and that consequently a 
general theological reformulation was necessary. We must trace this 
"gradual emergence".
When, during the years of his Detroit pastorate, Niebuhr wrote
3 
in his diary - HI am not really & Christian", and spoke of "the es&en-
4 
tially unethical nature" of modern society, he revealed that acute
awareness of the contradictions in human life which has ever character- 
ized him. The crucial question for him has always been: HOVELS evil to 
be understood, and its expressions abolished or mitigated! His answer 
was first liberal, finally biblical.
If the liberal spirit saw the source of evil &*> residing in 
man's misuse of freedom, it did not locate the reason for that misuse
1 See opening pages of Beyond Tragedy.
2 See Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic, p. 6.
3 Ibid, p. 166.
4 Ibid, Prefe.ee and Apology, p. viii.
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very deeply in the human spirit. The characteristic tendency was to 
suggest that whet was wrong, was ignorance end/or simply a lack of 
sufficient moral striving. Niebuhr himself, as a liberal, saw evil es 
the result of lack of effort, and correctable by effort. Men /Jiow c/i& 
love i& the law of life. What is needed is a much more serious effort 
to realize its demands and implications, individually and collectively. 
As late as 1926, he %a& able to record: "'Maybe it (Jesus' ethic)
would work if we tried it hard enough 1 ... that may be the answer to the
1 
whole question".
Trying Jesue* ethic "hard enough" involved, he sew clearly, 
ascetiem in some sense; for he recognized both the validity of the 
absolute law of love and the need to act in a world which did not live 
by it. His first impulse was toward a witness to the absolute demand
of the Gospel in & disavowal of concrete responsibilities. With res-
2 
pect to war, he declared, for instance: M I am done with this business".
But he was aware too that it was not so easy to be "done" with war or 
any institutional evil, criticising the religious idealists opposed to 
unethical nations lism for being "not sufficiently aware of the intimate
and organic relation between the imperialism of nations and the whole
3 
tendency of avarice which characterizes Western life". And if his
subsequent decision ha^ been a rejection of a vocational asceticism 
for himtelf and as a general Christian policy, it is neither because 
he ceased to believe in the absolute quality of the lav; of love nor
1 Ibid, p. 122.
2 Ibid, p. 147.
3 Does Civilization Need Religion!, p. 230.
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because he had decided that asceticism could be dispensed with. On the 
contrary, he has held that lev e as the law of life accepted by Christians
demands both a lay ascetici&m with as full a measure of independence from
1 
the world a& possible consistent with doing one's duty in it, and a
vocational asceticism which disavowsuxesponsibilities end risks martyrdom -
an asceticism without which the church and the world might "live under the
2 
illusion that the Kingdom of Caesar i& the Kingdom of Christ". He
rejected vocational ascetici&m for himself and as a general Christian 
policy, because, as he declared about the timejof leaving the pastorate,
pure ascetici&m is "useless for any direction of the affairs of a larger
3 
society"  But he knew that he was compromising with evil in so doing,
even as he would have be«n in choosing the opposite coursef. In an evil 
world, therefore, there is need for both Christian asceticism and Christian 
responsibility. There is compromise and evil either way, with no 
possibility of guiltlessness and purity. One must simply choose which 
compromise to make.
Thus did Niebuhr discover the impossibility of fulfilling Jesus' 
ethic by "trying hard enough". And in so doing he learned that the 
problem of tvil is deeperjthan he had thought. His realization of this 
undoubtedly marks the turning point in his journey from theological 
liberalism to a more biblical form of Christianity.
It will perhaps be well to describe this transition more fully 
from a slightly different perspective. Although in his first systematic
1 Ibid, p. 229.
2 Beyond Tragedy, p. 286.
3 Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic, p. 196.
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work, ho still stand skithin the so-called liberal point of view, he 
conducts a polemic against a certain type of theological liberalism, 
specifically that kind of liberalism, rooted in a philosophical monism, 
which lacks adequate ethical tension.
Religion is the meeting ground of metaphysics and ethics* It 
declares that human values are rooted in cosmic facts. The best poss- 
ible religion therefore is one which provides, on the one hand, the most 
adequate defense of the proposition that human values are related to 
cosmic facts, and, on the other, the greatest dynamic to the task of 
realizing values in individual and corporate life. There are, however, 
possibilities of conflict between the metaphysical and the ethical tasks 
in religion. A major one arises, according to Niebuhr, when religion 
becomes related to a philosophical monism which confuses God and the 
world. From such a confusion two attitudes toward life may be derived. 
One is a resignation to the natural order as already divine and immutable - 
characteristic of the East; the other is an overestimation of human 
capacities and the possibilities of hietoru- on the whole the character- 
istic Western error despite the presence of dualism in Christianity. 
The ethical consequence of such optimism is clear: complacency, too 
easy acceptance of things as they are, and/or too facile hopes about their 
improvement. The untenability of such theological liberalism rooted in 
philosophical monism has been shown and the problem of contemporary 
religion has been set, he thought, by the advance of science which raises
1 Does Civilization Need Religion!
questions about the purposefulness of creation and by the tragic realities
moJce 
of industri&l and international life which smvfc for scepticism about human
nature and historical progress.
"The only fruitful alternative to a monism and pantheism which 
identifies God and the world, the real and the ideal," wrote Niebuhr, "is
a dualism which maintains some kind of distinction between them and does
1 
not lose one in the other". Such a dualism is not, to be sure, without
difficulties, for it is impossible to have two absolutes, and it is 
unsatisfactory to be unable to say precisely how good and evil, (God and 
the devil) are related to one another. Yet if the choice is between a 
metaphysically inadequate dualism which is ethically potent, and a meta- 
physically adequate monism which is ethically impotent, he preferred the 
former. "In a sense religion is always forced to choose between an 
adequate metaphysics and an adequate ethics. This is not to say that 
the two interests are incompatible but that they are not identical. 
When there is a conflict between them it is better to leave the metaphy- 
sical problem with some loose ends than to develop a religion which is
2 
inimical to moral values.**
But the choice is not between a metaphysically inadequate dualism 
that is morally potent and a metaphysically adequate monism that is morally 
impotent, for the reason that monism itself is not only morally impotent 
but metaphysically inadequate as well. It may be logically more consis- 
tent, but it does not, as Niebuhr eays any interpretation must, do justice
1 Does Civilization Need Religion?, p. 194
2 Ibid, p. 214.
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1 
"to the fact that creative purpose meets resistance in the world".
"It may be impossible to do full justice to the two typee of facts by any
set of symbols or definitions; but life gives the lie to any attempt by
2 
which one is explained completely in terms of the other." Dualism, on
the other hand, does do justice to these two bete of facts, and thus is 
tenable, though not altogether satisfactory logically.
Niebuhr, in elaborating a metaphysical dualism, declares that 
"if a place for freedom and purpose in the cosmic order, however condi- 
tioned, is discovered, the essential affirmation of religious faith is
3 
metaphysically verified**, and he asserts that science makes such a
discovery. He argues with Whit©head that, since the dynamic nature of
*
reality does not account for the various forms in which it ex made con- 
crete, the transcendence and immanence of God is true, and human values 
have thus a basis in reality. At the same time, God is not merely con- 
tinuous or identical with the world. "His unchangeableness is his self- 
consistency in relation to all change; but this does not justify the 
deterministic conclusion of a 'complete self-consistency of the temporal
world 1 . The reality of God and the reality of evil as a positive force
4 
are thus both accepted", by scientific philosophy as well as by religion,
Although it is held that science supplies the ground of a meta- 
physically validated religion, the scope of religion is not confined to
5 
the bare concepts of science. There are'bverbeliefs" which, though
1 Ibid, p. 200.
2 Ibid, p. 210.
3 Ibid, p. 212.
4 Ibid, pp. 212-213.
5 Ibid, pf.
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inadequate, are nevertheless as justified as they are inevitable in religious 
devotion. These overbeliefs consist essentially in the personalization of 
the forces of good and evil and involve a dramatic rather than philosophic 
elaboration of the conflict between them. Their justification is, meta- 
physically, that they are based upon facts and experiences which, though 
perhaps inconsistent with each other, are nevertheless equally true. Their
ethical justification is that they further heighten the tension between good
1 
and evil and enhance spiritual energy.
 
Thus does Niebuhr, becoming more and more aware of the conflicts 
which reality reveals as well as harmonies, move toward a qualified 
liberalism.
There is yet a final stage in this movement from a liberal to a 
more biblical interpretation of the Christian faith - that of his criticism
of philosophical dualism itself, concluding in a rejection of "cheap
2 
credulities for majestic myth".
The five or six years that elapsed between the publication of 
Does Civilization Need Religion?, and Moral Man and Immoral Society and 
Reflections on the End of an Era, saw at least three vital changes for 
Niebuhr. One was leaving the Detroit pa&torate to teach at Union Theolo- 
gical Seminary in New York. A second was his marriage. The third was a 
decisive change in theological position. It hae often been thought that 
the theological change came a& the result of reading Kierkegaard and 
contemporary continental theologians influenced by him. Undoubtedly this
1 See llaid, pp. 214-215.
2 Prof. Niebuhr use^t this phrase in a Union Lecture.
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influence upon Niebuhr has been considerable. But, on the basic of what 
the writer know s of him, it should rather be said that he moved as it were 
under his own power and through his own experience, being confirmed but 
not determined by other thinkers and working out his ownpistinctive point 
of view.
At any rate, it is apparent, in his Leaves..., and in Does 
Civilization Need Re^i^ion. that he was profoundly dissatisfied with 
both the metaphysical foundations and the ethical f'ruitb of modern 
liberal religion. His polemic against theology based on philosophical 
monism is one phase and expression of this dissatisfaction. In its place 
he suggests a point of view rooted in a metaphysical dualism. But one 
senses a certain dissatisfaction with this alternative, even as he puts it 
forward, in passages which stress the perils to vital religion in too 
close association with any philosophical system; for reason is seen as 
at least a partial and potential threat to the imaginative discernment 
and moral fervor of the more elemental religious expressions. He speaks, 
for instance, of "the naturally incompatible factors of reason and imagi- 
nation, of intelligence and moral dynamic (as) really the crux of the
1 
religious and moral problem..." And at one point he goes so far as to
note hov/ religious myth reconciles these and does "justice to the con-
2 
flicts which the world reveals as obviously as its unities". Yet he
draws back here from a really serious consideration of a mythical dualism 
and, as we have seen, attempts to construct a rational, philosophical
1 Does Civilization Need Religion?, p.222.
2 Ibid, p. 195.
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dualism. By the time of the publication of Reflections on the ltod__of_an 
Era, however, Niebuhr was explicitly attacking rational dualisms, be they 
Platonic or Sarthian, on the ground that they find no meaning in nature and
history and "relegate perfection completely to another world of pure
1 
transcendence". His whole criticism of too rational systems, be they
monistic or dualistic, (this criticism being the negative precondition of 
his acceptance of religious myth) is given succinct expression in a later 
passage from Beyond Tragedy :
HA rational or logical expression of the relationship (between 
"time and eternity) invariably leads either to a pantheism in which 
"God and the world ar4 identified, and the temporal in its totality 
"is equated with the ^erenal; or in which they are separated so 
"that a false supernaturalism emerges, a dualism between an eternal 
"and spiritual world without content and a temporal world without 
"meaning or significance."*
Myth, particularly biblical myth, does not fall into these errors. He 
declares that
"myth alone is capable of picturing the world as a realm of 
"coherence and meaning without defying the facts of incoherence. 
"Its world is coherent because all facts in it are related to the 
"same central source of meaning; but it is not rationally 
"coherent because myth is not under the abortive necessity of 
"relating all things to each other in terras of immediate rational "unity." 3
And again:
"For only in the concepts of religious myth can an imperfect 
"world mirror the purposes of a divine creator and can the mercy 
"of God make the fact of sin and imperfection bearable without 
"destroying moral responsibility for the evil of imperfection or 
"obscuring its realities in actual history". 4
In summary, then, we may say that we have traced the develop-
1 Reflections on the End of an Era, p. 286.
2 Beyond Tragedy, p. 4.
3 An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 26.
4 Reflections on the Snd of an Era, p»~292.
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ment of Niebuhr's thought, proceeding as it does from an awareness of 
contradictions in the soul and in the world to principles of interpreta- 
tion embraced to make sense of them. As he measured these contradictions 
in ever greater depth, he moved from a theological liberalism based on a 
philosophical monism, to a qualified liberalism rooted in a philosophical 
dualism, to a point of view,whose determinative feature is an acceptance 
of biblical revelation and myth.
2. A Religion of Revelation and Myth.
There are three ways, broadly speaking, of interpreting the 
relation between God and the world. One asserts an identity, or at least 
a simple continuity, between them. This is the monistic view. The 
second, or dualistic interpretation, separates the two in a simple discon- 
tinuity. The third affirms that God is in the world and yet not in it, 
both expressed through it and contradicted by it.. This is the dialec- 
tical view, classically present in the Bible and maintained by Reinhold 
Niebuhr.
a. Revelation.
Tp say that God ie intimately related to the world and expressed
i
. t
through it is to imply, speaking metaphysically, that the world is good.
Its epistemological meaning is that God can be known by an analysis of
1 
the world, "being understood by the things that are made", as Si. raul
puts j.t. In this sense Christianity has a natural theology and agrees 
with naturalistic religions, Or so, at least, a dialectical understand- 
in& of Christianity, such ab one ^ets in Reinhold Niebuhr, would maintain.
1 Romans I; 19-20.
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But to hold, on the other hand, that God is beyond the world and even 
contradicted by it, is to suggest the contrast between Christianity and 
all naturalistic religions and to declare at once the tran&cendence of 
God and the impossibility of knowing Him adequately by a mere analysis 
of the world.
"The real situation is that he (man) has an environment of 
"eternity which he cannot know through the mere logical ordering 
"of his experience... Man is thus in the position of being unable 
"to comprehend ... without a principle of comprehension which is 
"beyond his comprehension."-1-
This dimension of depth in human experience is appreciated by mystic reli- 
gions, and the fact constitutes both their superiority to naturalistic 
religions and their point of agreement with Christianity. But here the 
similarity between mysticism and Christianity ends. For the mystic
"defines" God in terms of negation, deprecates the created world, provi-
2 
sionally deifies but finally loses man in an undifferentiated eternity:
while Christianity holds fast to the distinction between Creator and crea- 
ture but expects "the unveiling of the eternal purpose and will, under- 
lying the flux and evanescence of the world..., and the expectation is
I 3
fulfilled in/personal and social-historical experience." Thus Christian- 
ity is a religionlo f revelation.
The character of revelation, as Niebuhr understands it, is 
double - that is, personal and social-historical. He asserts:
"Without the public and historical revelation the private 
"experience of God would remain poorly defined and subject to 
"caprice. WiJhout the private experience of God. the public and 
"historical revelation would not i^ain credence."
1 Vol. 1 of Gifford Lectures, p. 125.
2 The Nature and Destiny^on_Man» Vol. I, see pp. 135-136.
3 Ibid, p. 126.
4 Ibid, p. 127.
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The content of private or general revelation is (l) the sense 
of reverence for majesty and dependence upon it (2) the sense of obli^a- 
tion to the source of being and meaning and of unworthinese before it 
(3) the longing for forgiveness and fulfillment. The first, that is, 
the sense of reverential dependence, becomes, when transferred from the 
inner to the outer world, the sense that the whole creation depends upon 
the same source of being. This is also in the category of general 
revelation. However, the second and third, which concern the sense of 
God*s judgment and mercy, take on a more definite meaning only as the 
private, general sense of them ie augmented by public-historical events, 
apprehended by Christians in the context of the onjgoing experience of 
the Hebrew-Christian community. The private sense of obligation and 
unworthiness is supported by the prophetic interpretation of events 
which declares that (l) Israel has a covenant with God which it has re- 
fused in its pride to keep, thus bringing His condemnation upon itself 
(2) that the whole experience of men in history, being within God's 
purpose, is marked by divine judgment insofar as there is human rebellion. 
And likewise, the private longing for forgiveness and fulfillment is 
finally answered in the Incarnation and Cross, the content of which is a 
forgiveness which does not abrogate judgment and a judgment which does 
not cancel forgiveness.
Thus, we may say that God, being beyond the world, can be known 
adequately only as He discloses Himself and His purpose to us, which He 




But, if the dialectical view of God's relation to the world 
necessitates, from the divine side, revelation, it involves, from the 
human side, according to Niebuhr, mythical rather than rational descrip- 
tion of what God says. A religious statement, by definition, cannot be 
literally true, for the categories of the finite are not able to embrace
the infinite, to say nothing of the fact that human sin corrupts the
to take events from the surface of nature and history
vision of Sod. It is therefore necessary/to suggest and describe the 
dimension of depth that lies beyond.
"The transcendent source of the meaning of life is thus in such 
"relation to all temporal process that a profound insight into any 
"process or reality yields a glimpse of the reality which is beyond 
"it. This reality can be revealed and expressed only in mythical 
"terms. These mythical terms are the most adequate symbols of 
"reality because the reality which we experience constantly suggests 
"a center and source of reality, which not only transcends immediate 
"experience but also finally transcends the rational forms and 
"categories by which we seek to apprehend and describe it."l
The Christian affirmations may, therefore, be held to be essentially though
not literally true. Such an epistemology of myth - rooted in the pauline
2 
word, "We see through a glass, darkly" - stands between and beyond more
rational theories. Against valuational theologies which tend to ascribe 
absolute significance to finite ideas, it asserts that we see "darkly", 
or do not see. Against mystical theologies which fear to name God lest 
He be blasphemed, it asserts that we do see. It is only by mythical 
methods that we avoid the alternative of either a naively anthropomorphic 
God or a God defined as final nothingness. It is also, Niebuhr thinks,
1 The Nature of Religious Experience, - Chapter "The Truth of Myths"-p.l35
2 See Niebuhr 1 s sermon on this text in Discerning the Signs of the Times.
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by a mythical interpretation of the Christian faith alone that the 
church can engage without capitulating to the modern mind. For, on 
the one hand, the essential truth of the basic tenets of faith can be 
maintained and, as he thinks, shown to be more adequate than their more 
"secular 1* alternatives, while on the other hand, obscurantism is avoided. 
Thus, a mythical epistemology, both in principle and in strategy, is 
regarded as fundamental.
Christianity is, then, a "natural religion", but distinctively 
a religion of revelation and myth. God speaks to Christians, as to all 
men, in general revelation. But Christians apprehend what He says, 
particularly concerning judgment and mercy, in the context of a given 
community, whose decisive historical experiences become the vehicle of 
further, special revelation. Thus the transcendent God reveals Himself 
in increasingly specific terms as Creator, Judge, and Redeemer, and His 
revelation is apprehended and described in the three great biblical 
myths of creation, fall, and redemption. These myths are the content 
of Christian theology and the context of its understanding of man. To 
Niebuhr'e interpretation o£ this doctrine, central in the interpretation 
of history, we now turn.
B. The Doctrine of Uan
1* "Man does not know himself truly except as he knows himself
1 
confronted by God. 1*
The Christian view of man as confronted by God is, according to 
Niebuhr, distinctive inibhe way it interprets and relates to each other 
three aspects of human existence. It emphasizes man's statusvas 'imago 
dei 1 , yet underlines his finite and limited character on every level - 
historical and traashistorieal. It maintains that man's refusal to 
accept his creatureliness under God is his sin, And it asserts that the 
solution of man's predicament lies £nGod's grace as pardon and as power. 
Ye must examine each of these more fully, beginning with the doctrine of 
man as a creature in the image of Sod.
2* Man as creature in the ima^e of God.
"The essential nature of man*, writes Niebuhr, "contains two 
elements; and there are correspondingly two elements in the original 
perfection of man. To the essential nature of man belong, on the one 
hand, all his natural endowments, and determinations, his physical and 
social impulses, his sexual and racial differentiations, in short his
character as a creature embedded in the natural order. On the other hand,
hit essential nature al&ojincludes the freedom of his spirit, 2
(his transcendence over natural process and finally his self-transcendence". 
Since the Godof Christian faith is the source of both vitality and form, 
man - created by God in His own image * is not only godlike in the highest
1 The Mature and Destiny of Man. Vol. I, p. 131.
2 Vol. I, p. 2707
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reaches of his spirituality but in the lowliness of his physical existence 
as well. Yet, the heart of the imago dei is, as it were, in that dimen- 
sion of spirit which transcends both natural process and ratiocination, 
and finally itself in such a way that it looks beyond itself to God and can 
find rest only in Him, - that is, in an obedience of will to the perfection 
of love.
It is impossible, Niebuhr holds» to understand man or to des- 
cribe him correctly without making a distinctionjbetween his essential nature 
and the virtue of conformity to it. For, while nothing can destroy the
essential nature of man, his freedom allows him possibilities of refusing
1 
te act according to it -possibilities which have of course been actualized
in sin.
This crucial distinction between essential nature and the virtue 
of conformity to it, and the problem of the relation between them, has been 
confused, he thinks, by a literalistic interpretation of the myth of the 
fall which placed the perfection from which man fell in a particular 
historical period. Such an interpretation encouraged Catholic thought to 
divide man into Mpura naturalia1* not affected by, and a "donum supernatur- 
al*" wholly lost in, the fall, while it inclined Protestantism toward the 
doctrine of total depravity. Thus, "the paradox that sin is a corruption
of man's true essence but not its destruction, is obscured in both
2 
Catholic and Protestant thought".
1 Vol. I, p. 269
2 Vol. I, p. 269
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Nevertheless, the double category of "pura naturalia" and "donum 
supernatural*", has itself a certain tentative validity if properly inter* 
preted. For/it points to the requirements of man as embedded in the natural 
order, and, as free spirit. The traditional natural law corresponds to 
the first, reughly, and defines the proper organization of man's natural 
functions; while the so-called "theological virtues" of faith, hope and 
love define his more ultimate requirements as free spirit. Since, however, 
the freedom of man reaches down and qualifies the lowest aspects of natural 
function, and since man remains a creature in the highest reaches of the 
spirit, this cannot be pressed, as Catholic thought presses it, to mean that 
one couldbe wholly lost and the other purely retained. The real situation 
is that both "natural justice" and "original righteousness" are indissolubly 
linked in the unity of existence, and that both are corrupted, yet present 
with us as requirements of our essential being.
Niebuhr, having rejected a particular period as the locus of man's 
original perfection, admitted its corruption, but asserted its continued 
presence with us, asks where it resides, and what its content is.
It resides, he says, in the self in the moment of transcending 
itself and judging its own concretion of will. "It is in this moment of
self-transcendence that the consciousness and memory of original perfee-
1
tion arise." In this moment it knwa itself to be one finite creature among 
many, and to be guilty of pretending to be more than this ̂tine re fore, also 
of injustice to its fellows. Original righteousness is thus present with 
sinful man as his uneasy conscience, as the law which he knows he ought to
1 Ibid, p. 2f7.
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lire by but does not live by. That he has such an uneasy conscience is 
the proof that he possesses no unspoiled goodness; but it also proves 
that he is not totally depraved, and gives the point of contact fer Sod's 
further activity with him, particularly for the revelation and redemption 
in Christ*
Now this self which in the moment of transcendence is the locus 
of original righteousness is not the universal and intelligible self as 
opposed to the empirical self,as idealism maintains, for this denies the 
unity of the self* There is only one self, which is both the agent of 
action and the judge of its actions; a self that acts sinfully but also 
knows its higher possibilities, which it apprehends as law. "The 'I', 
which from the perspective of self*transcendence, regards the sinful self 
not as self but as 'sin*, is the same 'I' which from the perspective of
sinful action regards the transcendent possibilities of the self as not the
1 
self but as law. It is the same self*.."
In placing original righteousness in a moment of the self which 
transcends history (as action) though not outside the self in history (as 
judge of action) Niebuhr believes he is in agreement with the symbolic 
interpretation of the myth of the fall. For there are no recorded perfect 
actions of Adam. Perfection before the fall may, then, be said to be, in 
a sense, perfection before the act (if act be understood to include all 
thoughts and movements of the anxious self in its world). Thus, "the 
"original righteousness of man stands, as it were, outside history. Yet
1 Ibid, pp. 278*279.
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it is in the man who ie in history, and when sin comas it actually 
borrows fro* this original righteousness. For the pretension of sin is 
that its act is not in history but an aot ef impartiality, a deed of 
eternity."
We have, then, noted that the locus of original righteousness 
in sinful man is his uneasy conscifuft*. What, it must be asked, is the 
eontent of original righteousness! It is faith, hope, and love - or 
harmony between man and God, within man himself, and between himself and 
his fellows. Faith is a requirement of man in his freedom because, 
without it, he seeks for an impossible self-sufficiency. Hope is a 
particular form of faith which deals with the future. Love is both a 
derivative of faith and an independent requirement of human freedom
fllAA P/*/fH6</
because, without it, asm- disregards the toast fact that Gfred is the eentre 
of being and meaning, tries abortively tojorganice life by and around 
himself, and degrades other persons to the level of objects.
This content of original righteousness is, as has been said, 
present to sinful man as "law". Its relation to man in his sin is 
indicated, Niebuhr points out, in the "Thou shalt" of the basic command- 
ment. For, if life conformed to it, the "Thou shalt* would be pointless. 
On the other hand, if there were not still in sinful man the sense of a 
more ultimate perfection the "Thou shalt" would be completely irrelevant 
and unintelligible to him. In Joins' parable of the rich young man 
three aspects of man's condition are made very obvious. The rich young
1 Ibid, p. 280.
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man, in coming to Jesus, reveals his awareness of a more ultimate per- 
feetien than he has or can attain in obedienoe to historic laws* But in 
asking his question, he shows also that he dees not know the full charac- 
ter of this more ultimate perfection. Yet, by his refusal to fellow 
Jesus' advice, he makes plain that he is not ready to follow it even when 
it is known. All this, Niebuhr says, is symbolic of the continuity yet 
contradiotionbetween man's essential nature and his sinful condition - a 
condition insoluble from the standpoint of human striving* but net* as 
Jesus suggests, impossible with God.
Thus, faith, hope, and love are not simple actualities of human 
existence; yet they remain relevant as the very law of our self-trans- 
cendent freedom and the ultimate requirement of man as the image of God.
But the Christian faith claims not only that man is the image 
of God. It asserts also that he is a creature, derived and dependent 
and weak, subject to change and decay, and unable by his own power to 
complete the meaning of his life. It must be emphasised that this 
creatureliness of man refers not merely tofeiiB bodily partieularly but 
to his mind as well, for it too is limited in scope and power* It is 
man in his unity that Christianity declares to be finite and involved in 
all the relativities and contingencies of nature - history.
Christianity does not believe, however, that finite limitation 
and particularity is evil» or even, of itself, a source of evil. It 
does contrast the limitedness and mortality of man with the majesty of 
Gos in terms which suggest a provisional pathos; but it also* and more
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basically, Maintains that the facts of human finitude must be accepted 
with reverence. For it sees each part ef life as related to the whole 
plan of God and rooted in Him as the center ef meaning. The presence of 
a certain ambiguity in the thought of St. Paul on the relation of mortality 
to sin, and of platonic influences in some Christian theologians, does not, 
Niebuhr thinks, finally qualify the basic biblical-Christian feeling that 
life in all its mortal facts is essentially good because a good God made 
it-
Along with the faith which accepts life's fragmentary character 
as belonging to the purpose of God goes the hope that God will fulfill 
its meaning. Man is a creature who has indeterminate possibilities. 
These possibilities are so great, according to Christianity, that they 
cannot be realised in nature-history, not by any exertion of man himself* 
The conception of the fulfillment of life in Christianity is, of course, 
generally consonant withtts whole interpretation of human existence. It 
affirms that life, if it is to be fulfilled, must be fulfilled by the 
power ef God, and as it essentially is - a unity of body and spirit. 
The richness and variety of natural-historical existence is declared to 
be taken up into the Kingdom of God: "I believe in the resurrection of 
the body.*.** Man ia not therefore mind which sloughs off the body and 
translates itself into the divine abyss; he is a finite creature - a 
unity of body and spirit - resurrected by the power of God. Thus, man, 
though theimage of God, is a creature, and remains so - both discreet and 
limited - on every level of the fulfillment of life - in history and 
beyond history in the Kingdom of God.
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9* Man as creature and sinner.
If Christianity is marked by a lefty sense of man's stature as 
imago dei and a creature of indeterminate possibilities, it is also 
oharaoteriied by the grave view it takes of the sinful situation in which 
he stands, says Niebuhr. In setting forth his interpretation of this 
aspect of the Christian view of van, we shall be concerned with (a) the 
occasion for sin, (b) the source of sin, (o) the nature of sin.
(a) The occasion (though not the oause) of man's sin is given in
the ambiguity of his finiteness and freedom* "He stands at the juncture
1 
of nature and spirit." He is a created thing, whose life is rooted in
nature and limited by it, yet transcends nature and in a sense dominates 
it* He can see farther than he can reach, envisaging but not comprising 
the whole. Thus, man knows both limits and possibilities. He is there- 
fore anxious*
Anxiety has a double character. It is "the basis of all 
creativity as well as the precondition of sin... Man may, in the same
moment, be anxious because he has not become what he ought to be; and
2 
also anxious lest he should cease to be at all". The firat aspect of
anxiety is creative, the latter invariably destructive; though it ie 
important to note that, in life, the two cannot be simply separated* 
The ideal pesibility ie that perfect trust in God will assure the crea- 
tive expression of anxiety and obviate its sinful possibilities. But 
this ideal possibility ie not realised. Man sins.
1 Ibid, p. 11.
2 Ibid, pp. 183-184.
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(b) What is the eouroe of hie sinning! A defect of the will. 
"Sin is te be regarded as neither a necessity of men's nature nor yet a 
pure caprice of hie will* It proceeds rather from a defect of the will 
for which reason it is not wholly deliberate: but since it i§ the will
in which the defect is found and the will presupposes freedom the defect
1 
cannot be attributed te a taint in man's nature."
The paradox of finiteness and freedom, with its inevitable 
concomitant anxiety, does not lead to sinjunlese it is falsely interpreted   
that is te say, unlcee sin is presupposed* Yet the situation is always 
falsely interpreted, man so choosing. This means that sin cannot be 
derived from or explained by anything other than itself* Te say man 
"chooses 1* is not, however, to imply a too simple freedom. He is free in 
the sense that he is responsible for his evil. But he is not free, ic as 
much eb he is the victim of "original sin". This so-called original sin 
is not merely the inertia of nature, nor the limitation of mind, nor 
historical-environmental conditioning. It is rather a bias toward evil 
within the will itself. Since, as has been said, it is within the will 
and the will presupposes freedom, man is responsible for it. Having
sinned, there is in man a bias toward evil. Man need never have sinned,
Z 
however, except he had already sinned. "Sin posits itself". Behind
actual sin is original sin; and behind original sin is the tempting 
serpent - instrument of the devil, an angel not created evil but himself 
fallen. Thus, "One may.*, go farther back than human history and still
1 Ibid, p. 242.
2 Kierkegaard, Begriff der An£6t» p. 57, quoted by Niebuhr in Human
Neture, p. 252.
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not escape the paradoxical conclusion that the situation of finitenees and 
freedom would not lead to sin if sin were not already introduced into the 
situation. Nor can the temptation whichjis compounded of the situation of 
finitenese and freedom) plus the fact of sin, be regarded as leading
necessarily to sin in the life of each individual, if again sin is not
1 
first presupposed in that life 1*.
To believe that man is a victim of original sin yet responsible 
for his evil iSf as we shall have occasion to observe at greater length 
later, to posbess a principle of interpretation for man and history that 
has very great implications. More specifically, it is to be able to re- 
fute or correct on theone hand, too simply deterministic doctrines - be 
they psychological, sociological, or theological - which contradict the 
interior knowledge which the soul has of its unnecessary involvement in 
evil, and on the other, too simply moralistic, pelagian notions which 
overestimate human freedom and thus tend toward self-righteousness and 
cruelty. The situation is that there is more freedom and therefore 
responsibility for both actual sin and original sia than the determinists 
realize, while there is lees freedom in actual sin and more responsibility 
in original sin than voluntarittic moralism suggests* For sinjls never 
merely the inevitable result of factors beyond our control, nor yet sheer, 
deliberate preference of evil to good, as such,
We noted a moment ago that the "logic of sin" is that it posits 
itself, that it leads from actual tt original sin, and from original sin
1 Human Nature, p» 254
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to the tempting serpent as tht instrument of the devil. This means that 
there is* according to Christianity* a force of evil in the world prior 
te and greater than nan which hae disrupted the harmony of creation. 
But this devil is himself an angel endowed with freedom who has fallen -
. i 1 '
like nan, unnecessarily. Thue even the devil is not an adequate explana- 
tion of evil. For beyend him also, sin posits itself. Indeed, its 
logic leads straight to the nature of God; and this is precisely where 
philosophies more consistent than Christianity carry it, says Niebuhr. 
What then is the justification, if any, for stopping short* and refusing 
te draw the final implication of the logic of sin? It is the double
«
empirical one that we know we ourselves, and not God, to be responsible 
for the evil we do, and, that evil, though indubitably real, is parasitic 
upon the more primary reality - good* If, then, there is a certain con- 
flict between the empirical and the logical, "Loyalty to all the facts
may require a provisional defiance of logic, lest complexity in the facts
1 
of experience be denied for the sake of a premature logical consistencyM .
Thus, the source of sin and evil lies not in God, but in a 
defect of will within His creatures.
(c) Having spoken thue far of the occasion for sin, and of the 
source of sin, we have now to consider its nature*
To assert, as Christianity does, that the devil operates by 
God's permission if not in His commission is, at once, to admit that evil 
is finally nysterious - that we do not fully know the relation between the 
principle of good and the principle of evil in the world-, and, to declare
1 Ibid, p. 263.
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that evil is parasitic or dependent on the good, whichie the essential 
reality:
"The idea in Hebraic mythology that Satan is both a rebel 
"against God and yet ultimately under His dominion, expresses the 
"paradoxical fact that on the one hand evil is something more than 
Nthe absence of order, and on the other hand that it depends upon 
"order. There can be disorder only in an integrated world; and 
"the forces of disorder cen be effective only if they are themselves 
"ordered and integrated... Evil, in other words, is not the 
"absence but the corruption of good".
This interpretation of the relation of evil to good, of the devil to Gad, 
permits, Miebuhr thinks, a more profound measuring of the depth of sin 
and force of evil in hi&tory than is possible on any other presupposition. 
It is in fact an absolutely indispensable insight for understanding 
history*s negative and destructive potencies, (even ae the doctrine of 
God's grace as power and as pardon is essential to understanding history's 
creativity and life's fulfillment)* Man could not reject God except for 
the fact that he is created in the image of God. This is the anthropo- 
logical meaning of the truth that evil is a parasitic corruption of the 
good.
But we must go on to define sin more specifically. Sin is a 
disruption which beth depends upon and violates the harmony of creation, - 
by unbelief, pride, sensuality, and injustice. Unbelief disrupts the 
harmony of the world by denying God His position as the center and source 
of meaning, and ie the primal sin. Pride, its obverse side, puts the 
self in the central position. Sensuality disrupts life's harmony by 
identifying the self unduly with some impulse within the self. And
1 The Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 73.
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injustice, flowing from all the others, is the violation of harmony 
wherein the self t claiming too much for itself» gives less consideration 
to other selves than is their rightful due.
Hanks limited yet limitless, both bound and free. He is there- 
fore anxious. In his anxiety he is aware of his weakness and the necessi- 
ty for completion* Perfect trust in God presupposed, he would pursue the 
true and qualitative development of life by subjecting himself in obed- 
ience to the will of God. But unbelief or sin presupposed, he seeks its 
quantitative development wherein he tries "to transmute his finiteness
into infinity, his weakness into strength, his dependence into independ-
1 
ence". The self deposes God and establishes itself. Tet the self
whichjit established is less than the true self; and by giving life a 
false center it destroys the real possibilities for itself and others, 
thereby increasing the insecurity which it had sought to overcome. Thus 
man may seek to escape the ambiguity of finiteness and freedom by hiding 
his finiteness in a proud assertion of freedom. Sometimes, however, he 
seeks to escape the paradox in the opposite way, that is, by trying to
sink his freedom in finiteness or a natural vitality. This is sensuality.
2 
"When anxiety has conceived it brings forth pride and sensuality^") both
of which, for other life, always mean injustice.
Niebuhr distinguishes three types of pride - pride of power, 
pride of knowledge, pride of virtue. In each, pride can take the form 
either of a complacency which implicitly denies the contingent and dependent
Human Nature,
1 Jrtfa?rf,~p7 ZOJ.«
2 Ibid, p. 186.
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character of human existence or else of seeking security ana independence 
te overcome recognised weakness. The first form is more often associated 
with those who are in some sense established, while the second is usually 
found among those who are not. Both ferns of pride are present in each 
group however; it is only a question as to which form is primary* In the 
quest for power* knowledge* or virtue, there is always an element of com- 
placent satisfaction with what is possessed, yet a darkly conscious aware- 
ness of its. insufficiency which inclines the sinning self towards atrate- 
gies which week to ote cure its known conditioned character; always a 
seeming unawareness of the weakness of man, the limitations of his know- 
ledge, the relativity of his values, yet also the sense of these things 
and a pretentious attempt to deny them. The final dimension of this 
pretention is reached when moraljpride issues in religious pride and 
explicitly claims divine sanction for human standards* This is what 
Niebuhr has in mind when he says that religion is not an inherently vir- 
tuous thing but only the final battleground between the self and God. 
And it is this which shows most profoundly the relevance of "a religion 
of revelation in which a fcoly and loving God is revealed te man as the 
source and end of all finite existence against whom the self-will of man 
is shatteredpjid his pride abased"* Yet even the recognition of such a 
truth in principle must not be assumed to guarantee that in fact man will 
not make his very humility the instrument of a new pride. On the con- 
trary he always does so. Such is the height of human freedom and the 
extent of the possibilities of its misuse.
1 Ibid, p. 201.
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Now it is because nan is proud that he ie dishonest* Since he 
is quite obviously not the center of the world, he must deceive both him- 
self and others if he is to make the presumption plausible. Dishonesty
ie 
conforms to the general character of sin, for it/neither mere ignorance,
nor conscious, deliberate lie. It ie rather a strategy te convince the 
self against the self in the process of which others must be deceived and 
enlisted to undergird the self in believing what it cannot quite believe* 
being itself the author of the deception.
We have now noted various types, forms, and aspects of pride* 
We have, however, not yet spoken of the vital distinction between indivi- 
dual and collective pride in Niebuhr's view of man's sin. While it is 
true, strictly speaking, that only individuals are moral agents, it is 
necessary to make this distinction (l) because group organs of will 
achieve a certain authority over individuals (2) because price is greater 
in the collective self.
Collective egotism is most consistently expressed through the 
state. For it has specific symbols of its reality which prompt a 
reverence for majesty and instruments of power that enable it to enforce 
its claims. The collective will of the state thus stands over and makes 
demands upon individual men. But it is also true that individuals, as 
members of the group, make more pretentious claims for themselves. They 
"join to set up a god whom each then severally and tacitly identifies
with himself, to swell the chorus of praise which each then severally
1 
and tacitly arrogates to himself". gince the nation really does
1 The Ethics of Power* Philip Leon, p. 140, quoted by Niebuhr in 
Human Nature, p. 212.
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transcend the individual in majesty, the self in its extension as the 
state can make claims of unqualified or exoessive significance more 
plausibly than is possible for the mere individual self. Furthermore, 
"in every human group there is less reason to guide and to check impulse,
less capacity for self-transcendence , less ability to comprehend the need
1 
of others" than is found in individuals in their more personal relations.
Thus it is that pride, arrogance, hypocrisy, and ruthless injustice are 
greater within and among human collectives.
The only possible basis of understanding and opposing this 
idolatrous pride of collective man is, Niebuhr declares, "a religion of 
revelation in the faith of which a voice is heard from beyond all human
majesties and a divine power is revealed in comparison with which 'the
2 
nations are as a drop in the bucket* ". This remains true despite the
fact that a church which witnesses to such a faith has proved over again 
to be quite capable of making idolatrous claims for itself.
Whether considered as individuals or as groups, men are in- 
volved in the sin ef olaiming for themselves more than is justified in 
view of their being only parts of the total human family under God. But 
they are not, says Niebuhr, equally so. And it is as necessary to 
recognise differences in degrees of sin and guilt as it is to know that 
"all men have sinned and come short of the glory of God".
Nowhere is the necessity of a dialectical logic more pointed 
than on this issue. For an undue or wrongly understood emphasis upon
1 Introduction to Moral Man and Immoral Society, £>*/
2 Human Nature, pp. 214- 216.
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the sinfulness of all men can be made to obscure these distinctions ia 
history, however relative , upon which the difference between a tolerable 
and an intolerable situation may depend. It is just such a mistake that 
both orthodox protestantism and moralistic perfectionism have made with 
catastrophic consequences* Yet the opposite attitude - often connected 
natural law theories , in Catholicism and elsewhere ,-of forgetting the 
equality of sin in an overemphasis upon the relative distinctions of 
history and of insinuating religious absolutes into contingent judgments - 
is also grievously wrong.
Sin is rebellion against God. Guilt is the objective histori- 
cal consequence of sin. All men are in rebellion against God and in 
that sense equally sinful and may be equally guilty. But all men are 
not equally rebellious and sinful, and therefore there may be and often 
is inequality of guilt. Biblical-Christian faith insists that it is 
those who are most tempted, by favoured position, who are most sinful and 
most guilty.
MWherever the fortunes of nature, the accidents of history or 
"even the virtues of the possessors of power, endow an individual 
"or a group with power, social prestige, intellectual eminence or 
"moral approval above their fellows, there an ego is allowed to 
"expand. It expands both vertically and horizontally. Its 
"vertical expansion, its pride, involves it in sin against God. 
"Its horizontal expansion involves it in an unjust effort to gain 
"security and prestige at the expense of its fellows". 1
This^why prophetic strictures fall with special force upon the mighty and 
noble, the wise and the righteous. Thus the Bible knows how to distin- 
guish the inequalities of sin and guilt, even as it also insists that
1 Ibid, p.
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"all men have sinned".
Finally, in this discussion of Niebuhr's view of man as creature 
and sinner, we must speak of sensuality and of its relation to pride.
"When anxiety has conceived it brings forth pride and sensuality". 
Man nay, as has been pointed out, try te esoape the contradiction of 
finiteness and freedom by denying his finiteness in pride. He may, 
alternatively, seek to esoape it by losing himself and his freedom in some 
aspect of finiteness, which is sensuality.
"If selfishness is the destruction of life's harmony by the 
"self's attempt te center life around itself, sensuality would seem 
"to be the destruction of harmony within the self, by the self*s 
"undue identification with and devotion to particular impulses and 
"desires within itself". 1
Niebuhr shares the pauline-augustinian visw that sensuality is 
derived from the more basic sin of pride. The self, having lost the true 
center of its life beyond itself is unable to maintain unity within itself, 
and thus looses control of its natural impulses. But is sensuality 
another kind of self-love, or is it an attempt te escape itself! It is 
both. It is at once an enhancement of the ego and a flight from it 
This is true of all sensuality; it is particularly vivid in sexual 
sensuality, where nature's alteregoism provides a powerful basis which 
spirit uses both te assert the self and to escape the self in the deifica- 
tion of another. But the final degree of sensuality is reached when the 
self finds the deification of self and the deification of another intoler- 
able, and tries to escape the tension and contradiction of life by a
1 Ibid, p. 228.
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plunge into nothingness. Thus, Nsensuality is always: (l) an extension 
of self-love to the point where it defeats its own ends: (2) an effort 
to escape the prison house of self by finding a god in a process or person
outside the self: (3) finally an effort to escape from the confusion
1 
which sia has created into some fora of subconscious existence".
The Christian view of nan, then, is that he is a sinner in 
contradiction to his own essential nature. The strategies of sin are 
therefore abortive, and add to the contingency of nature a contradiction 
of spirit. In other words, man's life, from the standpoint of the use 
he makes of his faculties and freedom, is tragic, - God's judgment stand- 
ing against his selfish schemes and bringing his vain imagination^ to nought - 
   Man as creature redeemed.
But, just as Christianity maintains that man's life is corrupted 
by sin and subject to judgment, so also it declares that redemption is 
possible by divine grace, as power and as pardon.
The law of man's life is love. He is not self-sufficient, 
bein& able to realise his potentialities only in loving relations with other 
human beings and with God. Yet man's life does not conform to its own 
law* Viewing the world from the perspective of self, he is betrayed into 
imagining himself the center of the world. Thus existence is not so much 
a harmony of life with life under the sovereignty of God as a disharmony 
produced by self-love. This is the egocentric predicament from which man 
must be saved.
But how is the pre-occupation with self to be broken! By an
1 Ibid, p. 240.
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effort of will! Ho. Because (l) tho capacities of tho solf as naturo 
with its surriTal impulse aro not adequate to tho demands of the eelf as 
free spirit (2) concentration on trying to froo tho solf of its pre- 
occupation with itself is still pro-occupation with tho solf and tends 
rather to aecentuate than to mitigate tho problem (3) man's lifo, being 
centered beyond iteolf ia God its source and end, must bo possessed and 
fulfilled from be/ond itself* Thus the neoossity of divine graoo for 
human salvation.
Yet, to insist upon the necessity of grace is not, says Niebuhr, 
to say that man brings nothing to tho experience of salvation and is 
wholly determined from above. For if, as has been maintained, sin how- 
ever serious is not able to destroy man's essential nature, "it must 
follow that there is some inner testimony from the very character and 
structure of tho human psyehe against the strategy of sinful egotism. *.
This is tho 'point of contact* between grace and the natural endowments
1 
of the soul... M
Having briefly noted tho relevance but insufficiency of man's 
natural powers for salvation, we must consider tho nature of grace as power 
not our own and its relation to man's natural resources.
The Christian doctrine of grace is the answer to the problem 
posed ia the doctrine of original sin. Man, a unity of body and spirit 
created ia the image of God, is unable to do the good that he intends. 
He must be enabled or empowered to do it. This means that all ration-
1 The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. II, p. 117.
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alistie or mystie schemes of salvation are ruled out, fer they rest upon a
mind-body dualism which hopes to extend the range of mind to a universality
QUT& 
where all vitality, power, and finally the particularised self i* lest.
Since nan is a unity of nature and spirit, he is subject to power as well 
as to mind. And his difficulty is not so much ignorance as impotence: 
"The good that I would that I do not". Thus, when the self has been 
lifted out of its self-oenteredaess, it must attribute the event to an 
invasion of spirit from without.
All power that comes from without to possess the self may not, 
however, be simply saving power. If not* such power and spirit, "Greater
than the self in its empiric reality but not great enough to do justice te
1 
the self in its ultimate freedom, can be most simply defined as demonic" 
A lever, a family, a state, a race, even a church - all these and many 
ethers eanldraw the self out of itself. Yet the true self, soaring above 
all earthbound things in its freedom, cannot find fulfillment in them. 
The truth is that nothing less than the Holy Spirit, of which Christ as 
love is the criterion, is adequate for the spirit and need of man*
To be possessed by the Holy Spirit means to receive an accretion 
of power which man does not have by himself. This is to say that the 
Holy Spirit is not merely the highest level of the human spirit. It is 
the indwelling spirit of God. Yet that indwelling spirit does not 
destroy the human spirit; nay, it fulfils it. But it is the true self 
which is fulfilled.
1 Ibid, pp. 110-111.
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. UL Now the real self obviously cannot be established unless the 
old, unreal and sinful self has been shattered. Suoh a shattering of the 
sinful self oocurs whenever it is confrented by God in Christ, "after the
flesh" or as "hidden", in suoh a way that it beeemes eonseieue of its sin
1 
and of the true source, center,, and end of its life. This is the
experienoe of repentance and faith. They are two aspects of the same 
reality and one cannot be said to be logieally or chronologically prior 
to the other. For wihout repentance the self eould not rise to faith; 
and without faith there eould be no repentance*. But with the9 cones a 
rebirthjof the real self and power for newness of life.
Thus, finite things which, when absolutized, are demonic and 
destructive, may otherwise become means of grace. It is true, of course, 
as has been said, that the self cannot find complete fulfillment in any 
thing less than the Holy Spirit. This is not to say, however, that man 
does not realise himself in relation to these things or that the Holy 
Spirit is not mediated by them. Indeed, the natural endowments and 
experiences of man are aspects of life which, though alone insufficient 
for salvation, may be the means of it, once charged with the force of 
epeeial grace. They include the gregarious impulse, paternal and filial 
affection; reason which knows that existence ie not essence and imagines 
(if not implements) more inclusive harmonies; the influence of traditions, 
especially that of the Christian community itself; commitments and hebite 
of life; the challenge of a cause; the concatenation of circumet&cce; the
1 See Ibid, p. 109.
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suffering of body or frustration of spirit and purpose. All these the 
Holy Spirit ean and does use infuoving the self to repentance and faith. 
The self, for its part, is not inanimate or merely passive under external 
pressure; indeed, it must actively affirm the movement of &raoe. Yet, 
when its eelf-eenteredness has been broken and it stand6 beyond the 
contradictions of sin in faith, the self knows that it is by a "miracle" 
wherein a given event or aspect of experience has become a special 
channel of empowering grace. Thus is shown the truth of both human 
freedom and divine grace:
"The real situation is that both affirmations - that only 
"God in Christ can break and reconstruct the sinful self, and that 
"the self must 'open the door* and is capable of doing so - are 
"equally true; and they are unqualifiedly true, each on their 
"own level* Yet either affirmation becomes false if it is made 
"without reference to the other."1
In divine grace as power, then, lies the possibility of new- 
ness of life. Because of it, there are in fact indeterminate possibi- 
lities of fulfillments both individual and collective. "There ie no 
limit...; except of course the one limit,that there will be some
corruption, as well as deficiency, of virtue and truth on the new level
Z 
of achievement".
To note this "one limit", it must now be observed, is to be 
aware of the necessity of justification and to know God's grace, not only 
as power, but as pardon. Such awareness is not a possibility of natural 
man, and is not to be validated or refuted by natural experience. It is
1 Ibid, p. 118.
2 Ibid, p. 154.
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only by faith, whereby nan statute beyond himself and knows that the Lord 
is God, that he can either apprehend (if not comprehend) the truth which 
completes the structure of meaning, lay hold on empowering grace, or 
understand that he never ceases to require God'a forgiveness. The doc- 
trine of justification was not, ae a matter of faet, arrived at inductive- 
ly and speculatively in the history of culture, and cannot be eo attained* 
It can only be known in faith existentially, that is, by being confronted 
by God in Christ, shattered in one*s self-esteem, and reconstructed* 
But once known, the principle of grace as pardon can be applied to and 
validated by common experience; in the impartiality of nature, the slow 
processes of judgment in history, the general transmutation of evil into 
good, the actual dependence of mutual love upon self-giving love. It 
can further be seen to be, not in contradiction to, but as supporting, 
the notion of grace as power - in the sense that life can be truly com- 
pleted only as it knows it cannot complete itself or arrive, even by 
grace as power, at completion in history. Yet the knowledge of grace as 
pardon does not necessarily mean a life consistent with it; for self- 
love can claim justification as a possession and generate new pride* It 
is a part of the genius and profoundity of Christianity that it includes 
this knowledge of red stance to its own truth, and is illustrated and 
validated by the very rejection of itself. But, without Christian pre- 
suppositions, such illustration is not apparent nor such validation dis- 
cerned. In other words, only a faith which measures the full depths of 
sin can understand the final necessities of grace.
LXXIV
Niebuhr admits that there has been practically as much resist- 
ance to the Christian doctrine of grace as parcon within the bounds of 
faith as outside it. The pre-Christian ages "expected a Christ but not 
the Christ who would vindicate God in his justice and mercy without
including any man in that rind ieat ion. The Christian ages seek a new way
1 
of vindicating men who have become righteous through Christ "  The pre-
dicament of man is that he stands in and yet above finitude; his sin
to pretend to have escaped, or to be able to escape, fromjthis predicament*
V
Obviously a faith which knows of God's concern for men can be egoistically 
corrupted into reinforcing this pretension, and this is exactly what has 
happened in much of Christian history. Thus the lagic of sin persists 
in the saints, and is prior to any specific theological expression of it* 
The actual bases of the weakening or denial of the doctrine of grace as 
pardon have varied. In mellenistic forms of the faith, God is thought 
to have bceome man in order that man might become God; and that, Christ 
having bridged the chasm between the eternal and the temporal, it remains 
only for man through knowledge of Him to rise to the eternal. The 
central issue, in other words, was thought to be that of time -eternity 
and not that of sin and grace at all. In more Hebraic forms of Christ- 
ianity, the basic issue is always understood ae sin and grace; and grace 
is recognized to include the double pauline emphasis on justification and 
aanc tificat ion. Yet the auguetinian-thomist doctrine has talked of for- 
giveness in baptism for sins that are past and has made justification
1 Ibid, p. 127.
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merely the prelude to sanetifloation by empowering grace through the 
sacramenta. Absolute perfections of couree not claimed; but rather that 
the converted, receiving the sacraments, may lire, not without venial or 
incidental sin. but without mortal sin, and that there ie no basic contra- 
diction between the souls of the faithful and the will of God. The 
crucial question is, therefore, simply one of fact: is this true or is it 
not? The Renaissance and modern views have believed, even more simply 
than Catholicism, that it is true. The Reformation declared that it is 
not; and Niebuhr agreed.
"The pride of a bishop, the pretensions of a theologian, the 
"will-to-power of a pious business man, and the spiritual arrogance 
"of the church itself are not merely incidental defects, not merely 
"venial sins. They represent the basic drive of pelf-love, 
"operating upon whatever new level grace has pitched the new life".
Thus, man remains, not merely finite and in process - which even the 
sanctificationists admit - but in basic contradiction to the divine will* 
as much in need of forgiveness at the end as at the beginning of sinful 
existence or moral striving.
The breadth and depth of the Christian experience of grace as 
power and as pardon is, Viebuhr thinks, succinctly put, and can be neatly 
sunmariced, in a pauline text, beginning: "I am crucified with Christ". 
The sinful, self-centered self is confronted and shattered by God in 
Christ. "Nevertheless I live". The whole self, now liberated and 
empowered by the Holy Spirit, rises to newness of life. "Yet not I; but 
Christ liveth in me". Though it is the self that lives anew, it is by
1 Ibid, p. 137.
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the power of Christ that it does os; yet also, only by faith, for there 
is a continuing sin and therefore a continuing need of forgiveness, to 
the end of history.
The final fulfillment of life must therefore lie beyond 
history, not merely because of the incompleteness of finitude and the 
height of human freedom, but also because the corruption of sin must be 
purged and overcome.
"Beyond" history is perhaps a less satisfactory tern than "at 
the end" of history. For the fulfillment of life, though transcending 
history, must also, obviously, be intimately related to history. "At 
the end" signifies the Christian sense that, on the one hand, life cannot 
be completed within the conditions of nature-history, and, on the other 
hand, that the Kingdom of God fulfills and does not negate historical 
existence. Thus does Christianity refutt both utopianism and other 
worldliness.
The hope that life will be fulfilled is a Justified hope, 
Niebuhr believes, because life actually does point beyond itself to an 
eternal grouna. But, just because it is "beyond 11 or to the "end" that 
it points, there can be no exact knowledge or literal description of the 
fulfilment of life. Every idea of fulfillment, which by definition 
transcends experience, must, like all other notions that relate man to 
God, the historical to the trans-historical* be mythical or symbolic 
rather than rational, and thus may be essentially though not exhaustively 
true. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be." Yet, since we do 
know what life is essentially, we can project essentially what its ful-
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fillment must be.
Life points beyond itself as finite and free. It transcend* 
itself, yet is unable to complete itself by its own power. The freedom 
by which it transcends itself opens the possibility, however, of trying 
to complete itself by its own power, or falsely. Thus, the problem of 
human weakness is complicated by the pretension of strength, or finite- 
ness by sin. Since life contradicts itself, mere development of what 
it is cannot complete it. And, since it is a unity of body and spirit, 
it cannot be divided so that an immortal part is released from a mortal 
part and absorbed into the divine. This ia any case could only anni- 
hilate man. "His hope consequently lies in a forgiveness which will
overcome not his finitenses but his sin, and a divine omnipotence which
1 
will complete his life without destroying its essential nature.**
C. The Movement of History.
1. The meaning of life and the meaning of history.
Niebuhr distinguishes three types of historical interpretation. 
One affirms the meaning of life but does not include history in the realm 
of meaning. Another equates the meaning of life with the meaning of 
history - either as reduced to nature or as a self-fulfilling process. 
The third asserts that the meaning of life includes but transcends 
history. Biblical Christianity is in the third category.
Religions and cultures which do not include history in the 
realm of meaning have no messianic expectation. For them, a Christ is 
not possible because the temporal-historical is not thought able to
* Beyond Tragedy, p. 306.
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receive eternal disclosures and fulfillment; and he is not necessary 
because there is believed to be in man already that which can raise him 
aboTe nature - history to the realm of eternal significance. Thus, to 
the Greeks, Christ, being an answer to a question that is not asked, is 
"foolishness*1 . But religions and cultures which equate the meaning of 
life with the meaning of history do not expect a Christ either. For, if 
they reduce history to nature, meaning itself is denied; and, if they 
see history as a self-fulfilling process, it is its own Christ and neerf 
not expect one. Only those religions and cultures which believe that 
the meaning of life includes but transcends history are messhnic. For, 
knowing that history points beyond itself, they look for a fuller disclo- 
sure and completion of meaning from beyond - they expeet a Christ.
It will be necessary to examine a little more closely Niebuhr's 
interpretation of the "logic" of messianic expectation, as it developed 
in Hebrew-Christian history. There are three levels of messianism: 
pre-prophetic, prophetic, and Christian.
In the first type, pre-prophetic or egoistic-naturalistic 
messianism, the problem of life is regarded primarily as the threat to 
meaning in the disadvantage of the nation as against its foes. As a 
consequence, messianic hope is expressed in terms of the eventual subjec- 
tion of those foes and of the establishment of the power and glory of the 
nation. The egoistic element is explicitly present on this level: yet 
it is never wholly overcome on the other and higher levels, even when 
(as in Christian concepts of history) it is disavowed in principle.
In prophetic messianism, the problem is no longer nationalis-
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tic, but  thical and universalistict the threat to the good forces of 
history by the evil forces. The messianic hope therefore is for a 
 shepherd-king" who will combine power and goodness and establish the good 
forces of history. This is a profound conception which refutes both 
false interpretations of history and non-historical religions and cultures. 
It refutes the latter in insisting that the basic problem of life is not 
finiteness but sin and that history must be redeemed and not sloughed off* 
It corrects the former in seeing that no force in history is adequate to 
the task of redemption and that the shepherd-king must therefore be more 
than purely historical. The weakness in the notion of the shepherd-king 
lies in thinking the divine power can be no less good for occupying a 
particular place of power in history. There was, however, beneath the 
problem of the evil forces of history and the shepherd-king answer to this 
problem, a deeper dimension in prophetic messianism which was gradually 
articulated. MThe assurance that God will complete history by overcoming 
the ambiguity of the momentary triumph of evil yields to the question of
how God will complete history by overcoming the perennial evil in every
1 
human good." This was the final prophetic problem for which traditional
messianism had, and apocalypticism found, no answer.
Niebuhr declares that it is necessary to note why this problem 
was not answered if we are to understand why Christ was a "stumbling- 
block" to the Jews. For one thing, this ultimate problem of history - 
that all men fall short - was subordinated by the pressure of the
1 Human Destiny, p. 30.
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penultimate problem of Hebrew experience - that their "jailors" were worse 
than they. But even more important was the fact that the prophetic per- 
ception of the ultimate problem was an affront to human self-righteousness* 
In the apocalyptic writings, where non-Christian messianism culminates, 
there is to be sure a certain ambiguity; for while it was known that there 
were no righteous worthy of triumph, it was nevertheless insisted that the 
end of history would indicate both God and the righteous. Thus, even 
when known, the final problem was not really faced*
Christian messianim represents both a completion and a correc- 
tion of Hebraic messianism. Jesus himself reinterpreted its basic ideas, 
and the Christian community drew the final conclusions of this reinter- 
pretation after His death.
In the debate within Hebraic religion between messianism and 
legaliem, Jesus stood on the side of meeeiani&m. He rejected legalism 
as an adequate disclosure of the divine purpose in history and as a means 
of fulfilling it. No "law" can state the final good of man, nor empower 
him to keep it* The freedom of man is higher and the problem of man is 
deeper than that - pointing, in fact, beyond or to the end of history for 
solution. But His messianism also contradicted traditional messianic 
notions, in so far as they were corrupted by egoistic-nationalistic 
elements, or tended to define the problem of history and the answer to it 
in too simply moral terms. The parable of the Last Judgment - by the 
very fact of a last judgment, and by the maintenance of the distinction 
between the righteous and the unrighteous - retains the prophetic-moral 
element* Yet, it also adds the significant note that those who are
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vindicated know they have not fulfilled the law of life and are contrite 
(even as those who are condemned believe themselves to be right*out). 
This, then, was the first rock of offence in Jesus' interpretation of 
messianiem: an affront to the pride of^nation and even more to the pride 
of man as man. But there was yet another offence: that "The Son of Man 
must suffer". The traditional notion of Messiah or Son of Man had been 
one of triumph; while the suffering servant idea had most probably con- 
cerned Israel's mission and triumph in the world through suffering. 
Jesus combined and reinterpreted theee two conceptions, declaring that the 
representative of God must suffer in order to reveal and fulfill the mean- 
ing of history. He neither suggests that vicarious suffering gradually 
triumphs in history, not yet that history remains purely tragic; but 
rather that the representative of God will fulfill essential meaning at 
the "end" at history. "Thus Jesus our reinterpretation of meseianism 
contains the two offensive ideas that the righteous are unrighteous in the 
final judgment and that God's sovreignty over history is established and
Hie triumph over evil is effected not by the destruction of the evil doers
1 
but by his own bearing of the evil." His reinterpretation was indeed
offensive to the Jews in His day and led to their rejection of Him; but 
its perennial offensiveness to man is abundantly shown by the resistance 
to it throughout Christian hittory. It has been a perpetual "stumbling 
block" in fact* even within the community which accepted it in principle. 
There is a final point of crucial importance in Jesus' own view 
of the "end" of history. It is suggested in the double emphasis:, the
1 Ibid, p. 46.
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Kingdom ha* come, and the Kingdom is coming. There i§ one sense in which 
the divine sovereignty over history has been revealed and established: 
there i§ another in which its fulfillment awaits a second manifestation 
of divine power. Jesus seeme, in combining the buffering servant" and 
the "Son of Uan H ideas in interpreting history, to have connected the 
"suffering servant 1* with his first coming and the "Son of man 1* with the 
second. In such an interpretation, history becomes an "interim* in 
which there are both realisations of life's true meaning and continuing 
contradictions to it. But the absolute character of Jesus' ethic is not, 
Niebuhr declares, due, as Albert Schweitzer holds, to the illusion of His 
proximate return. It is due rather to the actual character of man whose 
freedom can take its "law* only from the absolute and final reality, God. 
Thus does Jesus understand and reveal life's true meaning, but also, that 
in history, between His first and second coming, there is a conformity 
to and violation of it.
The revelation in Christ is not however complete until the epie 
of His life is closed and the history of expectation culminates in a 
community of faith which understands and accepts Him. To the Greeks 
Christ crucified was foolishness, because they had no problem for which 
He was the answer. To the Jews He was a stumbling blook, because, though 
they looked for a Christ, He was not the kind they had expected. But to 
them that were called, He was the wisdom of God and the power of God.
What, Niebuhr asks, is the specific content of this revelation 
in Christ! It is the Atonement, the final indication of the relation
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between judgment and mercy in 6od'§ attitude toward man in hie rebellion. 
The prophets had been certain of judgment; they had even known of mercy, 
But they were not eure how they were related to one another. Christian 
faith entered the world with the affirmation that what had formerly been 
partially revealed and partially concealed has now been clarified and 
established. Divine judgment was understood not to preclude divine 
forgiveness; and forgiveness not to obviate judgment. In the suffer- 
ing of Christ it was discovered that God "has a resource^ of mercy 
beyond His love and judgment but (that) He can make it effective only 
as He takes the consequences of His wrath and judgment, upon and into 
Himself... The wrath of God is the* world in its essential structure 
(as law) reacting against the sinful corruption of that structure...
The mercy of God represents the ultimate freedom of God above His own
1 
law; but not the freedom to abrogate the law." Thus, the doctrine
of the Atonement is consistent with and the culmination of Jesus' own 
teaching (which fulfilled and negated the logic of messiauiem) that the 
Son of Man must suffer and give His life as a ransom for many. It is 
the Christian answer to the final problem of life.
The Atonement as the significant content of the Incarnation is, 
says Nicbuhr, an insight of faith rather than a conclusion of reason. 
That is to say, it was not resched by a cumulation of knowledge in the 
history of culture and cannot be attained individually by merely taking 
thought; but only as the self-disclosure of God in Christ is apprehend-
1 Ibid, pp. 55-56.
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ed and appropriated by faith. Nor is it something that one apprehands 
once and for all. Rather, it must be constantly appropriated inwardly if 
the wisdom of God in Christ is also to become the power of God unto salva- 
tion.
nationalistic theologies misconstrue the situation. Preoccu- 
pied with the problem of finiteness rather than sin, they tend te think 
of the significance of Christ in terms of the Incarnation which bridges 
the chasm between the infinite and the finite rather thanjln terms of the 
Atonement which speaks of sinful man's reconciliation with a holy God. 
Christ as the wisdom of God is thereby reduced to metaphysical truths 
epem to reason, and is not at all the power of God that comes to those 
whose self-esteem has been shattered by confrontation with the crucified 
Christ* Thus, the identity of wisdom and power in Christ is obscured. 
But so, also, is the difference between wisdom and power. For, subsum- 
ing power under wisdom and assuming the sufficiency of wisdom, the problem 
of life is prematurely solved; whereas, a more adequate form of Christian- 
ity knows of sin and that, despite Christ even ae power, it remains as a 
perennial fact of historical existence. All this suggests the basic error 
of rationalistic theologies. But there is another: the attempt te com* 
prebend the significance of Christ in rational categories rather than to 
point to it mythically. Thus, the abortive effort is made to define 
Christ as both conditioned and unconditioned; rather than to regard Him 
as the symbol of the reality that bears history.
In correcting the errors of rationalism and asserting the pri- 
macy of faith, Niebuhr does not intend to deny the relevance of reason or
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the continuity between culture and faith. "This is to say that while 
'Heilgeschichtf is not merely an aspect of general history* nor its 
natural culmination, neither is it a completely separate history. M 
Since man transcends himself t and since sin however serious cannot des- 
troy his essential nature, he has and retains a certain capacity for 
truth and God. This makes possible that expectation of a Christ without 
which the Christ could not have been accepted - something which remains 
true despite the fact that the true Christ is not expected nor quite 
credible when He comes. Furthermore, once the revelation of God in 
Christ has beenjaccepted, it illuminates the whole of experience and is 
validated by experience.
Illustrative of the relation between revelation and reason is 
the analogy of the knowledge me^jhave of one another. Ken know what they 
know of each other by observing behaviour, .and alse by comprehending the 
depth in the other spirit in terms drawn from knowledge of themselves. •- 
But* in AO far as behaviour is incomplete as a basis of knowledge; in so 
far as behaviour betrays ambivalence; in so far as the depth of spirit 
in the other is interpreted egoistically and falsely by the self; there 
is needed a "word" of self-disclosure from the other person. And when it 
is given, it actually completes incompleteness, clarifies obscurities, 
and corrects falsifications. All this suggests* says Niebuhr, what is 
even more true of the relation between what men know of God by observa- 
tion and interpretation and what they know by His own self-disclosure.
1 Ibid, pp. 61-6$.
LXXXVII
In a word, the relation between revelation and reason, betwean faith and 
culture, is paradoxical. t~r
2. The possibilities and the limits of history.
The Christian faith, which regards Christ as the Son of Man and 
the revelation of the character of God, also believes that He is the 
Nseoond Adam", the disclosure of essential man* The possibilities of 
history have already been said to be determined by the nature of man as 
imago dei, and - sin and repentance presupposed - by ({od's grace as power; 
while the limits of hidtory nave been described as finiteness, and as sin 
as a perennial category of history requiring God's grace as pardon. It 
is Christ - particularly in His love on the Cross - who id the actual 
criterion of these possibilities and limits. We shall elaborate them * 
primarily now from the ethical standpoint.
"To say that the innocency of Adam before the fall can be restored
only in terms of the perfection)^ Christ is to assert that life can approach
1 
its original innocency only by aspiring to its ultimate end." History is
suspended between nature and eternity. It moves from the perfection of 
innocency or the harmony of life without freedom, through creativity and 
destruotiveness within freedom, toward that perfection of the Kingdom where 
free wills are related harmoniously to one another beneath the sovereignty 
of Cod. To define the possibilities and limits of history in terms of the 
first and second Adam is thus to recognize on the one hand that part of the 
norm of man's life is given in the harmony of nature, but also to see that 
the freedom of manjtranscends not only nature but his own history and to know
1 Ibid, p. 77.
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that his final "law" can be taken only from the perfection of Christ which 
transcends history and enters it only to be crucified. Such an approach 
obviously distinguishes Christian ethics fundamentally both from natural- 
istic and romantic-primitivistie ethics which seek to derive man's law 
purely from nature or lead him back to nature for fulfillment, and from 
rationalistic and mystical ethics which make gnosis rather than love toward 
God and man his norm and finally extricate him from the stuff of nature- 
history to lose him in anjundifforentiated eternity. Man being neither a 
unity without freedom, nor freedom without vitality, the law of his life 
must be derived from a God who is transcendent over, and immanent in, the 
world; and the possibilities and limits of history must be understood 
from the standpoint of a Msaorificial love" that bears a dialectical or
paradoxical relation to "mutual love".
1 
The perfection of Christ is the impossible possibility11 of
history. It is impossible because it cannot maintain itself in history 
and becomes sacrificial love. It is possible in the double sense that 
(l) manjia able if he chooses to refuse to participate in the push-and-pull 
of competing egos and to sacrifice himself (assuming that he measures life 
by faith or in transhistorical terms and knows that he who loses his life 
may gain it in hea.ven) (2) though disinterested love cannot justify itself 
as historical strategy, it can and does support mutual love which is able 
to justify or maintain itself in history. In the realm of ethics, sacri- 
ficial love is related to mutual love as, in the realm of truth, revelation
1 See, for instance, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, Chapter IV.
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is related to reason.
Sacrificial love completes the incompleteness of mutual love 
and defines its possibilities; for the self cannot achieve even mutual 
relations if it is dominated by a demand for reciprocity and a fear that 
it may not be given. Mutuality must, in other words, be a by-product 
not an intended consequence, and for this an element of disinterested 
venturesomeness is necessary. Disinterested love presupposed, however, 
the possibilities of mutual love are indeterminate (save only for the final 
limit that life cannot survive in fallen nature or history without some 
egoistic concern and calculation) and the agape of the Kingdom of God is 
therefore a very great resource for the fulfillment of life ia history.
Sacrificed love also clarifies obscurities and defines the 
limits of mutual love. Whether, or to what extent, a transcendant norm 
is historically practicable is a perennial problem of ethics. There is a 
frequent tendency to regard it as a simple possibility, and to imagine that 
through grace (as in sanctificationist Christianity) or through education 
(as in liberalism) or through revolution (as in marxism) mutuality can be 
extended without limit. In terms of the Gross, however, it is apparent 
that there is a limit, and that sacrificed love cannot finally be trans- 
muted into successful strategy.
Finally, sacrificial love corrects falsifications and refutes 
pretensions. Mutual love is a compound of egoism and righteousness which 
claims to be less egoistic and more righteous than it is. The Christian 
insight is unique in setting it under the Cross and discovering that all 
men have sinned and come short of the glory of Grod.
Thus, the law of life is neither a simple possibility nor yet 
an irrelevant impossibility* but is related to history as God is related 
to the world - that is, dialectically.
3. Interpretations within Christendom.
It is only occasionally, Niebuhr thinks, that this relation of 
the law of love to history, or the more general paradox of grace as power 
and as pardon, is understood infChristendom outside the New Testament. 
This means that the balanced view of the possibilities and limits of 
history in biblical principles of interpretation has usually been des- 
troyed, from one side or the other - the possibility or the limits being 
overestimated or underestimated. The most frequent error has of course 
been sanctificationist, in some form or other; only in the Reformation 
was it overcome in principle, but at the price of the opposite error of 
historical defeatism.
"The theologies which have sought to do justice to the fact 
"that saints nevertheless remain sinners have frequently} perhaps 
"usually, obscured the indeterminate possibilities of realisations 
"of good in both individual and collective life. The theologies 
"which have sought to do justice to the positive aspects of 
regeneration have usually obscured the realities of sin which 
appear on every new level of virtue."^
" 
"
This serious, general indictment of Christendom is defended and illustra- 
ted in anjextensive analysis, a summary of which may be useful here in 
further illuminating Niebuhr* s interpretation of history and as a back- 
ground of his call for a "new synthesis".
In Hellenistic Christianity - comprising roughly the patristic
1 Human Destiny, p. 125.
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age, and extending in Eastern Orthodoxy, in certain areas of Anglicanism,
and, slightly modified, in certain aspects of Renaissance spirituality
1 
to the present day - there has been a gnostic element which regarded the
Bignificanoe of Christianity as a bridging of the gap between the divine 
and the human and a translation of the believer, via knowledge, from 
temporality to eternity. There was not an explicit repudiation of the 
more Hebraic, biblical notions of sin, grace, and justification: rather, 
simply an appropriation of and emphasis upon that in Christianity which 
corresponds to Greek problems and concepts. But, in interpreting the 
nature of man dualistically and rationalistically, it tended to fulfil 
life in individual terms prematurely (if finally to negate it), while 
history itself was abandoned. -»...-  - -
In Roman Catholicism, the Hellenic spirit has had its vic- 
tories, yet there has also been a strong Hebraic element. More specifi- 
cally, man is understood in his volitional as well as rational aspects, 
and thus not merely wisdom but power is seen to be necessary to salvation* 
It is primarily in $he unbalancing of the biblical paradox of grace by 
the subordination of justification to sanctification that Catholicism has 
erred. The notion of forgiveness as applying to sins that are past is 
of early origin. It was present in St. Augustine as well and became 
definitive fot the Catholic conception of life through him. The 
subordination of justification to sanctification means simply that there 
is no serious contradiction in the life of the redeemed, either as indivi- 
duals or as the church. Thus, the possibilities of history were
1 Niebuhr accepts Harnack's practical identification of Hellenism with 
Gnosticism. See Ibid, p. 152*
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overestimated in Catholicism, at least in individualistic and ecclesias- 
tical terms. On the other hand, the identification of the church with 
the Kingdom of God made for a static conception of history; while the 
control of the order of culture by the church severely restrieted the 
process of secular development.
The medieval synthesis, which thus held together in arrested 
form the truths of justification and sanctification, was dissolved from 
two sides by the Renaissance and Reformation. They represent a double 
movement of dissolution which partly diverged and partly converged. They 
diverged in the sense that, while the Renaissance was asanctifieationist 
in principle and proximate in interest, the Reformation was justification- 
ist in principle and ultimate in interest. They converged because both 
opposed the same pretentious institution which claimed to dispense truth 
and grace and finally to control the historical situation.
Renaissance spirituality is distinctively marked by its creative 
impulse toward, but fatuous expectation of, the fulfillment of the possi- 
bilities of life in history. On both its sectarian side and its secular 
side it destroyed the paradox of justification and sanotification by 
giving up the truth of justification. In sectarianism the principle of 
grace as power necessary for fulfillment was retained - by the pietistio 
sects in individual terms, and by the radical sects in socio-historical- 
apoealyptio terms* In secularism* however, the notion of grace as power 
(as well as grace as pardon) was abandoned. Thus Renaissance spirituality 
represents a return to the classical confidence in rational man. Yet, it 
adds to this the biblical sense of the dynamic meaningfulness of history -
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stripped of course of it§ tragic aspect and its insistence that the final 
fulfillment of life can only be beyend history. The idea of progress is 
thus the typical Renaissance and modern (since the Renaissance spirit 
has dominated modernity) interpretation of history.
If the Renaissance objection to the medieTal synthesis was that 
it was too pessimistic, the Reformation found it too optimistic* It 
rescued the truth of justification implicit in prophetism and explicit in 
faulinism from its subordination to sanctifieation in Catholicism. In the 
history of culture, the Reformation represnts the victory of Hebraism 
over Hellenism. In the history of religion it means a profound awareness 
that the saints and the church as well as the world stand under God's 
judgment and require his mercy on every level of achievement- this final 
truth of Christianity it appreciates in principle with a depth and power 
unknown outside the New Testament (though to be sure it had its own ways 
of contradicting the principle - as for instance, in Luther's understand- 
ing of agape as a supra-moral, ecstatic, individualistic transcendence 0\><3. 
history, or in Calvin's bibliolatry). But, knowing the principle, it yet 
failed to relate it adequately to all the proximate problems or to under- 
stand the full scope of historical possibilities* And it was this that 
helped, along with the basic pride of man and the particular modd of m6etr- 
nity, to encompass its defeat as an historical force.
Anglicanism is neither Hellenic nor Roman Catholic, neither of 
the Renaissance nor the Reformation. It has rather its own content - at 
its best able to combine and express the paradox of grace better than 
other churches, but at its worst merely a distinctive combination of
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errors and traditional piety.
It is upon the basis of this sweeping historical analysis that
Niebuhr sets forth the necessity for, and the broad outline of, a "new
1 
synthesis'1 . This new synthesis must, he saye, go beyond the medieval
synthesis, for, inluniting Hellenism and prophetism, the basic paradox of 
grace was partly expressed and partly violated on both sides* And it 
must coabin* those insights of Renaissance and Reformation which, 
exploring the breadth and depth of life beyond the scope of the old syn- 
thesis, yet obscured one or the other side of the paradox. The con- 
struction of the new synthesis ( therefore, involves relating the gospel to
history more dialecticelly than ever before in Christendom. It means
/ 
vigorously affirming "that history fulfils and negates the kingdom of
God; that grace is continuous with, and in contradiction to, nature; 
that Christ is what we ought to be and also what we cannot be; that the
power of God is in us and that the power of God is against us in judgment
2 
and in mercy" 
The building of such a synthesis is, Niebuhr thinks, the major 
task that confronts the church in our time, and, though it may know it 
not, the world as well.
4. The fulfillment of history and of life.
Just as the Christian faith is aware than "man knows himself 
truly only as he knows himself as confronted by God", so is it also aware 
that history can be understood only as by faith the eternal power and
1 Ibid, particularly pp. 204-212.
2 Ibid, p. 204.
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purpose that bears it is discerned. From the standpoint of such a 
faith, history ie seen to be the frustration as well ae the realization 
of the meaning of life, and thus to point beyond itself.
We must go further now to note that an adequate interpretation 
of historical frustration and realization depends upon an appreication 
of the double relation of eternity to time. Eternity stands both over 
time and at the end of time, and in each case, bears a dialectical rela- 
tion to it. In so far as man's freedom is the basis of, and is direct- 
ed toward, historical activity, he faces the eternity at the end of time, 
even as, also, the process of history itself moves toward that end with 
its eumulative meanings. In so far as the freedom of man transcends 
socio-historicalprocess he faces the eternity which is above time* If 
the significance of history is viewed only from the standpoint of the 
eternity above history, the double fact that the individual realizes 
himself in social process and that the process itself has cumulative 
meaning is not recognized. If, conversely, the significance of history is 
viewed solely from the standpoint of the eternity at the end of time, 
the transcendent freedom of man is denied and the variety and richness of 
history are lost. History ie full of pluralistic diversification. 
Myriads of individuals "have their day and cease to be 1*; nations, 
empires, civilisations and cultures are born, grow great, decline, and 
die - not merely from natural causes but because they bring destruction 
upon themselves by sin. These largely transient elaborations of history 
must obviously have their primary, though not their sole, meaning in the 
eternity that is above every moment of time. "The vast society of
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historic organisms.,. are as certainly a testimony to the divine providence
under which they have grown, ae their destruction ie a vindication of the
1 
eternal judgment, which they are unable to defy with impunity". But
there ie a unity of history too - a unity between civilizations both in 
time or length and in space or breadth. There is a cumulative continuum 
in history which pitches experience on ever new levels and moves, like the 
meaning in the life of individuals, toward the "end", that is, toward both
fulfillment and dissolution. Thus,"the problem (of life) is that the end
2 
as finis is a threat to the end as teloe". Yet, it is immeasurably
complicated by the corruptionbf teloe by man's false eternals. And so it 
is that, since man partly conforms to and partly contradicts the purpose 
of God, the fulfillment of life at the Hend M must both confirm and begate 
the stuff of history.
Niebuhr understands the New Testament idea of the "end" of history 
in terms of the three symbols of the returnjof Christ, the last judgment, 
and the resurrection.
The eternity that is over time is, in a sense, the eternity that is 
disclosed in the first coming of Christ, while the eternity that is at the 
end of time is the eternity that fulfils the meaning of the historical 
process in the second coming of Christ. Thus history is an interim between 
the disclosure and the fulfillment of meaning, in which there are both 
contradictions and realizations. To eay that Chriet the suffering 
Messiah will come again in power and glory is to declare that the contra-
1 Ibid, p. 306.
2 Ibid, p. 287.
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dictions will be overcome and that "existence cannot ultimately defy
1 
its own norm1*, To describe His second coming as an event that will
both fulfil and terminate history ib, furthermore, to refute utopianism 
and other-worldliness . For it means, on the one hand* that the con- 
summation of life lies ctryond the conditioning of nature-history, and on 
the other, that the consummation fulfils rather than annuls the essence of 
the historical process.
The last judgment has three facets: (l) It suggests, in repre- 
senting Ghriet as the judge of history, that man is judged in terms of 
his own ideal possibility, and not for Wing finite. (a) It underlines 
the importance of the distinctions between good and evil in history, 
however relative, yet restrains human claims on behalf of them in 
suggesting they can finally be assessed only by God. (3) It expresses 
the sense that history does not solve its own problems but cumulates them. 
The creative principle, the logos or Christ, is in history as ohe law of 
its life. But existence does not conform to this law; and, sin pre- 
supposed, every enhancement of the potency of being involves an increase 
in both good and evil. The anti-Christ is therefore precisely the final 
and greatest evil of history. Yet evil has no independent reality or 
development, but rather presupposes and draws upon the power of good. 
If ,in its final expression, it explicitly defies that good, it is the 
anti-Christ of the sinners; if it claims to be that good, it is the 
anti-Christ of the saints. Thus, there is no resolution of the contra-
Ibid, p. 290
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dictions of history within history. "The anti-Christ who appears at the
1 
 nd of history can be defeated only by the Christ who ends history".
The resurreotionof the body is the final Christian symbol of the 
fulfillment of life. Unlike the notion of the immortality of the soul, 
which implies an inhernet capacity in man to survive death, the idea of the 
resurrection frankly admits human limits and declares man's dependence on 
the power of God. But it also affirms, more indubitably than the notion 
of imnartality, that history will be fulfilled in its essence - a unity of 
nature and spirit. A general resurrection at the last day, further, 
preserves the variety of elaboration by individuals which, though rooted 
primarily ia the eternity above time, is nevertheless necessary to the cul- 
mination of the historical process - even as the individuals themselves 
cannot know the final fulfillment of life without participating in that 
historical culmination. Thus, the idea of the resurrection takes account 
both of the inditidual's organic relation to nature and his fellows and of 
the freedom that transcends all natural-historical realities. It affirms 
that life's incompleteness will be completed in essenee. But, in pointing 
to a completion beyond the perennial corruptions of existence, it declares 
that there must be a purging of history as well, and that final fulfillment
is therefore a "completion of its essence by an annihilation of the
2
contradictions which sin has introduced into human life 11 .
»y. p. 319
2 Beyond Tragedy, p. 24.
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5. Conclusion.
Having now set forth the dialectical and the thomist versions 
of the Christian interpretation of history in their basic principlee, 
we must now go on to compare and contrast the two, at the same time 




A. The Common Ground of Distinctive Christian Notions*
The debate we are now about to jo}n is, it must be remembered, a 
debate between Christiana and within a Christian reference. It would be 
well at the start, therefore, to recall, in terms of the interpretation of 
history, the common ground that both unites Christians and distinguishes 
Christianity from an other-«orldlineee which can find no real significance 
in history and a utopianism which expects the fulfillment of life in history. 
The distinctive character of Christian historical interpretation may be 
indicated by six propositions, which are asfollows:
1. That history has its source, meaning, and destiny beyond itself;
2. That knowledge of the source, meaning, and destiny is possible, 
particularly injChrietianity;
3* That history ie part of a world essentially good because God made it;
4. That history is fallen and requires redemption;
5. That Christ is the unique focus of divine activity;
6* And that history, though a realm of meaning, is not the realm of 
completed meaning, which is at the "end" of history in the Kingdom 
of God.
B. The Disputed Ground.
It is only when more specific content is introduced into these general 
principles that differences arise among Christians, particularly now between 
Jacques Uaritaia and Reinhold Niebuhr.
1. A philosophy of being, and a myth of creation, judgment and 
redemption.
The more specific content, I shall maintain, is rooted in and 
determined by a primal decision about man which becomes the presupposition
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of subsequent metaphysical and historical interpretation. This decision 
ia ao doubt based in part upon an inductive or empirical process of 
thought; and, once held as a presupposition issuing in interpretative 
principles, it may actually be reinforced by its plausibility in explain- 
ing or illuminating certain areas of fact and experience. Yet, it can 
neither be arrived at by a purely inductive process - since every process 
of induction presupposes some principle in terms of which facts are select- 
ed and related to each other -^ nor proved by subsequent appeal te 
expetience - since experience is too limited to provide absolutely con- 
clusive proof. Thus, thought is and remains rooted in a primordial deci- 
sion. It is, in short, inescapably existential.
The crueial interpretative question between Maritain and Niebuhr 
is, then, the condition of man, or, more particularly - for the issue 
focuses here - the possibilities, limits, and role of reason. We shall 
shortly juxtapose the two views in some detail. But suffice it to say at 
the moment, that, for Maritain, the reason is less'jade qua te because of 
finitenese and less seriously impaired because of sinjthan for Miebuhr. 
Indeed, reason itself becomes the principle of interpretation for Mari- 
tain; while for Niebuhr the principle is one of faith which includes an 
explicit recognition of the inadequacy of reason, both as finite and as 
corrupted by sin.
The metaphysical consequences that follow upon the existential 
decision regarding the adequacy or inadequacy of reason may be suggested 
in terms of the notions of God, matter, man, and evil.
For thomism, being ie a continuum that encompasses, and rises
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from, first natter or pure potentiality to pure act, form, mind, or God* 
This hierarchy of being is also a hierarchy of value. Matter, though 
real, is inferior to mind. Man, in so far as he is material individual- 
ity, is inferior; but in so far as he is mind, he is superior. God, who 
is pure act, is as such the supreve value. He creates the world. He
"is the sole supreaae principle and the source of everything which exists,
1 
so far as it partakes of being..." It will be noted that God, though the
Creator of the world, is accorded supreme value as one of the principles of 
human existence, namely, the rational principle, raised to infinite pro- 
portions. It will also be observed that, since God is good, and creates 
everything so far as it has being, evil must, therefore, be merely the 
privation of being or the absence of good. Whatever else may be said 
abeut this thomist point of view, it has the virtue of consistency. The 
only question is whether it includes and accounts for the facts.
For dialectic, there is no simple continuum between God and the 
world or any aspect of it* Its principle of interpretation is not reason, 
and its God is not reason raised to the "'nth" power. Rather, it points 
to a mysterious God who is the source of both nature and reason, but is in 
no sense definable or even provable from the standpoint of either. God
is mystery as well aa meaning, the final mystery which clarifies the
2 
mystery of the world. Nor is there, for dialectic, a hierarchy of being
and of value. There is only Creator and created - the One valuable in
1 An Introduction to Phil, p. 20.
2 See Discerning the Signs of the Times, p. 154.
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Himself, and the other - all of it equally - valuable as His work. Thus, 
man ia understood as a unity of body and spirit, equally significant, and 
equally derived, dependent and weak, in mind and in body* As for evil, 
it is not regarded as merely the privation of being or the absence of 
good, but as the corruption of good - to be sure, negative in origin* and 
parasitic in nature, but dynamic in effect. Did God, then, the Creator 
of the world, create the evil that exists in it! No. Evil is the pro- 
duct of the misuse of freedom by man and the devil, who yet remain 
finally under the dominionfof God. In this interpretation logically 
consistent and metaphysically satisfactory! Not entirely. Yet it has 
the merit of refusing to blink or deny facts because it cannot explain or 
fit them into preconceived logical categories. Niebuhr is in complete 
accord with White head's point: "The defect of a metaphysical system is 
the very fact that it is a neat little system which thereby over-simplifies 
its expression of the world... In respect to its treatment of evil,
Christianity is therefore less clear in its metaphysical idea but more
1 
inclusive of the facts" .
We may, then, summarize the metaphysical consequences of the 
respective estimates of reason by saying that, if God is Creator of the 
world He cannot be interpreted simply in terms of anything within it, and 
that therefore thomism, a rationalist philosophy of being which attempts 
to do so» cannot attain to a Creator God transcendent as well as immanent* 
a process in which mind is absolutized, matter degraded, man dissected, 
and evil denied, whereas dialectic, not a rationalist philosophy of being
in the Making, p. 50.
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but a mythdlf creation, judgment, and redemption, is able, upon the basis 
of a God not merely within but mysteriously beyond the world, to affirm the
equal significance of the whole created order, the unity of man, and the
of 
reality of evil which yet remains within the purpose/a good God.
2. Differing Doctrines of Man in Summary.
We have mentioned that an existential decision about the condi- 
tion of man leads to certain metaphysical consequences. It is indeed 
the point of departure for all further elaboration of the doctrine of man 
itself. We must now give this doctrine - so vital, since man is the 
direct subject of history - further attention, confronting, comparing and 
contrasting the thomist and dialectical points of view, first as general 
principles.
Both see man as imago dei. But one means by this a corpoueal
being whose most distinctive characteristic is the possession of intelli-
1 
gence or reason; the other means by this a unity of body and spirit
(including but surpassing reason) whose distinctive mark is self-trans- 
cendent freedom. Bath see man as fallen. But one means by this a 
deprivation of "original righteousness 11 which leaves "natural Justice" 
in tact; the other means by this the corruption of man's nature from top 
tojbottom but not its destruction. Both see man as requiring redemption. 
But one means by this a forgiveness for sins that are past and a gradual 
growth in sanctity by empowering grace through the sacraments of the 
church, without mortal sin; the other means by this grace as power and 
as pardon to the end of history for all men - considered either indivi- 
dually or collectively. Both believe in the final fulfillment of life
1 See An Introduction to Phil, p. 126.
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at the "end" of history. But one means by this something quantitative - 
a Kingdom of God which is more than, but not dii'ierent from, the faithful 
of the church; the other means by this something also qualitative - a 
Kingdom of God which negates as well as completes both church and world. 
3. We must now spell out the meaning of these alternative views of the 
relation of man to God, of the historical to the eternal, in terms of the 
problem of truth, the problem of the good, and the problem of the Kingdom. 
a* The problem of truth.
Man, as we have already noted, is regarded by thomism as having 
received at his creation both a natural endowment and a supernatural addi- 
tion. The imago dei or the essential nature of man is contained within 
the natural endowment. This consists in man's substance - that in virtue 
of which he has existence - and those accidents which, while not identical 
with the substance, are nevertheless necessary to his being what he is - 
the principal aeidents being understanding and the will which proceeds 
from it. The imago dei St. Thomas defines as "primarily intellectual 
nature 1*, though he does assert, also, adding a more biblical element to
his aristotelian rationalism, "that the whole human soul is in the whole
1
human body... as God is ia regard to the whole world". Maritain like- 
wise insists that mawi'fe "most distinctive characteristic is the possession
2 
of intelligence or reason"; that " the possession of this faculty (is)
3 
the principalis&ime property of human being** 
The supernatural addition given to man at creation included
1 Summa Theologioae, Part I, Question 93, Art. 3.
2 An Introduction to Phil, p. 126.
3 Tne Dirges of Knowledge,, p. 250.
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the means of orienting himself toward God and his final end, and also the 
privilege of corporeal iamartality.
"The rectitude (of the primitive state) consisted in his reason 
"being subject to God, the lower powers to reason and the body to 
"the soul; and the first subjection was the cause of both the second 
Nand the third. Now it is clear that such a subjection was not from 
"nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin... Hence it is 
"clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of whieh reason 
"was subject to God was not merely a natural gift but a supernatural 
"endowment of grace."1
Nor was corporeal immortality a natural gift. It too was "a supernatural
force given by God to the soul whereby it was enabled to preserve the body
2 
frost corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God..."
Thus, even in a state of innocence, there were two dimensions in 
man: an essential nature with a capacity for the natural} and a non- 
essential addition with a capacity for the eternal.
In the fall, man - according to thomism - retained the first but 
lost the second. He ceased to be connatural with God in knowledge, lost 
the capacity for the so-called theological virtues, and was deprived of the
privilege! of corporeal immortality (the first two, though not the third,
3 
being subsequently restored by grace ). But the essential nature of man -
though wounded by deprivation - was not lost or even in itself corrupted* 
His natural endowment remained and with it the capacity for natural virtue 
and natural knowledge. 
9 Being - in itself intelligible, indeed co-extensive with intelli-
v
gibility (for thomism) - is still intelligible to him, though not (as 
always) wholly so. Man is still able to know the world, himself, pure
1 Summa Theological Part I, Question 95, Art. 1.
2 Ibid, Question 97, Art. 1.
3 Ibid, Question 97, Art. 1.
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spirits, and God, by sensible experience and by the first principlea of 
the intelligence; and finally by revelation to know God as He is in 
Himself. It is necessary to speak further here of this imposing struc- 
ture of rational and revelational epistemology.
There are two areas of experience in which man has immediate 
knowledge of essences. He is radically intelligible to himself* knowing 
his own substantial form directly, (though not in the state of union with 
the body). And in the beatific vision he will know God directly and 
immediately. All other knowledge of essences is not immediate.
This other world of essences is apprehended on three levels of 
abstraction: physica, whose object (sensible bodies) cannot exist or be 
conceived without matter: mathematics whose object (quantity) cannot 
exist but can be conceived without matter: and metaphysics, whose object 
(being as being) can both exist and be conceived with or without matter.
The concepts of physics are resolved in mobile being, ens 
sensible * the experimental sciences enphasizing therein the sensibile t 
the philosophy of nature the ens. Knowledge in the experimental sciences 
is not of things in themselves but according to how they act; it is know- 
ledge by signs and in signs, or perinoetic. These are sciences of 
affirmation - giving knowledge of things as concealed. The philosophy 
of nature is on the other hand knowledge of things as known, an explica- 
tive science. It is knowledge of being and thus in line with metaphy- 
sics, yet of being as particularized in the corporeal world of the sen- 
sible and mobile. Its intellection is dianoetic, that is, of natures in 
themselves (at least in their most universal features) by signs.
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Anthropology is on the border-line between philosophy of nature and meta- 
physics; for, in so far as man is a corporeal being hie study falls within 
the philosophy of nature, while, in so far as man is spirit capable of 
immaterial activities, he is a proper object of metaphysics.
The concepts of mathematics are resolved in that form of being 
which is ideal quantity, or the general ground of sensible properties. 
Knowledge here is also dianoetic. The mathematical essence is not known 
from within, nor from without, nor ie it created by the human mind; but 
rather is known by its intelligible constitution itself so far as that is 
given by means of signs constructed in imaginative intuition. The sen- 
sibly real is known here, but not in the order of existence. Entities 
grasped first in natura]A>odies become the bafcie upon which other entities, 
real or rational (fictive-synbolic) are constructed. The possibility of 
co-ordinating natural phenomena in terms of mathematical relations is, says 
Uaritain, the great discovery of modern times, and has given rise to the 
science of mathematical physics, at once experimental and deductive, 
materially physical and formally mathematical. This is a mediating science 
and illustrates the similarity between mathematics and physics - both know- 
ing according to the way things act and not according to what they are, 
both science (in the narrower sense) and not philosophy or wisdom.
The concepts of metaphysics are resolved in being as being and 
are concerned with what things are. The essences of corporeal beings 
connatural toour minds are known dianoetically. The essences of incor- 
poreal beings which are above us cannot be known in themselves but only by 
analogy, or ananoetic intellection. This epistemological principle ie
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rooted in the ontoxogical analogic, i.e., in being, at once one and mul- 
tiple, realized in diverse manners in diverse subjects according to
1
similar proportions. Metaphysical intelligibility is similar to mathe- 
matical in that it grasps a world of eternal truths, dissimilar in that 
its truths are always real whereas mathematical truths may be ideal. 
Metaphysical intelligibility is like that in the philosophy of nature, in 
that it is knowledge of the principles of being, yet unlike in that it is 
knowledge of being valid for all possible existence and not simply a 
moment of contingent realization, and, further, need not appeal, in order 
to establishes truths, to the verification of the senses. This also 
obviously distinguishes metaphysical intelligibility from that on the 
livel of physics.
There are three levels of ananoetic intellection of the trans-
/ til\
intelligible (not unintelligible in itself, or to us, but simply /con- 
natural to our minds) - the first two belonging to metaphysics, the third 
supernatural 
There is knowledge of pure created spirits in which analogy is 
circumscriptive. It is true that such higher analogues of being became 
objects for us in lower analogues of the corporeal world; yet the 
higher analogues are attained through them and do not overpass the ana- 
logic concept, since "the transcendental scale of the concept of spirit
2 
is sufficient tojinclude that of pure created spirit".
But in the knowledge of God, ananoetic intellection is uncir-
1 See, for instance, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 261.
2 Ibid, p. 271.
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cumscriptive. For, though our concepts and names accurately characterize 
God's being ae present in creation, they do not grasp it as it is in Himself, 
nor in any way delimit or enclose the divine reality. Maritain points out 
that there are two factors to be kept irjmind, inseparable for us but dis- 
tinct in themselves: what is signified, and the mode of our signification. 
The significance belongs to God even before it applies to creatures. The 
mode of signification is limited to the created analogue, and deficient 
with regard to God. Thus, we know with absolute certainty, by the 
several prooft and particularly from that of contingent being, that God
is, and that He is "simple, one, good, omnicient, all-powerful, free...
1 
sovreignly personal 11 ; but we donot know what these qualities are in God,
nor in what the Godhead itself consists. The higher analogue infinitely 
surpasses the lower and there is no common measure between them. At the 
sametime, the higher is known with absolute certainty in the lower. So 
it is that the knowledge of God in metaphysics or natural theology is 
neither quiddctative nor mythical, but is rooted in the analogy or right- 
ful proportionality.
Since our concepts are deficient with regard to God as trans- 
cendent, it follows that "negative" theology has a certain advantage over 
"positive" theology. Yet negative theology presupposes positive theology, 
as our ignorance is not pure ignorance, but rather ignorance of the known. 
Thus, we know by the reason that God is "good" without knowing what 
"goodness" in God is; and it is therefore better to deny that Hs is "good"
1 Ibid, p. 282; 289.
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than to surest He is merely "good 1* and not "Good" - which we cannot do 
except by indirect and negative meane. We will ada a further word on 
this matter in a moment.
It must now be noted that, in coneidering the natural knowledge 
of God, we have reached what Maritain calls the first degree of "wisdom". 
There are two other degrees of wisdom above this: the Jcnowledge of 
theology, and that of mystical contemplation. But in order to pass on 
to them, revelation and grace must intervene. For God is transcendent, 
and although "doubtless by our very nature as reasonable beings we are
capable of an approximation to the divine essence as our object of
1 
vision... we are only so ordinated by grace". Connaturality is necessary
to the knowledge of God in His essence. Such connatur&lity waB given at 
creation as a supernatural gift, but it was lost in the fall. It can 
only be restored by grace. Thus the third level of ananoetic intellection 
concerns the super-analogy of faith.
This analogy of faith is not only uncircumscriptive; it is also 
revealed. Factors of common human experience are used - still in them- 
selves unproportionate to the deity - but not so when charged with revela- 
tional potency. Through them God discloses Himself as He is known to 
Himself, and He is thereby known to us as He is in Himself, yet at a dis- 
tance and not seen. Both the knowledge of God on the highest level of 
metaphysics and the knowledge that comes in faiih are ananoetic, but there 
is this fundamental difference betwen them: "For metaphysical knowledge 
of God it is in the heart of the intelligible that our intellect, having
1 Ibid, p. 317.
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discovered the ananoetic value of being and the objects which belong to 
the transcendent order, rises, thanks to these, to the divine analogue. 
On the contrary in the knowledge of faith it is in the very heart of the 
divine transintelligible , in the depth of the Godhead itself that the 
whole process of knowledge starts in order to return thither, that it 
makes, by the free generosity of God, choice, in the intelligible uni- 
verse which falls under our senses, of objects and concepts of which God
alone knows that they areanalogical signs of what is hidden in Him, and
1 
of which He makes use to speak of Himself to us in our language".
Thus, it is only by a revealed analogy that we know paternity and filia- 
tion have a proper transcendental reference, that God became man, died 
and rose again for man's redemption, established His church with the 
sacraments and the means of grace, and restored to us the ho$e of glory. 
Since God is not seen, He is not known, even here, immediately. Yet 
the names Father, Son and Holy Ghost are not metaphorical, but describe 
what the divine persons formally and intrinsically are. There is, 
however, metaphorical or parabolic analogy. Super-analogous faith 
makes use both of notions which have anaoetic significance (once charged 
with revelational potency) and of notions in themselves incapable of 
being transcendentalized and whose ananoetic value therefore
concealed in a metaphorical analogy - as in the case (an example uised
2 
by Mar i tain ) of the phrase "and sitteth on the right hand of the
Father". They cannot be taken literally, yet they are essentially true
1 Ibid, p. 298.
2 Ibid, p. 299.
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Because they rest upon a concealed analogy of rightful proportionality.
»
This metaphorical analogy is not, says Maritain, "...myth, which signi- 
fies fictionally certain traits of the creature, but which with rggard 
to divine things has in itself only an entirely undetermined metaphorical
value, and holds in itself no rightful assignable analogy of proportion-
1 
ality". It is parabolic, in itself rightful and assignable to God, but
so full of meaning that it surpasses itself.
All this concerns cataphatic theology and the positive content 
of revealed truth. There is also an apophatic theology which knows God 
by negation - not only in natural theology where it consists in declaring 
that Grod is like nothing created - but also a form of knowledge or wisdom 
of a higher order which, presupposing the positive content of revealed 
truth, yet goes beyond it in myscital experience. "Goes beyond!" Not 
in content, but in its way of apprehension. Nothing is attained in con- 
templation that is not already known in dogmatic formulations of revealed 
truth. But whereas these know God in Himself,but at a distance, mystical 
contemplation, overpassing concepts at a distance, enters by love into 
union with God. It does not destroy conceptual ideas but simply trans- 
cends them - uniting ideas with reality and directly experiencing God, in 
whom subject and object, existence and intelligibility, subsist in 
soveriegn simplicity and unity. This is the highest r^ach of the human 
spirit elevated by grace, in history.
For both the knowledge of faith and of mystical contemplation,
1 Ibid, p.
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as well as for the beatific vision, the sanctifying grace of supernatural 
charity and the inhabitation of the triune Sod is necessary. Such grace 
creates in us a complete organism of supernatural energies - faith, hope, 
ths gifts of the Holy Ghost, the seven gifts of wisdom, and the infused 
moral virtues. Indeed, it makes us connatural with God and participants 
of the diviaejnaturs. But how can a finite creature "participate" in 
divinity? It is "formally" or by intention, one of the two forms of 
existence (the other being entitative). This is the crownjof the life of 
grace, which - though the highest degree of knowledge - is uncommiaioable, 
as God is the immediate actuation of our intelligence without intermediate 
ideas.
"Purely and perfectly spiritual, fr«e from all egotism, as from 
"every vestige of the 'animal 1 or 'biological 1 (I mean by the word 
"a life still centered round the interests of the individual and 
"the species), such a love, in which two natures are one spirit, 
"two persons one love, is inseparable from the penetrating savours 
"of a wisdom which in itself is in some manner substantial, and 
"from an experiencing knowledge of the divine persons. Thus it 
"carried the human being to the highest degree of knowledge which 
"is accessible here on earth".^
(it may be parenthetically noted here, before further exposi- 
tion or criticism, that Niebuhr's basic disagreement with Maritain, 
succinctly put, is simply that he would deny there is any love or any 
knowledge "purely and perfectly spiritual, free from all egotism". And 
he would doubtless add that the very pretention tolsuch excellence is the 
most decisive evidence of its untruth.)
1 Ibid, pp. 470-471.
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The vital factor - we may now observe - in this comprehensive 
thomist construction of the edifice of knowledge, rising from the sense* 
by degrees of abstraction until it is crowned (with the aid of revela- 
tion and grace) by the knowledge of God as He is in Himself, is that a 
straight line runs through it, each level demanding and receiving com- 
pletion from the one immediately above; science asking for philosophy, 
philosophy for revelation and faith, faith tor mystical union. The 
distinguishing deature of the relation between the four degrees of 
knowledge is , in other words, continuity.
The thomist confidence and claim in behaaf of reason and 
rational man is subject, as we have seen, to very definite qualifica- 
tions. They may be summarized here:
(1) All being is not reason, pure form or pure act.
(2) Knowledge is itself a kind of being, but it is, except for know- 
ledge of knowledge, of extra^meuotal being.
(3) Truth is conformity of the intelligence to the (extrarmental} 
thing.
(4) The mind is confronted by both sub-intelligible and super- 
intelligible realities. Corporeal natures below us refuse 
to surrender to us their specific, material determinations. 
Pure spirits and God are above us and can be known only by 
analogy.
(5) Reason must be completed by revelation.
(6) Salvation is not merely by knowledge and wisdom; power and 
grace are necessary.
(7) Knowledge is abstraction. It requires completion in the grace 
of charity and in the beatific vision, wherein subject and 
object are united as one spirit.
(8) God cannot be seen immediately except in the beatific vision, 
and then not exhaustively.
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Thus thomism, if a rationalism, is a qualified one. Yet, it is 
a rationalism. Whatever the qualifications with regard to reason, the 
following considerations indicate the extent of the thomist claims in 
its behalf:
(1) Reason is the heart of the imago del.
(2) It is uncorrupted, though wounded by deprivation, in the fall.
(3) The natural law is absolutely dependable (a point to be treated in 
the next section).
(4) Reason, though requring revelation, regulates so to speak the 
entire structure.
(5) Reason is in no sense contradicted, but simply confirmed and 
extended, by revelation.
(6) There is absolute certainty in both the deliverances of reason 
and in the deposit of revelation (which theology rationally 
explicates in infallible church dogmas).
(7) The beatific vision is a seeing of 3od - to be sure in love - 
but nevertheless primarily a seeing. Its character as seeing 
is shown by the fact that it precludes activity of every kind, 
including the loving service of Sod's creatures.1
(8) Christian truth is something that can be discerned and accepted 
as propositions that are true, or in modern parlance - 
non-existentially. They are there, to be observed and perhaps 
assented to; they may or may not be inwardly appropriated.
It may be said at once that Niebuhr would agree with all the 
thomist limitations on reason - while interpreting some in his own way, 
and adding others - and would disagree with every one of the thomist 
claims in its behalf just enumerated. However, before directly juzta- 
posing the two views on the quest for truth, we must go back, to take as
1 Ibid, p. 469.
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it were a running start, by reviewing and further developing Niebuhr's 
idea of reaaon and revelation.
Man, for Niebuhr, it a unity of nature and spirit created in 
the image of God, a creature who has misused his freedom to deface but 
not destroy his entire essential nature. He is (as always) able to 
know in part, the objectively real world of nature, history and God. 
But his vision, particularly of the latter two, has been blurred by sin. 
Therefore, both because oi finiteness and because of sin, further 
special help from God is required.
The distinction between natural and historical knowledge 
(including at its outer limit confrontation with Gou) is fundamental. 
For the fall has not seriously affected man's capacity for the first, 
thoughjlt has for the second.
Niebuhr invokes Jesus' words "the face of the sky" and "the 
signs of the times" to point to the difference between the knowledge 
of nature and the knowledge of history. Discerning"the face of the 
sky" is a process of knowing in which the mind is at the centre, while 
the self withjits anxieties is on the circumference. Here, therefore, 
man «ay approach that objectivity - that is to say, honestly and 
accurately - which is the regulative principle and ideal of all know- 
ledge. A mistake may be made, as man is finite and not omniscient. 
But it is not likely to be made because of "interest" or egoistic 
corruption. Discerning "the signs of the times" is, on the other hand, 
a process of knowing in which the total self, with its anxieties, is at 
the center, while the mind is now on the circumference. Here, again,
GXVIII
mistakes may be made which are due to ignorance of the mind and finite 
limitation. But they may also be due to a "holding of the truth in 
unrighteousness".
"There is thus a reliability in our knowledge of the 'lace of 
"the sky 1 which is practically unattainable in our discernment of 
"the 'signs of the times'. 'Signs of the times' include all forms 
"of historical, in contrast to natural, knowledge. To discern the 
"signs of the times means to interpret historical events and values 
"The interpretation of history includes all judgements we make of 
"the purpose of our own actions and those of others: it includes 
"the assessment of the virtue of our own and other interests, both 
"individual and collective: and finally it includes our interpre- 
tation of the meaning of history itself".*
HthrSoureft^ -Gen-ter-^nd lad.
2 
Philosophy is on the "border-line" between natural and his-
torical knowledge. In so far as it faces towards the facts of nature, 
it may partake of the character of natural knowledge; though the moment 
facts of nature begin to be interpreted in their implication for man the 
distinctive objectivity and certainty of naturalknowledge is qualified. 
In so far as it confronts the question of the meaning of human existence, 
it partakes of the character of historical knowledge and is subject to 
the peril of egoistic corruption. Manjoay know that life points to a 
fuller disclosure and completion of meaning from beyond itself, and thus 
may expect a Christ. But they also prematurely complete that meaning 
around themselves or some extension of themselves. Therefore, when the 
true Christ comes He is rejected, except by those who in faith think 
beyond themselves by grace and know that Jesus, who vindicates Grod with- 
out including any man in that vindication, is the Christ.
1 Discerning, the Signs of the Times, p. 2.
2 Ibid, p. 7.
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The knowledge of history and of God teeing subject not merely to 
the limitations of the mind but also to corruptions of the heart, it 
follows that historical error is overcome - insofar as it is overcome - 
partly by increased knowledge, but also by the vanquishment of the pride 
of the heart. Niebuhr admits this is not a new insight; but he thinks 
that "little has/been done to estimate the moral as distinguished from the
intellectual factors which are involved in our errors of historical
1 
judgement". The marxists have made some contribution by their notion
of "ideological taint"; but have vitiated their own point by regarding 
the taint as due to finiteness, and by restricting it to the bourgeois 
foe. It is a uniquely Christian insight that allows the foil apprecia- 
tion of both the intellectual and the moral factors in historical error.
The paradox of grace - that God's power is in us and yet against 
us - in terms of the problem of truth, means that we do and yet do not 
have it. "The truth, as it is contained in the Christian revelation, 
includes the recognition that it is neither possible for man to know the 
truth fully nor to avoid the error of pretending that he does... The
very apprehension of this paradox is itself an expression of the two-
2 
fold aspect of grace. It is a thought beyond all human thought..."
We must pause for a careful look at this "thought beyond all human thought'
Quite clearly, the thought which recognises the limits of human 
thought is beyond other human thought and peculiarly transcendent. But 
whether it is also beyond "all 1* human thought is another question.
1 Ibid, p. 10.
2 Human Destiny, p. 217.
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Niebuhr quotes Tillich approvingly aa arriving
"at a formal transcendence over the ambiguity of all historical 
"truth by the following logic: 'The doctrine of the character of 
"knowledge as a decision, like everything that makes truth relative, 
elicits the objection that this doctrine makes itself relative and 
thus refutes itself... What is true, however, of all human know- 
ledge cannot be true of the knowledge of knowledge, otherwise it 
"would cease to have universal significance. On the other hand, 
"if an exception be admitted, then for one bit of reality the 
"equivocal character of being is broken*., it that possible! It 
"would be impossible if the removalof the ambiguity of existence 
"were to occur at any place in existence. Whatever stands in the 
"context of knowledge is subject to the ambiguity of knowledge. 
"Therefore, such a proposition must be removed from the context of 
"knowledge... It must be the expression of the relation of know- 
ledge to the Unconditioned... The judgment that is removed from 
"ambiguity... can be only the fundamental judgment of the relation- 
"ehip of the Unconditioned to the conditioned... The content of 
this judgment is just this* - that our subjective thinking never 
can reach the unconditioned Truth... This judgement ie plainly 
the absolute judgement which is independent of ell ite fomt of 
"expres&ion, even of the one by which it ie expressed here* It is 
"the judgement which constitutes truth as truth."!
Niebuhr call e this "a precise formulation of the ultimate self-trans-
2 
cendence of the human spirit", in philosophical terms which deal with
the problem of finiteness and not of sin. If the aspect of Bin be 
included in the formulation of the problem as Niebuhr het included it, 
the terms would be different but the point the same, he says. Thus 
Tillich' s formal transcendence over the ambiguity of historical truth 
could be equated with hie own "'perfection' before the fall... which
fcoxKXtj; hovers ae a possibility but not a& an actuality over all action1*.
and which, if realifced at all, "belongs to the realm of 6racfc"^
Although I am fairly certain I agree with what Niebuhr and 
Tillicfc are trying to say, I do not believe they have succeeded in say-
1 From the Interpretation of History, pp. 169-170. Niebuhr quotes 
this in Human Destiny, pp.
2 Ibid. Human Destiny, p. 218.
3 Ibid, p. 218.
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iag it. I do, ia fact, think that they have violated their ownjprin- 
ciples. They have made here a necessarily abortive attempt to ration-
  :  . ''  i • >v '. ..
alise the biblical paradox. For, to claim "that for one bit of reality 
the equivocal character of being is broken" is to forsake dialectical
logic; to hold that there is at any point a formal, even if not rotter-
/ .., .
ial, transcendence over the ambiguity of all historical knowledge is to 
relapse into thomist principles and a thomist dissolution of the 
dialectic.
The necessity for a dialectical logic is given, as I understand 
iti in the double fact that there is not only continuity between God and 
man as imago dei, but also - between God as the Creator and man as 
creature - a quantitative discontinuity, and - between God as Holy and 
man as sinful - a qualitative discontinuity. Tillich, in treating the 
problem in terms of finiteness, has ignored the fact of quantitative 
discontinuity; and, in claiming formal transcendence over historical 
ambiguity and the possibility of making "the absolute judgement", has 
denied the fact of quantitative discontinuity. Niebuhr, in hie notion 
of perfection before the fall, ignores the fact that even here there 
would be quantitative discontinuity.
The situation, therefore, is that though, as Niebuhr eays,
"the real dialectic of the conditioned and the Unconditioned... is taken
1
seriously... only in the Christian faith", it is not taken with suffi- 
cient seriousness either by Tillich or himself - at least, so far as 
their formulation of the problem under discussion is concerned. The
1 Ibid, p. O18.
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"truth" is that there is no point where nan does not stand in, and under, 
God - both by reason of finiteness and of fin. Is thit statement itself 
"true"? Yes, and no. *e can say that and nothing more. It is a 
truth that we hold, not as formally absolute and materially relative - 
there is in any case no form without content - but a truth we have by 
faith - certain and yet uncertain. I see no possibility, and no 
desirability, of refusing to apply to the "final" truth the same dialec- 
tic "having and not having" which Niebuhr himself has put forward with 
such power. Nor can I believe he ever really intended otherwise. If 
he diet, he erred and violated hie own principle. It he did not, then 
let him reconsider the formulation which, in that case, misstates his 
real position.
The principle - that we have and yet do not have the truth - is 
the only possible ground, Niebuhr thinks, for the practice of toleration. 
There is a double test of tolerance: the holding of convictions and the 
spirit of mercy toward those who disagree. To hold convictions is to 
believe one has the truth. To have the spirit of mercy toward those 
who disagree ie to recognize one does not have it in any simple sense 
and to realize the majesty of truth. A simple having of the, truth leads 
to fanaticism. A simple not-having leads to scepticism and nihilism* 
Speaking historically, Catholicism is intolerant in principle; the 
Reformation ie often intolerant in fact, contrary to its principle; and 
the Renaissance has been tempted to scepticism and often illustrates the 
claim of Gilbert Chesterton that tolerance is the virtue of people who do 
not believe anything. None has altogether realized the two-fold necess-
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ity of responsibility toward the truth and generosity toward those who 
differ from us about what it is.
There have been offences on all sides. But since Catholicism 
is intolerant in principle and we are here Distinguishing Niebuhr's atti- 
tude from it, a further illustrative word about the results must be added.
Niebuhr refers to Erich Przywara's discussion of how the 
Dominican order became the chief instrument of the medieval inquisition, 
despite the fact that the great Dominicans w«re personally humble men, and 
quotes his defense: "The Dominican type regards itself as entrusted by an 
inscrutable providence with the sacred guardianship of the one Tirnth in the
midst of the world... Troth remote from all fluctuations due to indivi-
1 
duality and existence". Then Niebuhr observes:
"The difficulty with this essentially high-minded justification 
Nof the inquisition is that it does not understand that the one 
"everlasting truth of the gospel contains the insight that mere men 
"cannot have this truth 'remote from all functions due to individuals 
"ity and existence 1 . This error is the root of all inquisitions".2
 
We are now in a position to summarize Niebuhr's views on reason, 
revelation and the quest for truth, and at the same time to relate them 
directly to Maritain's.
(l) Both men have what - described philosophically - would be called a 
realist metaphysic and a critically realist epistemology. There is an 
objectively real world of nature, history, and God, which we can know in 
part.
1 Przywara, Polarity, p. 106, quoted by Niebuhr, Human Debtiny, pp.221- 232
2 Human Destiny, pp. 221-222.
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(2) They agree and differ as to the implications, for the problem of 
truth, of human finitenesB and sin.
They would agree that error in natural knowledge..is due almost wholly 
to finitenese. And further, both would say that in historical knowledge 
and ia the knowledge of God there is an incompleteness which requires 
revelation. But Uaritain regards error in historical knowledge as due to 
the difference between essence and existence, and the opaqueness of 
materiality; and error injiivine knowledge as due to the super-intelligibi- 
lity of the Deity. The logical implicate of this is that revelation need 
only complete what is lacking in reason. Niebuhr, on the other hand, 
thinks that error about proximate historical issues and about the Center, 
Source and End of history ie not fco much rooted in finite limitation as 
in our holding the truth in unrighteousness. There is thus for him not 
only an incompleteness that must be completed but also a sin that must 
be purged.
Niebuhr*s God is more transcendent than Maritain's, and finiteness 
is a more serious obstacle to the knowledge of Him. This accounts for 
whatever difference there is in their notions about "the mode of signifi- 
cation" of the divine. They agree that all human language is proportion- 
ate to creatures, not Creator. Maritain insists, however, that there 
are comcepts whose ananoetic significance is intrinsically and formally 
accurate as descriptions of God, and that there are other concepts whose 
ananoetic value, though metaphorical or parabolic, are yet rooted in a 
determinable analogy of rightful proportionality, end, being determin- 
able, thus distinguished from myth which has "no rightful assignable
cxxv
1
analogy of proportionality". Nicbuhr agrees that religious notions may 
be essentially true. But he denies that they can be literally true or 
possess a Hdeterminable analogy of rightful proportionality". A case in 
point is the interpretation^ the nature of Ghribt. Orthodoxy (perhaps 
for historically necessary reasons , in opposing heresy) has attempted to 
define the divinity and the humanity of Christ, and to assert that ie 
obviously impossible logically - namely, that the Unconditioned can become 
conditioned without ceasing to be Unconditioned. Thus the significance 
of Christ is supposedly grasped in rational categories , whereas His signi- 
ficance is precisely that He transcends all categories and should therefore 
rather be regarded as a symbol of the divine ground of being and meaning.
But if God is quantitatively more discontinuous with man as creature,
than 
for Niebuhr a* for Uaritain, He is also, according to Niebuhr, qualitatively
discontinuous. Man is not only ignorant and his concepts radically defi- 
cient to God; he is wilfully (if not wholly consciously) blind to the 
truth. He both egoistically conceives and completes meaning from the 
standpoint of the self as center. He invariably inclines to equate his 
truth with the Truth. Reason is therefore both incomplete, and submerged 
in idolatry so that revelation must and does contradict it.
Thus, whereas for Maritain there are truths about God which man holds 
with absolute certainty by his unaided reason, and further truths which he 
holds by faith from revelation, also with absolute certainty, there are, 
for Niebuhr - who regards absoluteness as a category of divinity, not 
humanity - no infallible proofs of reason and no infallible dogmas of
1 Tne of Knowledge, p. 300.
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revelation. There is only God's truth spoken to man in his misery and 
aspiration, partly relativized and partly corrupted, ^apprehended inward- 
ly, and held, not with simple certeinty, but with certainty and uncertainty* 
in fear and trembling. There is certainty - sufficient to stake one's 
existence, and to preclude scepticism and nihilism. But there is also 
uncertainty - sufficient to admit the possibility of error, and to preclude 
intolerance.
(3) Niebuhr believes, then, that there is both mystery and meaning. And 
his major charge against thomism is that it resolves mystery into meaning 
too simply - inother words, that it pretends to know too much. He 
declares that there are three kinds of people: those who are not per- 
plexed (the rationalists), those who are perplexed unto despair (the 
sceptics); and those who areroerplexed, but not unto despair (the Christ- 
ians). There are not, he thinks, many sceptics in any age. Many people 
perhaps most, claim to know too much. Naturalists claim to know so much 
about the natural world that it ceases to point to any mystery beyond 
itself. ' Thomists claim to know too much both about existence, and the 
mysterious ground of existence. Niebuhr writes: "Any careful reading of 
the works of Thomas Aquinas must impress the thoughtful student with the 
element of pretention which informs the flowering of the Catholic faith 
in the 'golden* thirteenth century. There seems to be no mystery which is 
not carefully dissected, and no dark depth of evil which is not fully 
explained, and no height of existence which is not scaled. The various 
attfriutes of God are all carefully defined and related to each other. 
The mysteries of the human soul and spirit are mastered and rationally
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defined in the most meticulous terms. The exact line which markt.
JBBtice from injustice is known. Faith ane reason are so intermingled
1 
that the characteristic certainty of each is compoundeddwith the other".
The natural law, upon which the earthly life of man is based, is infall- 
ibly known; and likewise, by revelation, the realities of grace and the 
conditions of glory. But such claims are pretentious, obscuring the 
weakness of man. "The Christian faith (being more dialectical) is the
right expression of the greatness and the weakness of nan injrelation to
2 
the mystery and the meaning of life 1*.
(4) Whereas, for Marit*.in, the final fulfillment of life is the contemp- 
lative vision of God in which man by grace becomes a (formal) participant 
of the divine mture, the fulfillment of life, on Niebuhr's view, ia an 
active relation of love between man and God and between man and man. 
The thomist view, Niebuhr thinks, represents a triumph of Greek rational- 
ism over the Hebraic element in Christianity. It is, or ought to be, 
refuted and precluded by Christ who was an event in history, an act, and 
not merely a thought. The whole stuff of history was present in Christ; 
and belief in His resurrection synbolizes not that an immortal part of 
man is extracted from a mortal part for some sort of union with God - 
but rather that the essential nature of history - a unity of body and 
spirit, and a relation of life to life - is fulfilled at the "end". 
Thus, there will be not merely a seeing of God, but a living with God 
and with man.
1 Discerning the Si^ns of the Times, p. 158
2 Ibid, p. 172.
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b. The problem of the good.
In the quest for the good, as in the quest for truth, 
Maritain believes that a higher degree of realization is possible than 
Niebuhr will admit - with respect both to "natural" man and "redeemed" 
man.
In developing their respecitve notions about the possibili- 
ties and limits of nature and grace, it will be well to bear in mind 
what exactly jrhey mean by these two terms. While Niebuhr does not 
distinguish BO rigidly between the two areas asfflaritain, it is never- 
the less true to say that both men mean by nature that aspect of man's 
experience not directly affected by confrontation with Christ, while 
they understand the realm of grace to be that area of experience 
directly confronted by Christ and lifted up by His power for good.
There is aflaense in which the quest for the good is more com- 
pletely historical than the quest for truth. Niebuhr declares that
"it engages all human vitalities and powers more obviously than the
1 
intellectual quest". Maritain would express the idea by saying that
truth, particularly philosophical truth, bears only upon essence, not 
existence, and that intelligibility is co-extensive with immateriality. 
Since rational knowledge is of universals and history is individual 
and contingent, there cannot, strictly speaking, be knowledge of history; 
or rather, there can be knowledge of history only in so far as the 
succession of events receives form from ideas and shares in their
1 Human Destiny, p. 244.
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intelligibility. History as such, therefore, can be fathomed only by 
revelation and faith which "descends to the weakness and entanglements 
of specific, historic and contingent events... Faith.can achieve this, 
because at the same time it ascends into the absolute stability and 
simplicity, into the most concrete and existential individuality of the 
divine Self, and because it knows historical events not asja process of 
historical knowledge, but by means of the supra-historical, eternal,
prime Truth in Person, declaring itself to us and enlightening human
1 
hearts". Thus historical existence is opaque to reason, which is
ordered on the universal and eternally necessary. The point that the 
quest for the good is more completely historical than the quest for the 
truth is likewise suggested by the thomist distinction between the specu- 
lative and the practical judgment. The former proceeds solely from the 
intellect and bears upon truth as truth. The practical judgment is 
directed toward action from the beginning and proceeds conjointly from 
the intellect and the will. Its validity, therefore, depends not 
merely upon the correctness of reasoning but upon the right orienta- 
tion of the whole personality.
If, therefore, the quest of the good is more completely 
historicali we may expect that the principles of historical interpreta- 
tion held by each man will be still more decisively tested as we ana- 
lyse them in terms of this problem.
It will be convenient to conftont the respective views by
the Time, p.
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concentrating, within the realm of nature, upon the problem of natural 
law, and, within the realm of grace, upon the problem of what remains 
of sin in the redeemed. We shall speak here in individual terms, and 
then, in the next section, in collective terms.
It is to be expected that Maritain, who believes, unlike 
Niebuhr, that man's essense was not corrupted in the fall, should have a 
more unambiguous confidence in man's capacity to discern and to keep the 
so-called natural law. By natural law, Maritain means that part of the 
divine law open to the unaided reason, that ensemlbe of "the rights and 
duties which follow from the first principle: 'do good and avoid evil 1 ,
in a necessary manner, and from the simple fact that man is man, nothing
1 
else being taken into account". The content of natural law is general
and abstract moral principles. But since it is a part of the natural 
law itself that general principles must be determined or specified, 
certain further principles are derived which are known as the law of 
nations and as positive law. The law of nations follows, likejthe natural 
law itself, from the first principle in a necessary manner, but in this 
case|supposing certain universal conditions of fact in history. The 
positive law likewise follows from the first principle} but in a fashion 
contingent upon the situation within given communities. Obviously, on 
such a view, the validity of any law depends upon its rootage in the 
divine law - a notion which is the complete negation of dominant modern 
positivist conceptions.
1 The Rights of Man, p. 39.
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The natural rights which follow in a necessary fashion from the 
fact that man is man include, aecording to Maritain, rights of the human 
person as such, rights of the civic person, rights of the social person.
Duties are correlative with tights, necessitating man's exercise 
of rights in a way attuned to the necessary ends of his being. In natural 
terms, this means moral achievementjclustered about the four cardinal 
virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance. All these virtues, 
while by no means always realized by men, are well within human capacities 
unaided by special grace.
Niebuhr's quarrel with natural law theories is not that there is 
no such thing as natural law and principles of justice or that these cannot 
be kept at all, but rather that such theories claim too much. Thus, an 
uncorrupted reason is supposed to discern self-evident truths. But "the 
fact that the content of the natural law as Catholicism conceives it 
differs so widely from the consent of the natural law as the eighteenth
century conceived it, though the contents of both are suppoeed to be
1 
'self-evident* truths of reason, must make the critical student critical".
No historical definition of even the most abstract principle can claim 
immunity from the limiting factors of finiteness and of sin. When 
Maritain admits the contingencies of positive law, Niebuhr agrees but 
insists that it is even more relative than is suggested by a theory which 
claims positive law as derived in a simple fashion from naturaljlaw.
When Maritain ascribes finality to natural law precepts themselves, Niebuhr
2 3 
flatly demurs. He describes a "descending scale of relativity".
1 The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, p. 69
2 See Human Destiny, p. 253.
3 The Children of Light and the GBildren of Darkness, p. 74.
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Moral principles, though not absolute as held by man, are more transcen- 
dent and valid thanjpolitioal ones; general political principles are mort 
valid than specific applications of these principles; and specific appli- 
cations may have greater validity than the interests of the forces in 
society which apply them. Yet such forces invariably claim the sanctity 
of the general principle to justify their ownjpower./
"There was a greater degree of validity in the ethical content 
Mof medieval natural law than in the social and political hegemony 
"of priests and landed aristocrats in the feudal society. And 
"there is more truth in the natural law as Jefferson conceived it, 
"than there is justice in the social hegemony of monopolistic 
"capitalism in our era, which maintains its prestige by appeals 
"to Jefferson's principles."-1-
It must be emphasised, however, that though Niebuhr insists on 
the relativity of all historical principles against thomists who tend to 
deny it, he also maintains against secular and Reformation relativists
v*ivi.
that there are transcendent, regulative nooss of conduct open to the so- 
called (tnaided reason. "The complex character of all historic concep- 
tions of justive thus refutes both relativists who see no possibility of 
finding valid principles of justive, and the rationalists and optimists
who imagine it possible to arrive at completely valid principles, free
2 
of every taint of special interest and historical passion."
Thomist natural law theories rest upon a rigid and mechanical 
distinction between natural and redeemed man, which Niebuhr challenges 
in itself. To suggest there is a virtue of the natural order and 
another virtue of the supernatural order is, he thinks, to obscure the
1 Ibid, p. 75.
2 Human Destiny, p. 256.
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fact that man is a unity of body and spirit the law of whose life at every 
point is love, and thus to incline to an easy conscience those who thinK 
natural man need seek merely justice. Love is not, to be sure, a simple 
possibility of earthly existence, but it is not for this reason irrelevant. 
Nor is it simply a higher principle man may live by in personal relations 
within the community of grace or beyond history in the Kingdompf God. 
It is the law of life, the completion and the negation of every lesser 
reality, the great truth incarnate in Christ which judges us and reduces 
us to contrition even as it beckons us onward and upward. There is there- 
fore no natural man who is entitled, on the basis of prudential calcula- 
tion of his own interests against others, to say, with a completely easy 
conscience, "this much and no more for you". There is no natural man, 
analysing his relation to war in terms which make it simply just or unjust, 
who may say, "I can participate in this just war with a completely clear 
conscience 1*. The situation is always, for Niebuhr, much more complex 
than that. "The simple fact that man is man" is not really so simple.
"One of the facts about man is that his vitalities may be 
"elaborated in indeterminate variety. That is the fruit of his 
"freedom. Not all these elaborations are equally wholesome and 
"creative. But it is very difficult to derive 'in a necessary 
"fashion' the final rules of his individual and social existence. 
"It is this indeterminateness and variety which makes analogies 
"between the 'laws of nature* in the exact sense of the words and 
"the laws of human nature so great a source of confusion. It is 
"man's nature to transcend nature and elaborate his own historical 
"existence in indeterminate degree".^
This finally postulates the necessity of perfect love as alone capable 
1 The Childrenjof Light and the Children of Darkness, p. 78.
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of fulfilling human possibilities. Thus is precluded sealing off a natural 
dimension of experience to be judged according to its own principles of 
justice.
There is* then, for Niebuhr as well as for Maritain, an area of 
experience not direotly confronted by Christ which yet has possibilities; 
but the pobsibilities of this "natural" area are, for Niebuhr, neither so 
high in knowledge or virtue, nor so separate from the realm of grace, as 
for Maritain.
Neither thinker, however, believes that the highest possibilities 
of history lie within the realm of nature, but in the realm of grace. 
It will therefore be necessary to consider this crucial area with the 
utmost care.
In the fall, according to liaritain, man turned from God his 
final end, and lost his ordination toward and capacity for the eternal 
(though not for the natural). This was mortal sin - the ultimate, 
constituting form of sin. Henceforth of himself he was lost. Only a 
further activity of God could restore fcan to his former capacity- This 
further activity takes place in Christ and in His church, offering to man 
the sanctifying grace of charity - the ultimate, constituting form of 
justification - which regenerates from within and restores man to con* 
naturality with God. Faith or the acceptance of God's grace in Christ 
is a prerequisite of salvation, but it is not in itself xsalvation. 
Rather, it must be completed by charity, from which flow good works. It 
is possible for man - having received redemption foom aortal sin - to fall 
again and lose sanotifyi*g grace. But it is also possible for man - 
having received forgiveness and sanctifying grace - to walk henceforth
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without mortal sin, if not without venial Bin or incidental impunities. 
Thus, according to thomiem, the redeemed man may be "fornially11 sinless 
yet "materially" sinful, but not, as with Luther - who did not admit a 
dietinction between mortal and venial sin - at once really sinful and
really justified. Maritain call* this Reformation principle "a fantaty
1 
of incurably nominalist theology which places opposites eide by
Since Niebuhr stands, broadly speaking, with Luther and the 
Reformation on this central issue, the debate between him and Maritain 
has reached its climax. Niebuhr asserts the necessity of grace for
salvation - nor merely "faith", which is subject to misconception as a
2 
work - but grace, both as power and as pardon to the end of history:
pardon as well as power, for not only is there no natural merit worthy 
of complete divine approval, but there is no grace as power which man 
cannot and does not make the basis of new pretension and sin. Thts is 
"redeemed" man at once sinful and righteous, sinful and justified.
The distinction between "sinful and righteous", and "sinful and 
justified" - whichis my own - points to the necessity of discu&aing this 
issue both from the standpoint of man's condition and of God's attitude 
toward that condition - a distinction (not always seen even by our two 
thinkers) the recognition of which may aid in clarification.
Regarding man's condition in grace: Maritain would like to 
refutt the doctrine that "redeemed" man is at once sinful and righteous 
(l) by making it mean at once "formally" sinful and "formally" righteous
1 Three Reformers, p. 177.
2 See, for instance, Human Destiny t pp- 186-187 (footnotes).
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(2) and by claiming that this is self-contradictory. But Luther and 
Niebuhr do not admit the formal and material categories (though, as we shall 
see in a moment, Niebuhr does distinguish between "in principle" and Hin 
fact"); and consequently they do not say, as Maritain believes, that man is 
sinful in so far as he is righteous and righteous in so far as he is sinful. 
That would indeed be self-contradictory, and would reduce paradox to 
absurdity. But dialectic or paradox is not contradiction; it is rather 
seeming contradiction made necessary by the complexity and depth of experience 
which defies precise description, a point which Maritain does not understand 
at all. As Niebuhr puts it: "It is not easy to express both these aspects 
of the life of grace, to which all history attests without seeming to offend 
the canons of logic. That is the reason why moralists have always found 
it rather easy to discount the doctrine of Ajustification by faith*. But 
here, as in many cases, a seeming defiance of logic is merely the conse- 
quence of an effort to express complex facts of experience. It happens to
be true to the facts of experience that in one sense the converted man is
1 
righteous and that in another sense he is not".
While Niebuhr does not agree that the redeemed man may be formally 
sinless end materially sinful, he does hold that thought or intention may 
be more pure than action. This ie the distinction he has in mind when he 
speaks of "in principle" and "in fact". He writes:
1 Human Destiny, pp. 124-125.
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"The important point,., ie whether the destruction of ein 
in principle 1 means that the power of inordinate self-love is 
"broken in fact. It is the thesis of St. Augustine and all the 
"catholic ages that this ie the case 0 and that residual sin 
"represents the eruption of vagrant desires and impulses which have 
"not yet been brought completely under the control of the central 
"will. The thesis is plausible enough: for if destruction of 
"'self-love 1 'in principle' does not mean 'in fact* in some basic 
"sense, what does it mean? Certainly there must be some facte 
"which reveal the new. principle by which the soul lives. Surely 
"there must be 'jfetffii meet for repentance'.
"But here the complexities of the moral life are obscured by 
"too simple statement of them. The actual situation is that man 
"may be redeemed from self-love in the sense that he acknowledges 
"the evil of it and recognizes the love of God as the only adequate 
"motive of conduct; and may yet be selfish in more than an 
"incidental sense".
The issue, then, is nothing less than this: whether, even by 
a merit of grace, the contradiction between the divine and human will 
can be healed in hiatory. Maritein's answer i& "Yes". Miebuhr's / 
answer is - "Yes and No".
Regarding, not man's condition, but God's attitude toward 
man's condition: Maritain would insist that God does not and cannot 
call ri&hteoub what is unrighteous and that charity must be the ultimate 
constituting form of justification. Niebuhr would maintain that God 
"imputes righteousness" to us and that we possessp.t only by faith. We 
must analyse the meaning of these views.
If, as Niebuhr maintains, man hae not the requisite charity in 
history tqkerit salvation, theryit is clear that, so far as God accepts 
us, it must be on some other basis than our charity. But what does
"imputed righteousness" mean? If, by it, Niebuhr means, as I think he 
-__
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means, simply that God continues to treat with us despite our Bin - thui 
displaying toward us not merely judgment but mercy - then I agree. But 
if he means, as it is my impression Luther tended to mean, calling what 
is sinful righteous, then I most emphatically disagree. For it seems 
to me that charity must be, as Maritain insists, the ultimate constituting 
form of justification, if God ie holy.
The truth in the respective positions, then, seems to me to be 
this: (l) So far as history is concerned, Niebuhr is right that man 
requires, if he ie to be accepted at all, an acceptance despite sin and 
the lacl^of charity.
(2) But if God is holy, He cannot be satisfied with a man who 
remains sinful. We must, therefore, believe that God will continue to 
work|with us, through eternity, until we fulfil His purpose in us. 
Thus Maritain is right to insist that charity must be the ultimate, 
constituting form of justification.
Our concern is with hi&tory. With respect to it, we must 
hold with Niebuhr that there is no discipline of nature or merit of 
grace by which man can confront the divine Judge with an easy conscience, 
Man, even redeemed man, is and remains to the end of hi&tory, at once 
sinful and righteous, sinful and justified (accepted), 
c. The problem of the kingdom.
If the quest for the good i& (because it engages most fully 
the powers of man) the most completely historical category, it may be 
regarded, particularly as pursued among human collectives, as roughly 
synonymous with the historical quest for the "Kingdom".
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Within historical collectives, Maritain distinguishes more 
rigidly than Niebuhr between the temporal and the spiritual orders, as 
well as claims more for the achievement in each sphere. Nevertheless, 
each recognizes in his own way both "worlo" and "church". The purpose 
of this part will be to develop further their respective notion^about 
the world and the church in relation to the Kingdom, and to consider 
especially the points of divergence between them. Broadly and tenta- 
tively, the essential difference between them may be said to be, in the 
temporal order, that for Maritain there are absolute principles infallibly 
known and analogically applied, while for Niebuhr there are absolute 
principles dialectically known and dialectically applied; and, in the 
spiritual order, that for Maritain the church is that place in human 
society where sin is overcome both in principle and in fact, while for 
Niebuhr, it is that place where sin is known to persist in fact on every 
level, and thus is overcome in principle.
The temporal order is rooted in man's so-called natural endow- 
ment, for thomism, and corresponds to "the things that are Caesar's 11 . 
It drav;s its unity from the natural catholicity of reason and the prin- 
ciples of the natural law. The spiritual order is rooted in the so- 
called supernatural addition, lost in the fall, but restored by grace, 
and corresponds to "the things that are God's". It draws its unity 
from the supernatural catholicity of grace. The/common good of civiliza- 
tion is the right earthly life of man discoverable by reason and propor- 
ticTate to man's natural endowment. The common good of the church is 
eternal life and union with the triune God. ""these are two specific
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ends, clearly distinct; they differ aslheaven differs from earth." Thei
spiritual order is obviously the more ultimate one, and thus the temporal 
is subordinate to it. Yet the subordination is only indirect, as the 
temporal has its own proper and so-far autonomous end. There is "progress M 
in both orders. The progress within the temporal order ie a double one: 
eo far as there is sin, there is movement toward the kingdom of perdition: 
so far ae there is conformity to the divine will, there is movement toward 
the Kingdom^f God. The progress within the spiritual order is, on the 
other hand, a simple movement toward the Kingdom of God- Indeed, the 
spiritual order or church is already the Kingdom of God, but in earthly 
pilgrimage. Thus "the Christian must needs stave as far as possible to 
realize in this world (perfectly and absolutely in the case of himself as 
an individual: in a relative mode and according to the concrete ideal which
belongs to eachfaifferent age with regard to the world itself) the truths of2 ' 
the Gospel".
There are, then, the two orders of the temporal and the spititual, 
rooted in the two dimensions of man's being. The essential nature of these 
orders, and the principles of their interrelationship, are unchanging. 
But, says Uaritain, actual expression or realization of the interrelation- 
ship of the two orders and of the exigencies of a temporal Christian order'is
3
"analogical, not univocal" This is to say merely that, though the prin- 
ciples are always the same, their realisation varies under varying conditions.
1 Scholasticism and Politics, p» 179
2 True Humanism, p. 103.
3 Ibid, p. 202.
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Thus, whereas in medieval Christendom the temporal refraction of the Gospel 
took one form, it must in modern times take another. By invoking the 
central thonist principle of analogy here, he means to refute at once Na 
univocal inertia which clings precisely to what is dead and gone..." and
"a whole ideology of revolutionary destruction, which rises in opposition
1 
to the very idea of Christendom".
It will be interesting to describe Maritain's conception of the 
regulative ideal and form of a new Christendom, particularly as that 
differs from the regulative ideal and form of medieval Christendom.
"Tor myself I hold that the historical ideal of a new 
"Christendom, of a new Christian temporal order, while founded on 
"the same principles (analogically applied) as that of the Middle 
"Ages, will imply a secular Christian, not a consecrational, 
"conception of the temporal order... the idea at its heart... will 
"not be that of God's holy empire over all things, but rather that 
"of the holy freedom of the creature whomkrace unites to God."2
We may draw out the meaning of these words at five points.
(l) Concerning the unity of the temporal order. Inpedieval Christendom
the unity of the temporal order was sought on the highest level of the
person; in fact, in the spiritual order itself. This implied doctrinal
agreement and political cohesion, and reduced diversity to a minimum.
In the new Christendom, on the other hand, the unity of the temporal order
will reside in that order itself, thus obviating the necessity of doctrinal
agreement and permitting tolerance - not to be sure, he says, dogmatic
tolerance which thinks liberty or error a good thing in itself, but civic
tolerance which recognizes the dignity of man and the evil of persecution.
1 Ibid, p. 202.
2 Ibid, p. 156.
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(2) Concerning the role of the temporal. Whereas medieval Christendom 
tended to regard the temporal as having a purely instrumental value, the 
new Christendom must recognize it as possessing its own proper, intermed- 
iary and infravalent end. This implies an autonomy of the temporal, and 
a cultural differentiation and pluralism, far greater than in medieval 
times.
(3) Concerning the use of political power. Expressive of the minister- 
ial and instrumental character of the whole temporal order in medievalism 
was the use of political coercion/for the spiritual good, individual and 
social. The new Christendom will insist upon the freedom of the indivi- 
dual from coercion, while the temporal order will serve the spiritual by 
pursuing its own proper end and developing the conditions for a rightly 
human life upon earth.
(4) Concerning the basis of feierarchical function and authority. In 
medievalism the basis was one of essential disparity between the leaders 
and the led - all human to be sure - but with the led in a position of 
natural inferiority. The new Christendom will be characterized by an 
essential parity of men bound to a common work, who choose their own 
leaders, and by a conception which sees authority as derived from God and 
going, AS it were, through the people to reside in their leaders.
(5) Concerning the common aim. The old Christendom sought a temporal 
order explicitly devoted to Christ by the labor of baptized mea and 
baptized polity. The new must seek an order implicitly devoted to 
Christ by its emphasis, in personal relations and in social structures, 
upon the dignity of man. Such a temporal order can at one and the same
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time recognize the lordship of Christ and include in its membership those 
who can do no more thanjaffirm the dignity of man. Within such a
the church, that is the Roman Catholic Church, would insist upan its pri-
1 
maey as the true church. But other religious families would be free;
and influence in the purely temporal would be indirect, through lay men 
and lay-orders, rather than direct, clerical and ecclesiastical.
The new Christendom of which Maritain speaks does not, needless 
to say, exist even inchoately to-day, and may not be realized to-morrow or 
even the next day. That does not matter, so far as the principles which 
ought to govern it are concerned. What he has sketched is the outline of 
that temporal system whose animating form will be Christian and will 
correspond to the climate of the historical epoch which will ensue when 
the self-liquidation of modern errors shall have taken place.
The realizations this temporal order will be, as every such 
order, a relative achievement, a refraction of the Gospel. Its good will 
be the earthly good of man under a special "historic heaven", even though 
that good itself will be elevated in its owrjorder by the grace which super- 
abounds in and through the souls of the faithful. Its evil f moreover, 
will be grave, and will stand beneath the divine judgment.
It is not, therefore, in the temporal but in the spiritual order 
that the highest possibilities of history are contained. "We must, then,
realize that the Church alone can keep in its purity the Grospel leaven...
2 
Everyone else corrupts it". The church is that place in history where
1 See, for instance, The Rights of Man, p. 17.
2 Three Reformers, p. 148.
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the contradiction between the divine arid human will has by grace been 
healed. It is not the Kingdom of God as it will be beyond history, for, 
though in essence supratemporal, it remains in a sense subject to finite- 
ness and in process. But the church is already the Kingdom of ^od in the
sense that it stands on the other side of sin, mediating judgment and
1 
grace to a sinful world. It reigns with Christ.
"Nature", considered from the standpoint of human collectivesi 
is, for Niebuhr, the realm of "justice". It is related to love, the 
ultimate principle, dialectically; that is, in terms of realization and 
contradiction. This is true both of the relation of the principles of 
justice to love, and of the structures of justice to love; though the 
principles of justice are more rational and transcendent than the struc- 
tures of justice, which more or less express the principles of justice 
within historical vitalities.
Principles of justice are approximations of the law of love in 
so far as they extend the sense of obligation toward other men (l) from 
immediately felt obligation to fixed principles of mutual support in law 
or custom (2) from intimate personal dealings to wider relations, either 
as discerned by the individual self or by the community. Principles of
justice contradict the law of love in so far as they presuppose and
a
organize strategies of egoistic concern; for whereas love is/perfect
harmony of life with life under the sovreignty of £od, justice is merely
1 Roman Catholics are not the only ones who hold a pretentious doctrine 
of the Cfcursh. Even Arnold Toynbee , in his great Study of History, 
seems inclined to underestimate ecclesiastical pride as an occasion 
for divine judgment upon history.
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a tolerable harmony. Thus, though Niebuhr recognizes transcendent prin- 
ciples of justice, he does not claim so much for them as Maritain. Ho 
summarizes his view in this way:
"the positive relation of principles of justice to the ideal 
"of brotherhood makes an ind&erminate approximation of love in the 
"realm of justice possible. The negative relation means that all 
"historical conceptions of ju&tice will embody some elements which 
Contradict the law of love. The interests of a class, the view- 
point of a nation, the prejudices of an age and the illusions of a 
"culture are consciously and unconsciously insinuated into the 
"norms by which men regulate their common life. They are intended 
"to give one group an advantage over another. Or if that is not 
"their intention, it is at least their unvarying consequence".1
The structures of justice, though approximations of the law of 
love, are also, and even more, contradictory to it than the principles of 
justice. For, while the principles are abstractly conceived, the struc- 
tures are historically concrete. Any human community is something more 
and something less than a construct of reason and conscience. Its 
"harmony" is a result of the interaction between ethical and legal prin- 
ciples and the coagulation of forces and vitalities. This is to say 
that communities are governed by power,* moral and physical. This power 
expresses itself as the means of organizing the community, and the balance 
of competing forces within the community. The peril and misuse of the 
first i* tyranny. The peril and misuse of the second is anarchy. 
Structures of justice can embody the principles of justice in indeterminate 
degree. Yet no system of justice can, sin presupposed, completely elim- 
inate the contradiction to brotherhood implicit in every actual manipula- 
tion of power.
1 Human Destiny, p. 256.
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The balance of power makes for justice in that it tends to pre- 
vent tyranny. But it is in|ltBelf an expression of conflict, covert and 
always potentially overt. It is a dispersion of forces which posits the 
necessity of a centre of power to organize the community. Thus^ the
centre of power or government "stands upon a higher plane of moral sanction
1 
and social necessity than... the balance of power". Yet government
itself is morally ambiguous in that, unchecked, it tends toward tyranny. 
This double character of government justifies the priestly sanctification 
and prophetic criticism of it in Scripture. It also necessitates demo- 
cratic government, which organizes the community, yet contains within its 
structure the right of control over and resistance to itself. The 
ambiguity of government is of course rooted in the double character of man. 
Considered from this standpoint: "Man's capacity for justice makes demo- 
cracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy
Z 
necessary".
Niebuhr' declares that thomism's rationalistic and moralistic 
errors incline it to underestimate the perils of anarchy and particularly 
of tyranny in society (a stricture even more true, he says, of both 
typical ancient and modern thought). "It (thomiem) does not comprehend 
that the justice and peace which the power of the state achieves is always
subject to some degree of corruption by reason of the inordinate character
3 
of this power, and the particular interests of the ruler".
It is evident, then, that Niebuhr 1 s view of "nature" differs
1 Ibid, p. 266.
2 The Children of Light and the Ghildrenof Darkness Forward XI.
3 Human Destiny, p. 275.
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from Maritain 1 s in that for him (l) nature and the realm of justice is 
not so distinct from grace (2) nature is related dialectically to grace 
(3) the principles of justice are not so transcendent (4) the structures 
of justice are less pure.
The disagrement between Niebuhr and Mar i tain is, if possible, 
still more fundamental with regard to the spiritual order or the church. 
For, whereas both recognize, however differently, the element of sinful 
contradiction in the temporal order, Maritain does not conceive the church 
as in any sense under judgment. Niebuhr states the difference btween the 
two views very precisely ... "the church was the historic locus where the 
contradiction between the historical and the divine was overcome in fact; 
rather than that locus where the judgment and mercy of God upon the
historical are mediated, and where, therefore, the contradiction of the
1 
historical and the holy is overcome in principle". The thomist and
Roman view sees the world in sin, but the church as standing with God 
over the world mediating His judgment &nd mercy, and not with the world 
under God. Such a conception of the church is, Niebuhr thinks, the 
quintessential sin which the prophets denounced in Israel.
This conception it the basis of the claim the Roman church makes 
for primacy, even in a pluralist society such asJMaritain sketches. Such
a claim is held by Maritain to be "but a simple consequence of ?;hat man
2 
owes to truth". But the identification of any human truth with the
 
Truth si at once a blasphemous pretension, and a position essentially
1 Ibid, p. 159.
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incompatible with a free society. That it is incompatible in principle is 
logically demonstrable; that it is incompatible in fact is demonstrable 
by means of reference to the history of Roman^intolerance. And no 
pleasantries about the "pluralist" historical ideal of the ne\nChristendom 
be allowed to obscure the fact.
The Roman combination of pretension to sanctity with immersion 
in ambiguity is nicely revealed by Maritain'e attitude toward historical 
compromise. Noting that certain critics have/deplored what they take to 
be the church's cynical "deals" with given states, he declares: "The 
Church must above all fulfill its own special task, and endure. It is 
Beside the point if the Church takes on the appearance of cynicism..."Now, 
Niebuhr would not level irrelevant, moralistic criticism at this attitude. 
He would simply insist that if Christ had pursued the same logic of the 
primacy of survival, there would have been no Cross; and that a church 
which puts the primacy upon historical survival is hardly entitled to 
claim the sanctity of Christ and His Cross. Indeed, the glaring incon- 
gruity between that Crose and a church whose historical "success" has been 
phenomenal, ought - one would suppose - to be apparent even to the saints.
The failure of the Roman church to conceive itself as standing 
under judgment end in need of mercy is for Niebuhr simply the final 
evidence of how "man's self-esteem resists that part of the Gospel which 
ie set against all human schievements". It may, therefore, be regarded 
as a disheartening revelation about man - even Christian man. But it is
riiM f-Tim^ f=>
Human Destiny, p. 147.
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also the validation of what Christianity says about man as a creature 
whose sin is to refuse to admit the incompleteness and the contradiction 
of his life on every level of existence, both individual and collective, 
temporal and spiritual. 
C. Summary and Conclusion.
1. Continuity, and continuity-discontinuity.
We are now in a position to summarize the two views of fiistory, 
and conclude. The crucial question betwen ostensibly religious and 
ostensibly irreligious interpretations of history is whether, ase. matter 
of fact, there is some sort of super-history to which history is related. 
The crucial question between religious interpretations like thomism and 
dialectic, which astume there to be such, is as to the exact nature of 
the relationship. The thomist answer to this question, as we have seen, 
is that the relationship is one of continuity at least between the faith- 
ful of the church and the Kingdom of God. The dialectical answer is, on 
the other hand, that the relationship is, at every point, one of 
continuity-discontinuity.
2. The "validation" of dialectic*
The problem of the "validation" of Christian truth is, as I 
understand it, a double one; for it must ask both what is Christian 
and what is true.
a. What is Christian is, of cour&e, determined by the object- 
ive nature of Christianity - which is quite independent of individual and 
corporate opinions about it. The objective nature of Christianity is the 
experience of a given community, moving toward and away from the central
CL
event in Christ. None of us graspswhat that objective nature is, in 
any simple sense, and there IB no way of doing so. The corporate 
judgment of the church, in so far as there is one, must certainly be 
regarded as having authority. But that authority cannot be thought 
infallible, nor beyond the ambiguity of finite judgments subject to sinful 
corruption. Neither can the corporate judgment of the church relieve 
the individual Christian of the responsibility of judging. Moreover, 
the judgment of the individual is itself inescapably existential. This 
is to say that one's conclusion about what is Christian is not and cannot 
be arrived at by a purely inductive process of thought, since every judg­ 
ment presupposes some criterion of judgment which must finally be rooted 
in a primordial decision.
For me , then, that is Chrifitian which belongs to the community 
of experience centering in Christ, - more particularly, as that is inter­ 
preted by St. Paul, in whose thought anet the whole biblical view of God 
and the world culminates in the paradox of judgment and mercy.
Christianity, thus understood, pronounces to man both a "Yes" 
and a "No". But its distinctive word ie "No", since man says "Yes" to 
himself.
Now, if this be a true view of Christianity, thomism cannot 
be an adequate expression of it. For it denies discontinuity and speaks 
a simple "Yes", at least to the redeemed man and the redeemed community. 
It may indeed be "the perennial philosophy", and possess^as I believe, 
it does possess - more coherence and relevance than any of its systematic 
alternatives. But it is also, as a pretentious rationalism, the most
1 Fof £. fa>milar view, see William Temple*^ Chribt.lanity-.ab an Inter ore- 01 Hifctor . ———————— ————————— * ——tory_. p. 9.
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perennial, plausible, pious, and perverse sanctification of historical 
ambiguity to be found in a field rich with possibilities. Dialectic, 
on the other hand, speaking both "Yes" and "No" to man at every point, 
is - so far and in this sense - an adequate expression of the Christian 
perspective.
b. Experiential.
The other aspect of this double question involved in a
'validation'of Christian truth concerns what is true- The more specific 
is&ue , in terms of the argument between thomism and dialectic on his­ 
torical interpretation, is the extent to which life can be fulfilled in 
history. Maritain believes it can be" essentially fulfilled. Niebuhr 
believes that it can and yet cannot be fulfilled.
At the risk of appearing naive - in reducing heretofore 
complicated and extended argument to the utmost simplicity and brevity - 
I should like to suggest it is quite obvious that life does not and 
cannot, in history, escape either finiteness (which both admit) or sin 
as serious contradiction of the divine will (which Maritain denies). 
One steady look, first at myself, then at my friende, the nations, 
western civilization, the churches, is sufficient, for me, to establish 
that. I really cannot imagine how any other view can be regarded as 
remotely plausible. But perhaps I speak as "natural" man and not 
with the perspective of "redeemed" man. 
3. The ta&k of the new synthesis.
If, hov/ever, I am correct in thinking the Christian inter­ 
pretation of history is that every moment of existence stands in, and 
yet under, £0d - in the full amplitude and profundity of those words;
CLII
and if, furthermore, that interpretation of history is true, certain 
vital implications seem to me to follow - both about the general relation 
of religion to culture, and about this issue in the world today.
It is, topegin with, clear that such an interpretation of 
history af lords a basis for cultural elaboration. If it is true that 
every moment of existence is rooted iryGod, then history must be regarded
as a compound of religion and culture, wherein religion is concerned with
1 
the meaning of life and culture with forms of its express,on. This
obviously contradicts those who make religion itself a form of culture 
and try to restrict it to churchly activity. Religion is not an isolated 
realm of esoteric discipline, but the dimension of depth in all exper­ 
ience J and there are not^two histories, on«jj» sacred and the other 
secular, but one history in which all cultural forms - intellectual, 
aesthetic, ethical, ecclesiastical - are equally significant religiously. 
Thus, 3od immanent as truth is the power of being or the essential content 
of thought; God immanent as beauty the content of art; God immanent as 
good the content of human relations; God immanent in the fullness of His 
being the conteni^of the church. In the intellectual, aesthetic, and 
ethical realms of experience, God - though indubitably present - may or 
may not be consciously regarded. What distinguishes the ecclesiastical, 
as an order of culture, is simply that there God is explicitly recognized 
as God, and there is sought, received, and adored.
1 For similar view4 see Paul Tillich's The RS3.ig.ious Situation,
T. S. Eliot's Notes towards the Definition of Culture, and Christopher 
Dawson's Religion and Culture.
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But it is equally clear that such an interpretation of history 
provides also a basis for criticism upon cultural elaboration. For, when 
Christianity declares that every moment of existence stands under God, it 
is aaying that God is more thanraan as creature and different from man as 
sinner; it is pointing to God as ultimate Being and Meaning above all 
cultural forms. Thus, God transcendent as truth becomes the basis of 
criticism upon thought, even as also He, transcendent as beauty, the good, 
and in the fulness of His being, becoines the basis of criticism upon the 
other realms of culture. From such a perspective, idolatrous claims in 
behalf of any human enterprise can be exposed; for it is understood, in 
principle at least, that both the incompleteness which marks and the sin 
which disfigures all things human must be resolved at the last by God's 
sovereign power and purpose.
I venture to suggest that it is only by recognizing this dia­ 
lectical relation of Christianity and culture that the world can find the 
health it now desperately but abortively seeks.
The thomist synthesis of medieval Christendom broke down pri­ 
marily because it partially misconstrued both the justificationist and 
the sanctificationist side of the biblical paradox of ^race. The 
Renaissance distilled from the old synthesis the sanctificationist bide, 
and the Reformation the justificationist side, of the paradox. And 
although each discerned possibilities beyond the scope of the old 
synthesis, the price has been cultural chaos and an ever-growing 
separation of form from content* We require, therefore, a new synthesis 
which will unite Christianity and culture once more in terms of the two
GLIV
aspects of grace, but in a way that gives full emphasis to both aspects 
Such a synthesis cannot be, as Maritain and the thoraists imagine, a 
rational synthesis. It can only be a dialectical synthesis, which at 
once synthesises and recognizes that synthesis is finally beyond the 
range of human powers.
The need for such a dialectical synthesis is discerned by 
1
many. Its principles have been sketched already by some, Niebuhr 
himself has, one might say, elaborated the relation of the Christian 
faith to the ethical realm of culture maximally, to the intellectual
realm partially, to the ecclesiastical realm minimally, and to the
2 
aesthetic realm not at all. It is only too apparent, however, that,
whatever the strength of contemporary thinkers and leaders, the con­ 
struction of the new synthesis must await the historically propitious 
moment - the fullness of time, as it were. Meanwhile, we can^only 
work toward its realization, preparing the way.
1 See, for instance, John Baillie's What is Christian Civilization? 
for one of the most recent, penetrating, and balanced analyses of 
the relation of Christianity to civilization.
2 It has recently struck me how little concern has been shown by 
Protestant theologians - particularly those largely influenced 
by the Reformation - for the aesthetic realm of culture. It is 
therefore gratifying to see that Brunner, in his recently published 
first volume of Clifford lectures, Christianity and Civilization, 
devotes the last chapter to the problem.
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